ret+=size_str;
}
-
- /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */
- {
+
+ /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ {
int el;
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- int need_ri;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- /* Need RI if renegotiating unless legacy renegotiation allowed */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
- || !s->new_session)
- need_ri = 0;
- else
- need_ri = 1;
if (data >= (d+n-2))
- {
- if (!need_ri)
- return 1;
- /* We need to see at least one extension: RI */
- /* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
+ goto ri_check;
+
n2s(data,len);
if (data > (d+n-len))
- return 1;
+ goto ri_check;
while (data <= (d+n-4))
{
n2s(data,size);
if (data+size > (d+n))
- return 1;
+ goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
switch (servname_type)
{
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
+ if (!s->hit)
{
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
- ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL))
+ if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
}
else
- s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
+ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+ && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
break;
}
n2s(data, idsize);
dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+ size -= 2 + idsize;
if (dsize < 0)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size)
+ if (dsize != size)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0)
{
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+ {
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+ X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ }
+
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
&sdata, dsize);
data+=size;
}
+ *p = data;
- if (need_ri && !renegotiate_seen)
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
- /* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
- *p = data;
return 1;
}
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
+ unsigned short length;
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
- unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- int need_ri;
- /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
- * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
- * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
- * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
- * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
- * absence on initial connect only.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION ||
- !s->new_session)
- need_ri = 0;
- else
- need_ri = 1;
if (data >= (d+n-2))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ n2s(data,length);
+ if (data+length != d+n)
{
- if (!need_ri)
- return 1;
- /* We need to see at least one extension: RI */
- /* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- n2s(data,len);
-
while(data <= (d+n-4))
{
n2s(data,type);
n2s(data,size);
if (data+size > (d+n))
- return 1;
+ goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
return 0;
}
- if (!renegotiate_seen && need_ri)
- {
- /* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
{
if (s->tlsext_hostname)
}
*p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
+ * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
+ * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
+ * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
+ * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
+ * absence on initial connect only.
+ */
+ if (!renegotiate_seen
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
projects / oweals / openssl.git / blobdiff