X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fpkcs12%2Fp12_kiss.c;h=c9b7ab61d1bd93b8216332ce270f197ce1b5094a;hb=dbd87ffc210328eb8670c24a427318172c1e334d;hp=767e1303da90eaf991509a58f4f1abbf07f7c05d;hpb=a9be3af5ad4836f7e50f0546311ca90c717b861e;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c index 767e1303da..c9b7ab61d1 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* p12_kiss.c */ -/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL +/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project 1999. */ /* ==================================================================== @@ -62,171 +62,235 @@ /* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */ -static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca); -static int parse_bags( STACK *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch); -static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch); +static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, + EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts); + +static int parse_bags( STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass, + int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts); + +static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, + EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts); + /* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert * and other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, * or it should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be * passed unitialised. */ -int PKCS12_parse (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, - STACK **ca) +int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, + STACK_OF(X509) **ca) { + STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL; + X509 *x = NULL; + /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */ -/* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */ + if(!p12) + { + PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER); + return 0; + } -if(!p12) { - PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER); - return 0; -} + if(pkey) + *pkey = NULL; + if(cert) + *cert = NULL; + + /* Check the mac */ + + /* If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases + * to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that + * under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length + * password are two different things... + */ -/* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */ -if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL)) { - if (!(*ca = sk_new(NULL))) { + if(!pass || !*pass) { + if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL; + else if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = ""; + else { + PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) { + PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Allocate stack for other certificates */ + ocerts = sk_X509_new_null(); + + if (!ocerts) + { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; - } -} + } -if(pkey) *pkey = NULL; -if(cert) *cert = NULL; + if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) + { + PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR); + goto err; + } -/* Check the mac */ + while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts))) + { + if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert) + { + if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey)) + { + *cert = x; + x = NULL; + } + } -if (!PKCS12_verify_mac (p12, pass, -1)) { - PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE); - goto err; -} + if (ca && x) + { + if (!*ca) + *ca = sk_X509_new_null(); + if (!*ca) + goto err; + if (!sk_X509_push(*ca, x)) + goto err; + x = NULL; + } + if (x) + X509_free(x); + } -if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca)) { - PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR); - goto err; -} + if (ocerts) + sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free); -return 1; + return 1; -err: + err: -if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free (*pkey); -if (cert && *cert) X509_free (*cert); -if (ca) sk_pop_free (*ca, X509_free); -return 0; + if (pkey && *pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); + if (cert && *cert) + X509_free(*cert); + if (x) + X509_free(x); + if (ocerts) + sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free); + return 0; } /* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */ -static int parse_pk12 (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, - EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca) +static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, + EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts) { - STACK *asafes, *bags; + STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes; + STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags; int i, bagnid; PKCS7 *p7; - ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL; - char keymatch = 0; - if (!( asafes = M_PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0; - for (i = 0; i < sk_num (asafes); i++) { - p7 = (PKCS7 *) sk_value (asafes, i); + + if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0; + for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) { + p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i); bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type); if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) { - bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7data (p7); + bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7); } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) { - bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata (p7, pass, passlen); + bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen); } else continue; if (!bags) { - sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free); + sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); return 0; } - if (!parse_bags (bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, - &keyid, &keymatch)) { - sk_pop_free (bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); - sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free); + if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) { + sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); + sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); return 0; } - sk_pop_free (bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); + sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); } - sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free); - if (keyid) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free (keyid); + sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); return 1; } -static int parse_bags (STACK *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, - EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, - ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch) +static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass, + int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < sk_num (bags); i++) { - if (!parse_bag ((PKCS12_SAFEBAG *)sk_value (bags, i), - pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid, - keymatch)) return 0; + for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) { + if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value (bags, i), + pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) + return 0; } return 1; } -#define MATCH_KEY 0x1 -#define MATCH_CERT 0x2 -#define MATCH_ALL 0x3 - -static int parse_bag (PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, - EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, - ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, - char *keymatch) +static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, + EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8; X509 *x509; - ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL; ASN1_TYPE *attrib; + ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL; + if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_friendlyName))) + fname = attrib->value.bmpstring; if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID))) - lkey = attrib->value.octet_string; - - /* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */ - if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) { - if (*keyid) { - if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp (*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL; - } else { - if (!(*keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup (lkey))) { - PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PARSE_BAGS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - } - } - + lkid = attrib->value.octet_string; + switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag)) { case NID_keyBag: - if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1; - if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY (bag->value.keybag))) return 0; - *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY; + if (!pkey || *pkey) + return 1; + if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag))) + return 0; break; case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag: - if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1; - if (!(p8 = M_PKCS12_decrypt_skey (bag, pass, passlen))) + if (!pkey || *pkey) + return 1; + if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen))) return 0; - *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY (p8); - PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free (p8); + *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8); + PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); if (!(*pkey)) return 0; - *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY; break; case NID_certBag: if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate ) - return 1; - if (!(x509 = M_PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0; - if (lkey) { - *keymatch |= MATCH_CERT; - if (cert) *cert = x509; - } else if (ca) sk_push (*ca, (char *)x509); + return 1; + if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) + return 0; + if(lkid && !X509_keyid_set1(x509, lkid->data, lkid->length)) + { + X509_free(x509); + return 0; + } + if(fname) { + int len, r; + unsigned char *data; + len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname); + if(len >= 0) { + r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len); + OPENSSL_free(data); + if (!r) + { + X509_free(x509); + return 0; + } + } + } + + if(!sk_X509_push(ocerts, x509)) + { + X509_free(x509); + return 0; + } + break; case NID_safeContentsBag: return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen, - pkey, cert, ca, keyid, keymatch); + pkey, ocerts); break; default: