X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=TODO;h=e9a52069eb7994a33b17d7ff3a90f39063a32112;hb=0700c60ef320c8ccbd417833441697c64d6c525c;hp=7231181a248270c0dafd90b081fc36743ad68a95;hpb=8aabcda325071d9a4ba3a26bf2b12570812437fd;p=oweals%2Fgnunet.git diff --git a/TODO b/TODO index 7231181a2..e9a52069e 100644 --- a/TODO +++ b/TODO @@ -1,15 +1,40 @@ PHASE #1: (Goal: settle key design questions) -ARM: -* Make sure ARM supports daemons (non-service background processes, see hostlist/topology) +core: +- test fails with fresh /tmp directory (but passes when run a second time) + problem seems to be caused by HELLO validation (unvalidated + HELLO not used to connect for good, then somehow SETKEY never happens); + * double-check crypto involved in HELLO validation (PONG signature check; + what about MiM? Might be trivial right now; adding source IP-address + to PONG signature might help? How would we validate that (given that + we may be learning our source IP address(es) the same way...)) + + if we add address to transport-level PONG, we may be able to simplify + WELCOME messages (no need to add addresses there anymore, right?); + + we probably want some kind of voting/counting for learning IP addresses + (maybe including IP addresses in ads proportional to how often others + report them? we at least need some protection against >64k HELLOs!), + + provide a way to give the user a list of "learned" IP addresses and + a way to easily "veto" addresses off the list! + => If MiM attacker uses vetoed address, blacklist the specific IP for + the presumed neighbour! + * Use special, non-WELCOMEing TCP-connection for HELLO/address validation; + that way, we can avoid confusion between a dozen parallel validating connections + and the real one, avoid queueing messages on validating connections and + shut those down immediately after sending/receiving the PONG + (and maybe avoid some signalling about connections to the other layers) + * core notifies clients about "encrypted" connections being up well before + we get the encrypted PONG; sometimes this may be OK (for topology killing + unwanted connnections), but of course not in general. I suspect we want + to signal on PONG and have topology hook directly into transport to + kill plaintext connections before they have a chance to become encrypted + (may require minor hack in transport API) Util: -* improve disk API [Nils] +* improve disk API [Nils] (Nils, is this done? -Christian) * Windows: use events instead of pipes to signal select()s [Nils] -* only connect() sockets that are ready (select()) - [Nils: I'm not sure what you mean by this; fresh sockets are always - ready for connect(), just 'write' after connect needs select AFAIK; - please clarify. --Christian] +* only connect() sockets that are ready (select()) [Nils] + [On W32, we need to select after calling socket before + doing connect etc.] TESTCASES WANTED: For these functions, it would be nice if we had testcases ("make check") @@ -60,10 +85,12 @@ PHASE #2: (Goal: recover basic file-sharing functionality) Datastores: * implement sqlite-based sqstore/datastore service - + implement library (talks to service) + implement service (datastore + talks to plugin) + + implement library (talks to service) + implement sqlite plugin (talks to DB) + + fix testcases (make them use CPS, complete their inner workings...) * implement sqlite-based dstore services + + design API + implement library (talks to service) + implement service (talks to plugin) + implement sqlite plugin (talks to DB) @@ -72,8 +99,6 @@ Applications: * DHT, DV * FS / fs-libs -Databases: -* have ONE backend working PHASE #3: (Goal: ready for pre-release) [completion-goal: end of 2009] @@ -152,6 +177,8 @@ Minor TODO items: - implement exponential back-off for service restarts - better tracking of which config changes actually need to cause process restarts by ARM. - have way to specify dependencies between services (to manage ARM restarts better) + - client-API is inefficient since it opens a TCP connection per service that is started + (instead of re-using connections). * PEERINFO: - have gnunet-peerinfo print actual host addresses again - add option to gnunet-peerinfo to modify trust value