X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=c65cf1f5fcf5bef3436854c893414bf36f1f8f9c;hb=ea5240a5edceccc6c6410a56b68ec4d8038da4bb;hp=66870e6c87bcd3d5277abf020fcd298704c7e951;hpb=16b1b03543fc6362f9e48f1bd9d4b153ea58c553;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 66870e6c87..c65cf1f5fc 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -4,6 +4,21 @@ Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.8 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but + takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently, + the following flags are defined: + + OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH + This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first + element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero + number. + + OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH + This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first + element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful + if there are more than one element where the comparing function + returns zero. + *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca' in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation @@ -2424,6 +2439,31 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h. [Richard Levitte] + Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003] + + *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of + Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat + a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error + in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). + [Bodo Moeller] + + *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation + to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call + RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. + They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. + [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] + + *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not + seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as + an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there + is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe + by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and + having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors + (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but + avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared + between threads, blinding will still be very fast). + [Bodo Moeller] + Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked