X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frsa%2Frsa_eay.c;h=d82dd15493bd1802b9bae7d6d579cbae65a05bed;hb=003144a8e8ed5c6c4aaee6e227773bb3d6bc0f9d;hp=6a68770031d6d651b3903d24a8529ce2eda2715e;hpb=975842f9fb216e453b67c19ffe4509837fb59ccb;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 6a68770031..d82dd15493 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -79,15 +79,17 @@ static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
 	"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
 	RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
-	RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
-	RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
+	RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+	RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
 	RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
 	RSA_eay_mod_exp,
 	BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if  e == 3 */
 	RSA_eay_init,
 	RSA_eay_finish,
-	0,
+	0, /* flags */
 	NULL,
+	0, /* rsa_sign */
+	0  /* rsa_verify */
 	};
 
 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
@@ -98,13 +100,11 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM f,ret;
 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 		i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
 		break;
-#ifndef NO_SHA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
 	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
 	        i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
 		break;
@@ -139,6 +139,13 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 
 	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
 	
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{	
+		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
 		{
 		BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
@@ -163,7 +170,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 			BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
 		}
 		
-	if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
 
 	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
@@ -186,16 +193,15 @@ err:
 	return(r);
 	}
 
+/* signing */
 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM f,ret;
 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 
@@ -223,6 +229,13 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	if (i <= 0) goto err;
 
 	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+	
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{	
+		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
 
 	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
 		RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
@@ -235,10 +248,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
 		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
 		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
-		{ if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+		{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
 	else
 		{
-		if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
 		}
 
 	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
@@ -267,14 +280,12 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM f,ret;
 	int j,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
@@ -299,6 +310,12 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	/* make data into a big number */
 	if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
 
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
 		RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
 	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
@@ -311,10 +328,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
 		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
 		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
-		{ if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+		{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
 	else
 		{
-		if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
 			goto err;
 		}
 
@@ -329,7 +346,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
 		break;
-#ifndef NO_SHA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
         case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
 	        r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
                 break;
@@ -359,17 +376,16 @@ err:
 	return(r);
 	}
 
+/* signature verification */
 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM f,ret;
 	int i,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
@@ -392,6 +408,13 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 
 	if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	/* do the decrypt */
 	if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
 		{
@@ -417,7 +440,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 			BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
 		}
 		
-	if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
 
 	p=buf;
@@ -452,15 +475,14 @@ err:
 
 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
-	BIGNUM r1,m1;
+	BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
 	int ret=0;
 	BN_CTX *ctx;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_init(&m1);
 	BN_init(&r1);
+	BN_init(&vrfy);
 
 	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
 		{
@@ -514,11 +536,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 		}
 		
 	if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-	if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
 
 	if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-	if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
 
 	if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
@@ -541,10 +563,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 	if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
 	if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
 
+	if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
+		{
+		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+		/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+		 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+		 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+		 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+		if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
+		if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+		if (vrfy.neg)
+			if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+		if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
+			/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+			 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+			 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
+			if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+		}
 	ret=1;
 err:
 	BN_clear_free(&m1);
 	BN_clear_free(&r1);
+	BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
 	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 	return(ret);
 	}