X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=846e66e1dd326eb753bbff4f18b08eb9e5812c43;hb=51b77c0337bd22ce391f339bd376788dc4e9a4ad;hp=47d76cb81a0215d0075615f08a0019882d681ca2;hpb=fc6800d19f4a0ca852c07128952d4c347d2d7065;p=oweals%2Fopenssl.git

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 47d76cb81a..846e66e1dd 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,7 +2,98 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.1  [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+  *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
+     PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
+     the new parameter format automatically.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
+     to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
+     the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
+     hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
+     SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically
+     support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use
+     static structures instead of allocation if default values are used.
+     New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves.
+     Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client
+     to set list of supported curves.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and 
+     supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility
+     to print out received values.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
+     between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
+     ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different
+     chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both
+     server and client use DH certificates with common parameters.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server
+     certificates.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+     record length exceeds 255 bytes:
+ 
+     1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+        hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+     2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+        the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+        set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+        -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+        Most broken servers should now work.
+     3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+        TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+
+  *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1  [14 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+     STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
+     and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
+     OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
+     those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect 
+     the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
      support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
@@ -274,6 +365,24 @@
        Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
      [Steve Henson]
 
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
  Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
 
   *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.