X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=loginutils%2Fsu.c;h=de8c18d25e40ef1b26247078e9e756c7bed5909f;hb=c73b70c7013aa98a86653ad7e7d15bcca16622f2;hp=9a134dd88a32a47fb3a4ff6a0b70541d99c23829;hpb=06c0a71d2315756db874e98bc4f760ca3283b6a6;p=oweals%2Fbusybox.git

diff --git a/loginutils/su.c b/loginutils/su.c
index 9a134dd88..de8c18d25 100644
--- a/loginutils/su.c
+++ b/loginutils/su.c
@@ -5,13 +5,14 @@
  *  Licensed under the GPL v2 or later, see the file LICENSE in this tarball.
  */
 
-#include "busybox.h"
+#include "libbb.h"
 #include <syslog.h>
 
 #define SU_OPT_mp (3)
 #define SU_OPT_l (4)
 
-int su_main(int argc, char **argv)
+int su_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 {
 	unsigned flags;
 	char *opt_shell = NULL;
@@ -22,20 +23,18 @@ int su_main(int argc, char **argv)
 	const char *tty;
 	char *old_user;
 
-	flags = getopt32(argc, argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
-	argc -= optind;
+	flags = getopt32(argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
+	//argc -= optind;
 	argv += optind;
 
-	if (argc && LONE_DASH(argv[0])) {
+	if (argv[0] && LONE_DASH(argv[0])) {
 		flags |= SU_OPT_l;
-		argc--;
 		argv++;
 	}
 
 	/* get user if specified */
-	if (argc) {
+	if (argv[0]) {
 		opt_username = argv[0];
-//		argc--;
 		argv++;
 	}
 
@@ -45,13 +44,11 @@ int su_main(int argc, char **argv)
 		But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
 		in this case resort to getpwuid.  */
 		old_user = xstrdup(USE_FEATURE_UTMP(getlogin() ? : ) (pw = getpwuid(cur_uid)) ? pw->pw_name : "");
-		tty = ttyname(2) ? : "none";
+		tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2) ? : "none";
 		openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
 	}
 
-	pw = getpwnam(opt_username);
-	if (!pw)
-		bb_error_msg_and_die("unknown id: %s", opt_username);
+	pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username);
 
 	/* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL.  It may be NULL when NEW_USER
 	   is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), but that doesn't have
@@ -85,18 +82,19 @@ int su_main(int argc, char **argv)
 		   compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
 		   shell.  */
 		bb_error_msg("using restricted shell");
-		opt_shell = 0;
+		opt_shell = NULL;
 	}
 #endif
 	if (!opt_shell)
 		opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;
 
 	change_identity(pw);
+	/* setup_environment params: shell, clear_env, change_env, pw */
 	setup_environment(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, !(flags & SU_OPT_mp), pw);
 	USE_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(NULL);)
 
 	/* Never returns */
 	run_shell(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, opt_command, (const char**)argv);
 
-	return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	/* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */
 }