X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fd1_both.c;h=4481c550511237a3a1be1f345975c827fa1077b8;hb=be88529753897c29c677d1becb321f0072c0659c;hp=e82590f911d6a981783de98deb748cab759644e7;hpb=7143acab25dc4b0dfa602b9b40c1783114aee193;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index e82590f911..4481c55051 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1
 /* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
 static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
 
-static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
 static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
 	unsigned long frag_len);
@@ -228,14 +227,14 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
 
 	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
-	if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
 		{
 		s->d1->mtu = 
 			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
 
 		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
 		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
-		if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
 			{
 			s->d1->mtu = 0;
 			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
@@ -264,11 +263,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			return ret;
 		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
 		}
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0);  /* should have something reasonable now */
-
 #endif
 
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
+
 	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
 			(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
@@ -468,20 +466,6 @@ again:
 	if (!s->d1->listen)
 		s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
 
-	/* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
-	 * this means that we don't need to retransmit of the
-	 * buffered messages.  
-	 * XDTLS: may be able clear out this
-	 * buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order
-	 * handshake message/record is received at the record
-	 * layer.  
-	 * XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to
-	 * know that change cipher spec and finished messages
-	 * have been received by the client before clearing this
-	 * buffer.  this can simply be done by waiting for the
-	 * first data  segment, but is there a better way?  */
-	dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
-
 	s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 	return s->init_num;
 
@@ -809,7 +793,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 		*ok = 0;
 		return i;
 		}
-	OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+	/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+	if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 
 	/* parse the message fragment header */
 	dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
@@ -881,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 
 	/* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 
 	 * handshake to fail */
-	OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+	if (i != (int)frag_len)
+		{
+		al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 
 	*ok = 1;
 
@@ -1385,7 +1380,7 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	return p;
 	}
 
-static unsigned int 
+unsigned int 
 dtls1_min_mtu(void)
 	{
 	return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /