return ret;
}
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+/* tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates |*aead_ctx|, if needed and returns 1. It
+ * returns 0 on malloc error. */
+static int tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx)
{
- static const unsigned char empty[]="";
- unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
- unsigned char *exp_label;
- unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
- int client_write;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- const SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
- const EVP_MD *m;
- int mac_type;
- int *mac_secret_size;
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
- int reuse_dd = 0;
+ if (*aead_ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx);
+ else
+ {
+ *aead_ctx = (SSL_AEAD_CTX*) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX));
+ if (*aead_ctx == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_AEAD_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
- is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
- m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
- mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
-#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
- printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
- comp);
- printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
- printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
- c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
- printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+static int tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len)
{
- int i;
- for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
+ SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx;
+
+ if (is_read)
+ {
+ if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx))
+ return 0;
+ aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx))
+ return 0;
+ aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx;
+ }
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
+ if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len,
+ EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL /* engine */))
+ return 0;
+ if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len);
+ aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len;
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record =
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_INCLUDED_IN_RECORD) != 0;
+ if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher
+ * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument |is_read| is true iff this
+ * function is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a
+ * ChangeCipherSpec message. In order to support export ciphersuites,
+ * use_client_keys indicates whether the key material provided is in the
+ * "client write" direction. */
+static int tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s,
+ char is_read, char use_client_keys,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_len,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len)
+ {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ const char is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) != 0;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+ char is_aead_cipher;
+
+ unsigned char export_tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char export_tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char export_iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char export_iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+
+ if (is_read)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
goto err;
else
/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
- dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
- mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
+
+ cipher_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
+
+ memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
+ s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+
+ cipher_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
+
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
+ s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len;
+ }
+
+ if (is_export)
+ {
+ /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
+ * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ const unsigned char *label;
+ unsigned label_len;
+
+ if (use_client_keys)
+ {
+ label = (const unsigned char*) TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ label = (const unsigned char*) TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ label, label_len,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ key /* secret */, key_len /* secret length */,
+ export_tmp1 /* output */,
+ export_tmp2 /* scratch space */,
+ EVP_CIPHER_key_length(s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc) /* output length */))
+ return 0;
+ key = export_tmp1;
+
+ if (iv_len > 0)
+ {
+ static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ empty /* secret */ ,0 /* secret length */,
+ export_iv1 /* output */,
+ export_iv2 /* scratch space */,
+ iv_len * 2 /* output length */))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (use_client_keys)
+ iv = export_iv1;
+ else
+ iv = &export_iv1[iv_len];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* is_aead_cipher indicates whether the EVP_CIPHER implements an AEAD
+ * interface. This is different from the newer EVP_AEAD interface. */
+ is_aead_cipher = (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0;
+
+ if (!is_aead_cipher)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key =
+ EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type,
+ NULL, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
+ if (!mac_key)
+ return 0;
+ EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, s->s3->tmp.new_hash, NULL, mac_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ {
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key,
+ NULL /* iv */, !is_read);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, iv_len, (void*) iv);
+ }
+ else
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key, iv, !is_read);
+
+ /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+ if (is_aead_cipher && mac_secret_len > 0)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ mac_secret_len, (void*) mac_secret);
+
+ if (is_export)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(export_tmp1, sizeof(export_tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(export_tmp2, sizeof(export_tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(export_iv1, sizeof(export_iv1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(export_iv2, sizeof(export_iv2));
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ {
+ /* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message -
+ * i.e. we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just
+ * written one. */
+ const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
+ /* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client
+ * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a
+ * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */
+ const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE ||
+ which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+ const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret, *mac_secret;
+ const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key, *key;
+ const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv, *iv;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
+ unsigned key_len, iv_len, mac_secret_len;
+ const unsigned char *key_data;
+ const char is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) != 0;
+
+ /* Update compression contexts. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+
+ if (is_read)
+ {
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand=NULL;
+ s->expand = NULL;
}
if (comp != NULL)
{
if (s->expand == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ return 0;
}
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+ s->s3->rrec.comp =
+ (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
goto err;
}
-#endif
- /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
- mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
}
else
{
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- else
- /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
- dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress=NULL;
+ s->compress = NULL;
}
if (comp != NULL)
{
- s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
if (s->compress == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ return 0;
}
}
-#endif
- /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
- mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
- if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+ /* Reset sequence number to zero. */
+ memset(is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence, 0, 8);
- p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
- i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+ /* key_arg is used for SSLv2. We don't need it for TLS. */
+ s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
- cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
- cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
- /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
- else
- k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
- (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
+ mac_secret_len = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
+ if (aead != NULL)
{
- ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
- key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
- iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
- exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write=1;
+ key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+ iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
}
else
{
- n=i;
- ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
- key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
- iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
- exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write=0;
- }
+ key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+ if (is_export && key_len > SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ key_len = SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
}
- memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
+ key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ client_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len;
+ server_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len;
+ client_write_key = key_data; key_data += key_len;
+ server_write_key = key_data; key_data += key_len;
+ client_write_iv = key_data; key_data += iv_len;
+ server_write_iv = key_data; key_data += iv_len;
- if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ if (use_client_keys)
{
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
- mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
- EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
+ key = client_write_key;
+ iv = client_write_iv;
}
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
- if (is_export)
+ else
{
- /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
- * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
- */
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- exp_label,exp_label_len,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- goto err2;
- key=tmp1;
-
- if (k > 0)
- {
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
- goto err2;
- if (client_write)
- iv=iv1;
- else
- iv= &(iv1[k]);
- }
+ mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
+ key = server_write_key;
+ iv = server_write_iv;
}
- s->session->key_arg_length=0;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int i;
- printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
- printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
- printf("\n");
- printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
- printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ if (key_data - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
{
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- else
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
- /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- *mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+ if (aead != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read,
+ key, key_len, iv, iv_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys,
+ mac_secret, mac_secret_len,
+ key, key_len,
+ iv, iv_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
if (s->msg_callback)
{
int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
- if (*mac_secret_size)
+ if (mac_secret_len)
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
- mac_secret, *mac_secret_size,
+ mac_secret, mac_secret_len,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (c->key_len)
+ if (key_len)
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
- key, c->key_len,
+ key, key_len,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (k)
+ if (iv_len)
{
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV;
else
wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k,
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, iv_len,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
}
#endif
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\niv=");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
- return(1);
+ return 1;
err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
- return(0);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *hash = NULL;
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
int ret=0;
+ unsigned key_len, iv_len;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return(1);
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_comp(s->session, &comp))
+ goto cipher_unavailable_err;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher &&
+ (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
- return(0);
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead))
+ goto cipher_unavailable_err;
+ key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+ iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher);
}
+ else
+ {
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size))
+ goto cipher_unavailable_err;
+ key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.new_aead=aead;
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
- num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+
+ num=key_len+mac_secret_size+iv_len;
num*=2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
OPENSSL_free(p2);
}
return(ret);
+
+cipher_unavailable_err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
}
/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
unsigned long l;
int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+ const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead;
+
+ if (send)
+ rec = &s->s3->wrec;
+ else
+ rec = &s->s3->rrec;
+
+ if (send)
+ aead = s->aead_write_ctx;
+ else
+ aead = s->aead_read_ctx;
+
+ if (aead)
+ {
+ unsigned char ad[13], *seq, *in, *out, nonce[16];
+ unsigned nonce_used;
+ ssize_t n;
+
+ seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+ memcpy(ad, dtlsseq, 8);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(ad, seq, 8);
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ad[8] = rec->type;
+ ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+ ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+
+ if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) ||
+ aead->variable_nonce_len > 8)
+ return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */
+
+ memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, aead->fixed_nonce_len);
+ nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ size_t len = rec->length;
+ size_t eivlen = 0;
+ in = rec->input;
+ out = rec->data;
+
+ /* When sending we use the sequence number as the
+ * variable part of the nonce. */
+ if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
+ nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+
+ /* in do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by
+ * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the
+ * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number
+ * bytes into place without overwriting any of the
+ * plaintext. */
+ if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
+ {
+ memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
+ len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ }
+
+ ad[11] = len >> 8;
+ ad[12] = len & 0xff;
+
+ n = EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx,
+ out + eivlen, len + aead->tag_len,
+ nonce, nonce_used,
+ in + eivlen, len,
+ ad, sizeof(ad));
+ if (n >= 0 && aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
+ n += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* receive */
+ size_t len = rec->length;
+
+ if (rec->data != rec->input)
+ return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */
+ out = in = rec->input;
+
+ if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(nonce + nonce_used,
+ aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record ? in : ad,
+ aead->variable_nonce_len);
+ nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+
+ if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
+ {
+ in += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ out += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ }
+
+ if (len < aead->tag_len)
+ return 0;
+ len -= aead->tag_len;
+
+ ad[11] = len >> 8;
+ ad[12] = len & 0xff;
+
+ n = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, len, nonce, nonce_used,
+ in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, sizeof(ad));
+
+ rec->data = rec->input = out;
+ }
+
+ if (n == -1)
+ return -1;
+ rec->length = n;
+ return 1;
+ }
if (send)
{
int ivlen;
enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
else
seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *seq;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- size_t md_size;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
int i;
EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
unsigned char header[13];
mac_ctx = &hmac;
}
- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
{
unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
else
memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+ /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+
header[8]=rec->type;
header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
mac_ctx,
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
0 /* not SSLv3 */);
EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+ tls_fips_digest_extra(
+ ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+ mac_ctx, rec->input,
+ rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
}
if (!stream_mac)
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
#endif
- if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
{
for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
{
projects / oweals / openssl.git / blobdiff