X-Git-Url: https://git.librecmc.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=sidebyside;f=libbb%2Fcorrect_password.c;h=513c930286feb89565a2895d40c7e2e9eaa18827;hb=5f7c82b32f548b5a1d6a4186630e8ef496a9d5e6;hp=815c51c43f5af2ac75116b12c976ccfd5a9ed469;hpb=e190c166364d0a5bb5e5089a16644ff96c9799e5;p=oweals%2Fbusybox.git diff --git a/libbb/correct_password.c b/libbb/correct_password.c index 815c51c43..513c93028 100644 --- a/libbb/correct_password.c +++ b/libbb/correct_password.c @@ -30,45 +30,95 @@ #include "libbb.h" -/* Ask the user for a password. - * Return 1 if the user gives the correct password for entry PW, - * 0 if not. Return 1 without asking if PW has an empty password. - * - * NULL pw means "just fake it for login with bad username" */ +#define SHADOW_BUFSIZE 256 -int correct_password(const struct passwd *pw) +/* Retrieve encrypted password string for pw. + * If pw == NULL, return a string which fails password check against any + * password. + */ +#if !ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS +#define get_passwd(pw, buffer) get_passwd(pw) +#endif +static const char *get_passwd(const struct passwd *pw, char buffer[SHADOW_BUFSIZE]) { - char *unencrypted, *encrypted; - const char *correct; + const char *pass; - /* fake salt. crypt() can choke otherwise. */ - correct = "aa"; - if (!pw) { - /* "aa" will never match */ - goto fake_it; - } - correct = pw->pw_passwd; + if (!pw) + return "aa"; /* "aa" will never match */ + + pass = pw->pw_passwd; #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS - if ((correct[0] == 'x' || correct[0] == '*') && !correct[1]) { - /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */ + /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */ + if ((pass[0] == 'x' || pass[0] == '*') && !pass[1]) { struct spwd spw; - struct spwd *result; - char buffer[256]; - if (getspnam_r(pw->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result) == 0) - correct = spw.sp_pwdp; - /* else: no valid shadow password, checking ordinary one */ + int r; + /* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL. + * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */ + struct spwd *result = NULL; + r = getspnam_r(pw->pw_name, &spw, buffer, SHADOW_BUFSIZE, &result); + pass = (r || !result) ? "aa" : result->sp_pwdp; } #endif + return pass; +} - if (!correct || correct[0] == '\0') +/* + * Return 1 if PW has an empty password. + * Return 1 if the user gives the correct password for entry PW, + * 0 if not. + * NULL pw means "just fake it for login with bad username" + */ +int FAST_FUNC check_password(const struct passwd *pw, const char *plaintext) +{ + IF_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS(char buffer[SHADOW_BUFSIZE];) + char *encrypted; + const char *pw_pass; + int r; + + pw_pass = get_passwd(pw, buffer); + if (!pw_pass[0]) { /* empty password field? */ return 1; + } - fake_it: - unencrypted = bb_askpass(0, "Password: "); - if (!unencrypted) { - return 0; + encrypted = pw_encrypt(plaintext, /*salt:*/ pw_pass, 1); + r = (strcmp(encrypted, pw_pass) == 0); + free(encrypted); + return r; +} + + +/* Ask the user for a password. + * Return 1 without asking if PW has an empty password. + * Return -1 on EOF, error while reading input, or timeout. + * Return 1 if the user gives the correct password for entry PW, + * 0 if not. + * + * NULL pw means "just fake it for login with bad username" + */ +int FAST_FUNC ask_and_check_password_extended(const struct passwd *pw, + int timeout, const char *prompt) +{ + IF_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS(char buffer[SHADOW_BUFSIZE];) + char *plaintext; + const char *pw_pass; + int r; + + pw_pass = get_passwd(pw, buffer); + if (!pw_pass[0]) /* empty password field? */ + return 1; + + plaintext = bb_ask(STDIN_FILENO, timeout, prompt); + if (!plaintext) { + /* EOF (such as ^D) or error (such as ^C) or timeout */ + return -1; } - encrypted = crypt(unencrypted, correct); - memset(unencrypted, 0, strlen(unencrypted)); - return strcmp(encrypted, correct) == 0; + + r = check_password(pw, plaintext); + nuke_str(plaintext); + return r; +} + +int FAST_FUNC ask_and_check_password(const struct passwd *pw) +{ + return ask_and_check_password_extended(pw, 0, "Password: "); }