return ret;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ * SNI,
+ * elliptic_curves
+ * ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
+ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
+ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
+ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
+
+ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
+ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
+ 0x01, /* 1 point format */
+ 0x00, /* uncompressed */
+ };
+
+ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+ static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
+ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
+ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
+ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+
+ if (data >= (d+n-2))
+ return;
+ data += 2;
+
+ if (data > (d+n-4))
+ return;
+ n2s(data,type);
+ n2s(data,size);
+
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+ if (data+size > d+n)
+ return;
+ data += size;
+
+ if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ {
+ const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len != d+n)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
switch (servname_type)
{
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
+ if (!s->hit)
{
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
- ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL))
+ if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
}
else
- s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
+ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+ && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
break;
}
n2s(data, idsize);
dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+ size -= 2 + idsize;
if (dsize < 0)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size)
+ if (dsize != size)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0)
{
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+ {
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+ X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ }
+
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
&sdata, dsize);
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
+ unsigned short length;
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
- unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
- n2s(data,len);
+ n2s(data,length);
+ if (data+length != d+n)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
while(data <= (d+n-4))
{
return 1;
}
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
{
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ switch (ret)
+ {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ int al;
+
/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
* Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
- * the certificate has changed.
+ * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+ * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
*/
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
{
int r;
+ CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+ certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+ if (certpkey == NULL)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+ * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+ */
+ s->cert->key = certpkey;
r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
switch (r)
{
}
else
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- err:
+
+ err:
switch (ret)
{
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done=0;
- default:
- return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
}
}
HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
goto tickerr;
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
}
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
goto tickerr;
+ }
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
p = sdec;
projects / oweals / openssl.git / blobdiff