X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=e1b33745e503f5b1391f6db9c1478b9101a0269d;hb=d4a62400056e4ce1e3a010802fcf10dd8003c8e3;hp=4d766fb2f210d9099ff797a46fc0cf265daa9a7a;hpb=f69a8aebab14a24181ea9ce91d52278edce7e7b7;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 4d766fb2f2..e1b33745e5 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,7 +2,283 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.8  [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e  [XX xxx XXXX]
+
+  *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
+     protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
+     ClientHello is fragmented.  (The server can't insist on the
+     particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
+     message has informed the client about his choice.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add RFC 3779 support.
+     [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
+     static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
+     Improve header file function name parsing.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d  [28 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+     cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
+     [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+     in a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2937)  [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. 
+     (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+     malicious SSLv2 server.  (CVE-2006-4343)
+     [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites
+     match only those.  Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted
+     as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got
+     the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only
+     have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.
+     That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as
+     "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --
+     namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones
+     from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0.
+
+     So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit
+     ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar
+     ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions.
+     Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0
+     ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite.
+
+     Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the
+     128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now.
+     The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and
+     AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning;
+     however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release
+     (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
+     definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into
+     multiple values to extend the available space.
+
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c  [05 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
+     possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
+     undesirable limitations.
+     [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly.  Now special
+     treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites
+     cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias.
+     However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for
+     non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension
+     support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation
+     to avoid potential handshake problems.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
+
+      - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+      - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+      - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+     The latter two were purportedly from
+     draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+     appear there.
+
+     Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from
+     draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt.  These are just as
+     unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
+     dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key
+     versions), which is now available for royalty-free use
+     (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html).
+     Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132.
+
+     To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
+     series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
+     is configured with 'enable-camellia'.
+     [NTT]
+
+  *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding
+     bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not
+     necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false
+     positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient
+     code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by
+     now or any which still have the bug do not support compression.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b  [04 May 2006]
+
+  *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit
+     cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed.
+     [Austin Ziegler <halostatue@gmail.com>]
+
+  *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to
+     draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without
+     TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9
+     branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch).
+     [Douglas Stebila]
+
+  *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support
+     opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use
+     "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32
+     to conform with the standards mentioned here:
+           http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt
+     Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include
+     --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location
+     of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library
+     can't be loaded.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code
+     sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't
+     handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a
+     non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries
+     under VC++ build system.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO.
+     Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a  [11 Oct 2005]
+
+  *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+     (part of SSL_OP_ALL).  This option used to disable the
+     countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+     rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+     idea.  (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+     for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+     Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+  *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at
+     runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman.
+     [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add functions for well-known primes.
+     [Nick Mathewson]
+
+  *) Extended Windows CE support.
+     [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during
+     runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by
+     attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to
+     smime utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8  [05 Jul 2005]
+
+  [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+  OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
+  *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private
+     key into the same file any more.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'.
+     [Stefan <stf@udoma.org]
+
+  *) Removed the macro des_crypt(), as it seems to conflict with some
+     libraries.  Use DES_crypt().
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Correct naming of the 'chil' and '4758cca' ENGINEs. This
+     involves renaming the source and generated shared-libs for
+     both. The engines will accept the corrected or legacy ids
+     ('ncipher' and '4758_cca' respectively) when binding. NB,
+     this only applies when building 'shared'.
+     [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> and Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify
+     PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and
+     use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code:
+     - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after
+       a fixed number of uses (currently 32)
+     - add new function for parameter creation
+     - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the
+       BN_BLINDING parameters
+     - hide BN_BLINDING structure
+     Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve
+     performance when a single RSA object is shared among several
+     threads.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Add support for DTLS.
+     [Nagendra Modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+     to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file()
+     [Walter Goulet]
+
+  *) Remove buggy and incompletet DH cert support from
+     ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for
+     the apps/openssl applications.
+     [Nils Larsch]
+
+  *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes
+     -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently
+     DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set.
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default.
+     The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx".
+
+     The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless
+     "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified.
+
+     (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented.  This is because IDEA
+     is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license
+     fee for non-commercial use.  As before, "no-idea" can be used to
+     avoid this algorithm.)
+
+     [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820).  This work was
      sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and
@@ -432,14 +708,13 @@
      Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
-  *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating new macros that behave like
-     functions
-
-          void BN_set_sign(BIGNUM *a, int neg);
-          int BN_get_sign(const BIGNUM *a);
+  *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function 
+          void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg);
+     and a macro that behave like
+          int  BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a);
 
-     and avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications.
-     [Nils Larsch  <nla@trustcenter.de>]
+     to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications.
+     [Nils Larsch]
 
   *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes
      used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c).
@@ -730,14 +1005,14 @@
   *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62,
      SECG, and WAP/WTLS.  Each curve can be obtained from the new
      function
-          EC_GROUP_new_by_nid(),
+          EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(),
      and the list of available named curves can be obtained with
           EC_get_builtin_curves().
      Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be
      accessed via
-         EC_GROUP_set_nid()
-         EC_GROUP_get_nid()
-     [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
+         EC_GROUP_set_curve_name()
+         EC_GROUP_get_curve_name()
+     [Nils Larsch <larsch@trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
  
   *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there
      was actually never needed) and in BN_mul().  The removal in BN_mul()
@@ -748,7 +1023,204 @@
      differing sizes.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
- Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f  [XX xxx XXXX]
+ Changes between 0.9.7l and 0.9.7m  [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+  *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
+     protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
+     ClientHello is fragmented.  (The server can't insist on the
+     particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
+     message has informed the client about his choice.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
+     static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l  [28 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+     cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
+     [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+     in a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2937)  [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. 
+     (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+     malicious SSLv2 server.  (CVE-2006-4343)
+     [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit
+     ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"
+     will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar
+     ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that
+     "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the
+     SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite).  This is a backport combining
+     changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k  [05 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
+     possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
+     undesirable limitations.
+     [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
+
+      - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+      - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+      - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+     The latter two were purportedly from
+     draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+     appear there.
+
+     Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from
+     draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt.  These are just as
+     unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
+     dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j  [04 May 2006]
+
+  *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS
+     module in FIPS mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make 
+     from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the
+     "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++
+     build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build. 
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i  [14 Oct 2005]
+
+  *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS.
+     The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not.
+     BEWARE!  A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be
+     safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of
+     the difference induced by this change.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h  [11 Oct 2005]
+
+  *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+     (part of SSL_OP_ALL).  This option used to disable the
+     countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+     rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+     idea.  (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+     [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+     for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+     Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+  *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is
+     mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform
+     the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent.  (Otherwise,
+     the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key
+     after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with
+     biased k.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for
+     RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of
+     squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are
+     independent of the particular secret key.  This will mitigate
+     cache-timing and potential related attacks.
+
+     BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation,
+     and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag
+     BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent.  RSA, DSA, and DH
+     will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag
+     RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or
+     DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set.
+
+     [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and
+     SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0
+     Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set.
+     (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello
+     message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some
+     clients need.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in
+     a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls
+     to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before).
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions
+     instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code
+     structures constant.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g  [11 Apr 2005]
+
+  [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+  OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
+  *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because
+     the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another
+     with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++
+     complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included
+     nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up
+     some needed definitions.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Undo Cygwin change.
+     [Ulf Möller]
+
+  *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
+     Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
+     they must be explicitely allowed in run-time.  See
+     docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f  [22 Mar 2005]
+
+  *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating
+     server and client random values. Previously
+     (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in
+     less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms).
+
+     This change has negligible security impact because:
+
+     1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random
+        data.
+
+     2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial
+        handshake.
+
+     3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in
+        size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random
+        values.
+
+     The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue
+     to our attention. 
+
+     [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
+
+  *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
+     [Ulf Möller]
 
   *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
      prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
@@ -757,6 +1229,10 @@
   *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
      [Steve Henson]
 
+  *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development
+     branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
   *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate
      failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs.
      [Nauticus Networks SSL Team <openssl@nauticusnet.com>, Steve Henson]
@@ -809,11 +1285,11 @@
  Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d  [17 Mar 2004]
 
   *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed           
-     by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)                    
+     by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)                    
      [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]   
 
   *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
-     (CAN-2004-0112)
+     (CVE-2004-0112)
      [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]   
 
   *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
@@ -856,9 +1332,9 @@
   *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
 
      Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
-     invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+     invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
      
-     Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CAN-2003-0545).
+     Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
 
      If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
      certificate signature with the NULL public key.
@@ -943,7 +1419,7 @@
      via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
      block cipher padding has been found.  This is a countermeasure
      against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
-     between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
+     between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
 
      [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
      Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
@@ -1160,7 +1636,7 @@
 
      Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
      supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
-     (CAN-2002-0657)
+     (CVE-2002-0657)
      [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
 
   *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
@@ -2844,7 +3320,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
  Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m  [17 Mar 2004]
 
   *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
-     by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
+     by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
      [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
 
  Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l  [04 Nov 2003]
@@ -2852,7 +3328,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
 
      Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
-     certain ASN.1 tags (CAN-2003-0851)
+     certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
      [Steve Henson]
 
  Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k  [30 Sep 2003]
@@ -2860,7 +3336,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
 
      Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
-     invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+     invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
      
      If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
      certificate signature with the NULL public key.
@@ -2912,7 +3388,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
      block cipher padding has been found.  This is a countermeasure
      against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
-     between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
+     between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
 
      [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
      Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
@@ -3045,7 +3521,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
      the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
      negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
-     supplied buffer. (CAN-2002-0659)
+     supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
      [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
 
   *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
@@ -3053,15 +3529,15 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
 
   *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
-     too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
+     too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
      [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
 
   *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
-     supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
+     supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
      [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
 
   *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
-     supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656)
+     supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
      [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
 
  Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d  [9 May 2002]