Initial support for RFC6689, a.k.a. DANE.

[oweals/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 04385f6c64df90cb55658ea09886a804b36913bc..88570201a1b1a2ec0ddc85ab78b2cb9f0c145a23 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -707,6 +707,11 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
        {
        unsigned char curve_id[2];
        EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+       /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
+       if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+               return 1;
+#endif
        /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
         * no other curves permitted.
         */
@@ -1382,11 +1387,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
        if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
                {
-               size_t lenmax;
                 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
                 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
 
-               if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
+               if (limit < ret + 6)
+                       return NULL;
 
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
                 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
@@ -2442,7 +2447,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        unsigned char selected_len;
 
                        /* We must have requested it. */
-                       if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+                       if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
                                return 0;
@@ -2786,11 +2791,11 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
        switch (ret)
                {
                case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-                       ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+                       ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
                        return -1;
 
                case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
-                       ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+                       ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
                        return 1; 
 
                default:
@@ -3118,7 +3123,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
        HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
        HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-       if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+       if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
                return 2;
        /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
        /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
@@ -3424,6 +3429,32 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
 
        tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+       if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+               {
+               /* Use first set signature preference to force message
+                * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
+                */
+               const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
+               if (s->server)
+                       sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
+               else
+                       sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
+               if (sigs)
+                       {
+                       idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
+                       md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
+                       c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+                       c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                       if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+                               {
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+#endif
+
        for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
                        i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
                {
@@ -3719,6 +3750,8 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
        sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
        if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
                return 0;
+       if (c == NULL)
+               return 1;
        return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
        }
 
@@ -3837,6 +3870,15 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                /* If no cert or key, forget it */
                if (!x || !pk)
                        goto end;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+               /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
+               if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+                       {
+                       rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+                       cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+                       return rv;
+                       }
+#endif
                }
        else
                {