-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-# include <openssl/bn.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
+
+
+#define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \
+ (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val))
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
SSL_SESSION **psess);
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
} tls_curve_info;
-# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
-# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
-
+/*
+ * Table of curve information.
+ * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
+ * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
+ */
static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
{NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
{NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
{NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+ {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
};
static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
/* The default curves */
static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
- /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
+ 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
- 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
};
-static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
- /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
- 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
- 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
- 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- /*
- * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
- * via an explicit callback or parameters.
- */
- 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
-};
-
-
static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
};
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
{
+ const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
return 0;
- return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
+ cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
+ if (pflags)
+ *pflags = cinfo->flags;
+ return cinfo->nid;
}
int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
- /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
- switch (nid) {
- case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
- return 1;
- case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
- return 2;
- case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
- return 3;
- case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
- return 4;
- case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
- return 5;
- case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
- return 6;
- case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
- return 7;
- case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
- return 8;
- case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
- return 9;
- case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
- return 10;
- case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
- return 11;
- case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
- return 12;
- case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
- return 13;
- case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
- return 14;
- case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
- return 15;
- case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
- return 16;
- case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
- return 17;
- case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
- return 18;
- case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
- return 19;
- case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
- return 20;
- case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
- return 21;
- case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
- return 22;
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
- return 23;
- case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
- return 24;
- case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
- return 25;
- case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- return 26;
- case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- return 27;
- case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- return 28;
- default:
- return 0;
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
+ if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
+ return i + 1;
}
+ return 0;
}
/*
* so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
*/
static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
- const unsigned char **pcurves,
- size_t *num_curves)
+ const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
{
size_t pcurveslen = 0;
+
if (sess) {
*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*num_curves = 0;
return 0;
- } else {
- *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
- return 1;
}
+ *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
+ return 1;
}
/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
int k;
+
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
return -1;
* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
*/
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
* Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
* but s->options is a long...
*/
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist
- (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
- &num_supp))
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
+ &supp, &num_supp))
/* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist
- (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
- &num_pref))
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
+ &pref, &num_pref))
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
- /*
- * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
- * are allowed.
- */
- if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
- supp = eccurves_all;
- num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
- } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
- (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
- pref = eccurves_all;
- num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
- }
-
- k = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
+ for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
+
for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
if (nmatch == k) {
int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
- return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
+
+ return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
}
k++;
}
}
/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
-int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
- const char *str)
+int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
{
nid_cb_st ncb;
ncb.nidcnt = 0;
static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
EC_KEY *ec)
{
- int is_prime, id;
+ int id;
const EC_GROUP *grp;
- const EC_METHOD *meth;
if (!ec)
return 0;
/* Determine if it is a prime field */
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
if (!grp)
return 0;
- meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
- if (!meth)
- return 0;
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
- is_prime = 1;
- else
- is_prime = 0;
/* Determine curve ID */
id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
- /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
- if (id) {
- curve_id[0] = 0;
- curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
- } else {
- curve_id[0] = 0xff;
- if (is_prime)
- curve_id[1] = 0x01;
- else
- curve_id[1] = 0x02;
- }
+ /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
+ if (id == 0)
+ return 0;
+ curve_id[0] = 0;
+ curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
if (comp_id) {
if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
return 0;
- if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
- if (is_prime)
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ } else {
+ if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
else
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
- } else
- *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ }
}
return 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
- * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
+ * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
* @s: SSL connection
* @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
*
*/
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
{
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
- return 1;
-# endif
/*
* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
* curves permitted.
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
+# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
#else
# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
+# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
#else
# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
+# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
#else
# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
#endif
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
#endif
};
tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
};
#endif
-size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs)
{
/*
* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
}
#endif
/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
- if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
+ if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
} else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
#endif
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
- sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
break;
}
/* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
- EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
- (void *)sig)) {
+ EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
}
/*
- * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
- * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
- * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
- * settings.
+ * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
+ * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
+ * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
+ *
+ * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
+ * by the client.
+ *
+ * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
*/
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
- /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
- if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
- s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
- /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
- /*
- * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
- * algorithms.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
- if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
#endif
}
+/*
+ * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
+ * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
+ * @c: cipher to check
+ * @op: Security check that you want to do
+ *
+ * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
+ */
int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
{
- if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
- || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
+ if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
return 1;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+ || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+ return 1;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+ || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+ return 1;
+
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
}
+static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
+ unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
+ unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
+ if (u1 < u2)
+ return -1;
+ else if (u1 > u2)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
+ * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
+ * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
+ * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
+ * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
+ * occurred.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
+{
+ PACKET extensions = *packet;
+ size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
+ unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* First pass: count the extensions. */
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
+ unsigned int type;
+ PACKET extension;
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
+ !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ num_extensions++;
+ }
+
+ if (num_extensions <= 1)
+ return 1;
+
+ extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
+ if (extension_types == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
+ extensions = *packet;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+ PACKET extension;
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
+ !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ /* This should not happen. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
+ qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
+ for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+ if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ done:
+ OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
+ return ret;
+}
+
unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
using_ecc = 1;
break;
}
return NULL;
}
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- unsigned long size_str;
- long lenmax;
+ size_t size_str;
/*-
* check for enough space.
- * 4 for the servername type and entension length
+ * 4 for the servername type and extension length
* 2 for servernamelist length
* 1 for the hostname type
* 2 for hostname length
* + hostname length
*/
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
- || (size_str =
- strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
+ size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit))
return NULL;
/* extension type and length */
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
* Client Hello message */
- int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
/*-
* check for enough space.
- * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
+ * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
* 1 for the srp user identity
* + srp user identity length
*/
- if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit))
return NULL;
/* fill in the extension */
/*
* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
*/
- long lenmax;
const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
size_t i;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
- return NULL;
if (num_formats > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length
+ * 1 byte for the length of the formats
+ * + formats length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit))
+ return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
/* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
return NULL;
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
- return NULL;
if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length
+ * 2 bytes for the curve list length
+ * + curve list length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + (num_curves * 2), limit))
+ return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
etmp = ret + 4;
s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
ret += curves_list_len;
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- int ticklen;
+ size_t ticklen;
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
* ticket
*/
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
s2n(ticklen, ret);
- if (ticklen) {
+ if (ticklen > 0) {
memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
ret += ticklen;
}
}
skip_ext:
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
size_t salglen;
const unsigned char *salg;
unsigned char *etmp;
- salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
+ salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
+
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length
+ * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length
+ * + sigalg list length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
etmp = ret;
s2n(salglen, etmp);
ret += salglen;
}
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
int i;
- long extlen, idlen, itmp;
+ size_t extlen, idlen;
+ int lentmp;
OCSP_RESPID *id;
idlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
- if (itmp <= 0)
+ lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+ if (lentmp <= 0)
return NULL;
- idlen += itmp + 2;
+ idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
- extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
- if (extlen < 0)
+ lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
+ if (lentmp < 0)
return NULL;
+ extlen = (size_t)lentmp;
} else
extlen = 0;
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
return NULL;
+ /*
+ * 2 bytes for status request type
+ * 2 bytes for status request len
+ * 1 byte for OCSP request type
+ * 2 bytes for length of ids
+ * 2 bytes for length of extensions
+ * + length of ids
+ * + length of extensions
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit))
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
s2n(idlen, ret);
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
/* skip over id len */
ret += 2;
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
+ lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
/* write id len */
- s2n(itmp, q);
+ s2n(lentmp, q);
}
s2n(extlen, ret);
if (extlen > 0)
i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
}
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Add Heartbeat extension */
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length
+ * 1 byte for the mode
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
return NULL;
+
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
s2n(1, ret);
/*-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
/*
- * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
+ * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
* for Next Protocol Negotiation
*/
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
+
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
#endif
+ /*
+ * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
+ * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
+ * (see longer comment below)
+ */
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
+ * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length
+ * + ALPN protocol list length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
return NULL;
}
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length
+ * + SRTP profiles length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
/* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
return NULL;
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
+ /*
+ * In 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c we negotiated EtM with DTLS, then just
+ * silently failed to actually do it. It is fixed in 1.1.1 but to
+ * ease the transition especially from 1.1.0b to 1.1.0c, we just
+ * disable it in 1.1.0.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the SCT type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
#endif
+
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+ return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
else
hlen = 0;
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already
+ * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200,
+ * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer
+ * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway.
+ *
+ * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length
+ * + padding length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit))
+ return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
s2n(hlen, ret);
memset(ret, 0, hlen);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+ int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
#endif
return NULL;
}
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
+ * + reneg data length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
&& s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the server name type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
/*
* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
*/
- long lenmax;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
- return NULL;
if (plistlen > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
+ * 1 byte for the points format list length
+ * + length of points format list
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit))
+ return NULL;
+
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
*(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
* extension
*/
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
+ * later
+ */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
}
if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
int el;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
+ * + length of the SRTP profiles list
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
};
- if (limit - ret < 36)
+
+ /* check for enough space. */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit))
return NULL;
- memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
- ret += 36;
+ memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
+ ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
+ * 1 byte for the mode
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
s2n(1, ret);
s->
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
+ * + length of protocols list
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
s2n(npalen, ret);
#endif
if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
return NULL;
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
+ if (s->tlsext_use_etm) {
/*
* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
* for other cases too.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
else {
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+ return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
}
-#endif
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
+ return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
- unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+ size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
+ * 2 bytes for ALPN data length
+ * 1 byte for selected protocol length
+ * + length of the selected protocol
+ */
+ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
s2n(3 + len, ret);
}
/*
- * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
- * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
- * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
- * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
- * success.
+ * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
+ * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
+ * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
+ * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
- unsigned int data_len;
- unsigned int proto_len;
- const unsigned char *selected;
- const unsigned char *data;
- unsigned char selected_len;
- int r;
-
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
- return 0;
+ PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
- /*
- * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
- * length-prefixed strings.
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
- || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
- goto parse_error;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
do {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
- || proto_len == 0
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
- goto parse_error;
- } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
-
- r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return -1;
+ /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
+ return 0;
}
- memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
+
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
+ &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
}
- return 0;
- parse_error:
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return -1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
+ * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
+ * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+ const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
+ unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+
+ if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+ int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed,
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
+ s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+ } else {
+ *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*-
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
*/
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
{
- unsigned int type, size;
- const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
- PACKET tmppkt;
+ unsigned int type;
+ PACKET sni, tmppkt;
+ size_t ext_len;
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
- };
-
- /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
- static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
+ /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
+ static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
+
tmppkt = *pkt;
if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
- || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
return;
+ }
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
- || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
- return;
- } else {
- const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
- return;
- }
+ ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
+ sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
+ ext_len);
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+/*
+ * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
+ * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
+ *
+ * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
+ * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
+ */
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int type;
- unsigned int size;
- unsigned int len;
- const unsigned char *data;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+ PACKET extensions;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-#endif
+ s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
goto ri_check;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
- goto err;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
- goto err;
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
+ return 0;
- while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
- PACKET subpkt;
+ if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
+ return 0;
- if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
- goto err;
+ /*
+ * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
+ * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
+ * resumption.
+ */
+ while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
+ PACKET extension;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
+ return 0;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
- goto err;
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
+ PACKET_remaining(&extension),
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
*/
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- const unsigned char *sdata;
unsigned int servname_type;
- unsigned int dsize;
- PACKET ssubpkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
- goto err;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
- goto err;
-
- if (s->servername_done == 0)
- switch (servname_type) {
- case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- goto err;
-
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
- OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
- (unsigned char *)s->session
- ->tlsext_hostname,
- len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
- if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- s->servername_done = 1;
-
- } else {
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
- && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
- && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
- (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
- }
-
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
+ PACKET sni, hostname;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
+ /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
+ || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
+ * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
+ * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
+ * such.
+ * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
+ * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
+ * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
+ *
+ * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
+ * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
+ || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
+ || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
+ return 0;
}
- /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
- goto err;
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->servername_done = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
+ * fall back to a full handshake.
+ */
+ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+ && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
+ strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
+ }
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
- || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
- len))
- goto err;
- s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
-
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
- goto err;
+ PACKET srp_I;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
+ * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
+ PACKET ec_point_format_list;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
- || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
- goto err;
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
if (!s->hit) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
+ &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ &s->
+ session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
- ecpointformatlist_length;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- ecpointformatlist_length))
- goto err;
- } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- goto err;
- }
- /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
- unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
- /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
- || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
- || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
- goto err;
+ /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
+ || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
- goto err;
-
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
+ &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ &s->
+ session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
- ellipticcurvelist_length;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
- ellipticcurvelist_length))
- goto err;
- } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
- goto err;
- }
- /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- goto err;
}
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
- || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
+ PACKET_remaining(&extension),
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
- unsigned int dsize;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || (dsize & 1) != 0
- || (dsize == 0)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
- || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
- goto err;
+ PACKET supported_sig_algs;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
+ || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
+ || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
+ PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- PACKET ssubpkt;
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
+ (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ const unsigned char *ext_data;
+ PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
+ (&extension, &responder_id_list))
+ return 0;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
- (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
- goto err;
+ /*
+ * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
+ * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
+ */
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
+ OCSP_RESPID_free);
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+ }
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- const unsigned char *sdata;
- unsigned int dsize;
- /* Read in responder_id_list */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
- goto err;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
- unsigned int idsize;
+ PACKET responder_id;
+ const unsigned char *id_data;
- if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
- goto err;
- }
- sdata = data;
- data += idsize;
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
- if (!id)
- goto err;
- if (data != sdata) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- goto err;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
+ &responder_id)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
+ return 0;
}
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
+
+ id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
+ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
+ PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
+ if (id == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
+
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- goto err;
- }
- sdata = data;
- if (dsize > 0) {
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
+ ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
- goto err;
+ d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
+ PACKET_remaining(&exts));
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
+ || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
}
- }
- /*
- * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
- */
- else
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ /*
+ * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
+ */
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ }
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
- s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
+ * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
}
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
+ if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-#endif
+ s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
/*
* Note: extended master secret extension handled in
* tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
* ServerHello may be later returned.
*/
else if (!s->hit) {
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+ if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
+ PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
}
- /* Spurious data on the end */
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
- goto err;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
+ */
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
ri_check:
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
+ * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
+ * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
+ * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
+ */
return 1;
-err:
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
}
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
-
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
return 0;
*/
static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
{
- unsigned int len;
+ PACKET tmp_protocol;
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
return 0;
}
SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-#endif
+ s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
return 0;
}
+ if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
const unsigned char *data;
PACKET spkt;
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
- || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
+ || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
- || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
+ || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
/*
* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
* request message.
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ /*
+ * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
+ * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
+ * need to let control continue to flow to that.
+ */
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
+ s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
+ if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
+ s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
+ if (size > 0) {
+ s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+ if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- if (s->
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
- size,
- s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
+ size,
+ s->
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
+ * a single Serverhello
+ */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
unsigned len;
/* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+ if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
- || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
+ || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- }
-#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
+ s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname =
+ OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
* an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
* because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
* However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
- * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
- * initial connect only.
+ * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
*/
if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
return 0;
- }
+ }
}
return 1;
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
-
+ s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
return 1;
}
ret =
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
+ && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
return 1;
}
}
+
/* Initialise digests to default values */
void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
{
{
int al;
size_t i;
- /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
+
+ /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+ SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
return 0;
}
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+/*
+ * Upon success, returns 1.
+ * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
+ */
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
/*
* If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
* influence which certificate is sent
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int r;
+ int ret;
CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (certpkey == NULL) {
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
- * et al can pick it up.
- */
- s->cert->key = certpkey;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- switch (r) {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- else
+ if (certpkey != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
+ * et al can pick it up.
+ */
+ s->cert->key = certpkey;
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ switch (ret) {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ default:
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
- } else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
- err:
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
+ }
- default:
- return 1;
+ if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
+ return 0;
}
+
+ return 1;
}
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
&& (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
size_t i;
unsigned char *list;
}
}
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret =
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
+ && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
/*
* Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
unsigned int type, size;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
if (have_ticket == 0)
retv = 0;
-end:
+ end:
return retv;
}
* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
* sess_id: points at the session ID.
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
+ int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
- if (eticklen < 48)
- return 2;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
return -2;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ret = -2;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rv == 0)
- return 2;
+ goto err;
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ ret = 2;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
- return 2;
- if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
+ sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
+ ret = 2;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
- etick + 16) <= 0) {
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+ etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
+ 0) {
goto err;
- }
+ }
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
if (mlen < 0) {
goto err;
}
+ /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
+ if (eticklen <=
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
+ ret = 2;
+ goto err;
+ }
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
- || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (sdec == NULL
- || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
+ if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
-err:
+ err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- return -1;
+ return ret;
}
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
return NID_undef;
}
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
- const EVP_MD *md)
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
{
int sig_id, md_id;
if (!md)
{NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
{NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
{NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
};
static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
if (hash_alg == 0)
return NULL;
- for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
- {
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
return tls12_md_info + i;
}
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
-# endif
+#endif
}
return -1;
}
}
if (psignhash_nid) {
if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
- || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
- sign_nid) <= 0)
+ || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
}
}
* RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
* down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
*/
- sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
switch (sigalgs[1]) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
} else
- conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+ conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
return 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
- /*
- * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
- * ignoring any peer preferences.
- */
- const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
- if (s->server)
- sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
- else
- sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
- if (sigs) {
- idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
- md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
- pmd[idx] = md;
- pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
- pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
#endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
+ EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
-# endif
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
+ EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
+#endif
}
return 1;
}
}
/*
- * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
+ * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
*/
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
}
-int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
- int client)
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
{
unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
int rhash, rsign;
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
if (!x || !pk)
goto end;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
- rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
- CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
- *pvalid = rv;
- return rv;
- }
-#endif
} else {
if (!x || !pk)
return 0;
return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
{
if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
DH *dhp = DH_new();
+ BIGNUM *p, *g;
if (dhp == NULL)
return NULL;
- dhp->g = BN_new();
- if (dhp->g != NULL)
- BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
+ g = BN_new();
+ if (g != NULL)
+ BN_set_word(g, 2);
if (dh_secbits >= 192)
- dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
else
- dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
- if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
+ if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
DH_free(dhp);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
return NULL;
}
return dhp;
{
/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
+ /* Don't check signature if self signed */
+ if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
+ return 1;
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
const EVP_MD *md;