X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fx509%2Fx509_vfy.c;h=0a5dcbe2ab414f891afa3db031d981d5508131ff;hb=4b49bf6a93d1958513aff6a1254194fb581500cb;hp=db62c9f6a348cead99bae90c22fa592edab3a160;hpb=f684090cbe0706bcd0280f7a14f609bed3c640c0;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index db62c9f6a3..0a5dcbe2ab 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -75,15 +75,14 @@ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
 static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
 static int x509_store_ctx_num=0;
-#if 0
-static int x509_store_num=1;
-static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL;
-#endif
+
 
 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
 	{
@@ -113,7 +112,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		}
 
 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-	if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
 
 	/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
 	 * present and that the first entry is in place */
@@ -299,6 +297,13 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
 	X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 
+	/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
+	 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
+	 */
+
+	ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
+	if(!ok) goto end;
+
 	/* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
 	if (ctx->verify != NULL)
 		ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
@@ -339,16 +344,14 @@ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 	ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
 	if (ret == X509_V_OK)
 		return 1;
-	else
-		{
-		ctx->error = ret;
-		ctx->current_cert = x;
-		ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
-		if ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK) && ctx->verify_cb)
-			return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-		else
-			return 0;
-		}
+	/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+	if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+		return 0;
+
+	ctx->error = ret;
+	ctx->current_cert = x;
+	ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+	return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -373,14 +376,13 @@ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 
 static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
-#ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 	return 1;
 #else
 	int i, ok=0;
 	X509 *x;
 	int (*cb)();
 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-	if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
 	/* Check all untrusted certificates */
 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
 		{
@@ -415,21 +417,20 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
-#ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 	return 1;
 #else
 	int i, ok;
 	X509 *x;
 	int (*cb)();
 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-	if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
 	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 	ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
 	if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
 		return 1;
-	ctx->error_depth = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+	ctx->error_depth = i;
 	ctx->current_cert = x;
 	if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
@@ -440,6 +441,183 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 #endif
 }
 
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	int i, last, ok;
+	if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+		return 1;
+	if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+		last = 0;
+	else
+		last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+	for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
+		{
+		ctx->error_depth = i;
+		ok = check_cert(ctx);
+		if (!ok) return ok;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+	X509 *x;
+	int ok, cnum;
+	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+	ctx->current_cert = x;
+	/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+	ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+	/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
+	 * notify callback
+	 */
+	if(!ok)
+		{
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	ctx->current_crl = crl;
+	ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+	if (!ok) goto err;
+	ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+	err:
+	ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+	X509_CRL_free(crl);
+	return ok;
+
+	}
+
+/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
+ * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
+ * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData).
+ */
+static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x)
+	{
+	int ok;
+	X509_OBJECT xobj;
+	ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj);
+	if (!ok) return 0;
+	*crl = xobj.data.crl;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* Check CRL validity */
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
+	{
+	X509 *issuer = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+	int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i;
+	time_t *ptime;
+	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+	chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+	/* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
+	 * is next certificate in chain.
+	 */
+	if(cnum < chnum)
+		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+	else
+		{
+		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+		/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+		if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
+			{
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+			if(!ok) goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if(issuer)
+		{
+
+		/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+		ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
+
+		if(!ikey)
+			{
+			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* Verify CRL signature */
+			if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
+				{
+				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* OK, CRL signature valid check times */
+	if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+		ptime = &ctx->check_time;
+	else
+		ptime = NULL;
+
+	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+	if (i == 0)
+		{
+		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+		if (!ok) goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (i > 0)
+		{
+		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+		if (!ok) goto err;
+		}
+
+	if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
+		{
+		i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (i < 0)
+			{
+			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	ok = 1;
+
+	err:
+	EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+	return ok;
+	}
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+	{
+	int idx, ok;
+	X509_REVOKED rtmp;
+	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
+	rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+	idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
+	/* Not found: OK */
+	if(idx == -1) return 1;
+	/* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than
+	 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
+	 */
+	ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+	ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+	return ok;
+	}
+
 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	{
 	int i,ok=0,n;
@@ -449,7 +627,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	int (*cb)();
 
 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-	if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
 
 	n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 	ctx->error_depth=n-1;
@@ -492,6 +669,13 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 				if (!ok) goto end;
 				}
 			if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+				/* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
+				 * this is a waste of time.  That check should
+				 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
+				 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
+				 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
+				 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
+				 * been declared trusted. */
 				{
 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
 				ctx->current_cert=xs;
@@ -649,14 +833,16 @@ ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
 	{
 	time_t t;
+	int type = -1;
 
 	if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
 	else time(&t);
 
 	t+=adj;
-	if (!s) return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
-	if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
-	return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
+	if (s) type = s->type;
+	if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
+	if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
+	return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
 	}
 
 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
@@ -703,12 +889,17 @@ int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
 	     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-        {
-        x509_store_ctx_num++;
-        return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
+	{
+	/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
+	 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
+	 * That function uses locking, so we don't (usually)
+	 * have to worry about locking here. For the whole cruel
+	 * truth, see crypto/ex_data.c */
+	x509_store_ctx_num++;
+	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
 		&x509_store_ctx_method,
-                argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func);
-        }
+		argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func);
+	}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
 	{
@@ -832,8 +1023,8 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
 			}
 		}
 
-	if (purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
-	if (trust) ctx->trust = trust;
+	if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
+	if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust;
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -859,8 +1050,8 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
 	ctx->cert=x509;
 	ctx->untrusted=chain;
 	ctx->last_untrusted=0;
-	ctx->purpose=0;
-	ctx->trust=0;
+	ctx->purpose=store->purpose;
+	ctx->trust=store->trust;
 	ctx->check_time=0;
 	ctx->flags=0;
 	ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
@@ -871,11 +1062,55 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
 	ctx->error_depth=0;
 	ctx->current_cert=NULL;
 	ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
-	ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
-	ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
-	ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-	ctx->verify = store->verify;
-	ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+	/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
+	 * use defaults.
+	 */
+
+	ctx->flags = store->flags;
+
+	if (store->check_issued)
+		ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+	else
+		ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+	if (store->get_issuer)
+		ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+	else
+		ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+	if (store->verify_cb)
+		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+	else
+		ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+	if (store->verify)
+		ctx->verify = store->verify;
+	else
+		ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+	if (store->check_revocation)
+		ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+	else
+		ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+	if (store->get_crl)
+		ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+	else
+		ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
+
+	if (store->check_crl)
+		ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+	else
+		ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+	if (store->cert_crl)
+		ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+	else
+		ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+	ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+
 	memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
 	}