unsigned char *out, int olen)
{
int chunk;
- unsigned int j;
- HMAC_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
+ size_t j;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int A1_len;
+ size_t A1_len;
int ret = 0;
chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+ if (!mac_key)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
- if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
goto err;
- if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
goto err;
- if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
goto err;
- if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
goto err;
- if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+ /* Reinit mac contexts */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
goto err;
- if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
goto err;
- if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
goto err;
- if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
goto err;
- if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
goto err;
- if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
goto err;
if (olen > chunk)
{
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
goto err;
out+=j;
olen-=j;
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */
+ /* calc the next A1 value */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
}
else /* last one */
{
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
goto err;
memcpy(out,A1,olen);
break;
}
ret = 1;
err:
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
return ret;
}
if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
}
len=slen/count;
+ if (count == 1)
+ slen = 0;
S1=sec;
memset(out1,0,olen);
for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
unsigned char *tmp, int num)
{
int ret;
- ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
return ret;
}
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+/* tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates |*aead_ctx|, if needed and returns 1. It
+ * returns 0 on malloc error. */
+static int tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx)
{
- static const unsigned char empty[]="";
- unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
- unsigned char *exp_label;
- unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
- int client_write;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- const SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
- const EVP_MD *m;
- int mac_type;
- int *mac_secret_size;
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
- int reuse_dd = 0;
+ if (*aead_ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx);
+ else
+ {
+ *aead_ctx = (SSL_AEAD_CTX*) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX));
+ if (*aead_ctx == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_AEAD_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
- is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
- m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
- mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
-#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
- printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
- comp);
- printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
- printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
- c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
- printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+static int tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len)
{
- int i;
- for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
+ SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx;
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
+ if (is_read)
+ {
+ if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx))
+ return 0;
+ aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx))
+ return 0;
+ aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len,
+ EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL /* engine */))
+ return 0;
+ if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len);
+ aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len;
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record =
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_INCLUDED_IN_RECORD) != 0;
+ if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher
+ * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument |is_read| is true iff this
+ * function is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a
+ * ChangeCipherSpec message. In order to support export ciphersuites,
+ * use_client_keys indicates whether the key material provided is in the
+ * "client write" direction. */
+static int tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s,
+ char is_read, char use_client_keys,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_len,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len)
+ {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ const char is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) != 0;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+ char is_aead_cipher;
+
+ unsigned char export_tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char export_tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char export_iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char export_iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+
+ if (is_read)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
- else
+ else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
goto err;
else
/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
- dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
- mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
+
+ cipher_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
+
+ memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
+ s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+
+ cipher_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
+
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
+ s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len;
+ }
+
+ if (is_export)
+ {
+ /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
+ * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ const unsigned char *label;
+ unsigned label_len;
+
+ if (use_client_keys)
+ {
+ label = (const unsigned char*) TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ label = (const unsigned char*) TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ label, label_len,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ key /* secret */, key_len /* secret length */,
+ export_tmp1 /* output */,
+ export_tmp2 /* scratch space */,
+ EVP_CIPHER_key_length(s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc) /* output length */))
+ return 0;
+ key = export_tmp1;
+
+ if (iv_len > 0)
+ {
+ static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ empty /* secret */ ,0 /* secret length */,
+ export_iv1 /* output */,
+ export_iv2 /* scratch space */,
+ iv_len * 2 /* output length */))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (use_client_keys)
+ iv = export_iv1;
+ else
+ iv = &export_iv1[iv_len];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* is_aead_cipher indicates whether the EVP_CIPHER implements an AEAD
+ * interface. This is different from the newer EVP_AEAD interface. */
+ is_aead_cipher = (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0;
+
+ if (!is_aead_cipher)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key =
+ EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type,
+ NULL, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
+ if (!mac_key)
+ return 0;
+ EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, s->s3->tmp.new_hash, NULL, mac_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ {
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key,
+ NULL /* iv */, !is_read);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, iv_len, (void*) iv);
+ }
+ else
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key, iv, !is_read);
+
+ /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+ if (is_aead_cipher && mac_secret_len > 0)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ mac_secret_len, (void*) mac_secret);
+
+ if (is_export)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(export_tmp1, sizeof(export_tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(export_tmp2, sizeof(export_tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(export_iv1, sizeof(export_iv1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(export_iv2, sizeof(export_iv2));
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ {
+ /* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message -
+ * i.e. we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just
+ * written one. */
+ const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
+ /* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client
+ * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a
+ * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */
+ const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE ||
+ which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+ const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret, *mac_secret;
+ const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key, *key;
+ const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv, *iv;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
+ unsigned key_len, iv_len, mac_secret_len;
+ const unsigned char *key_data;
+ const char is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) != 0;
+
+ /* Update compression contexts. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+
+ if (is_read)
+ {
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand=NULL;
+ s->expand = NULL;
}
if (comp != NULL)
{
if (s->expand == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ return 0;
}
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+ s->s3->rrec.comp =
+ (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
goto err;
}
-#endif
- /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
- mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
}
else
{
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- else
- /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
- dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress=NULL;
+ s->compress = NULL;
}
if (comp != NULL)
{
- s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
if (s->compress == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ return 0;
}
}
-#endif
- /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
- mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
+
+ /* Reset sequence number to zero. */
+ memset(is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence, 0, 8);
- if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+ /* key_arg is used for SSLv2. We don't need it for TLS. */
+ s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
- p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
- i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+ mac_secret_len = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
- cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
- cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
- /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
- (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
+ if (aead != NULL)
{
- ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
- key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
- iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
- exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write=1;
+ key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+ iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
}
else
{
- n=i;
- ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
- key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
- iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
- exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write=0;
+ key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+ if (is_export && key_len > SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ key_len = SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
}
- if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
+ key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ client_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len;
+ server_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len;
+ client_write_key = key_data; key_data += key_len;
+ server_write_key = key_data; key_data += key_len;
+ client_write_iv = key_data; key_data += iv_len;
+ server_write_iv = key_data; key_data += iv_len;
+
+ if (use_client_keys)
+ {
+ mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
+ key = client_write_key;
+ iv = client_write_iv;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
+ key = server_write_key;
+ iv = server_write_iv;
+ }
+
+ if (key_data - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
+ return 0;
}
- memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
- mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
- EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
- if (is_export)
+ if (aead != NULL)
{
- /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
- * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
- */
- if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
- exp_label,exp_label_len,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- goto err2;
- key=tmp1;
-
- if (k > 0)
+ if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read,
+ key, key_len, iv, iv_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys,
+ mac_secret, mac_secret_len,
+ key, key_len,
+ iv, iv_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ {
+ int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
+ if (mac_secret_len)
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
+ mac_secret, mac_secret_len,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ if (key_len)
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
+ key, key_len,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ if (iv_len)
{
- if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
- goto err2;
- if (client_write)
- iv=iv1;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV;
else
- iv= &(iv1[k]);
+ wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, iv_len,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
}
-
- s->session->key_arg_length=0;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int i;
- printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
- printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
- printf("\n");
- printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
- printf("\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\niv=");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
#endif
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
- return(1);
+ return 1;
err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
- return(0);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *hash = NULL;
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
int ret=0;
+ unsigned key_len, iv_len;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return(1);
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_comp(s->session, &comp))
+ goto cipher_unavailable_err;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher &&
+ (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
- return(0);
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead))
+ goto cipher_unavailable_err;
+ key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+ iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size))
+ goto cipher_unavailable_err;
+ key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
}
+ s->s3->tmp.new_aead=aead;
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
- num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+
+ num=key_len+mac_secret_size+iv_len;
num*=2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
OPENSSL_free(p2);
}
return(ret);
+
+cipher_unavailable_err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
}
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * short etc).
+ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ * an internal error occured.
+ */
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
unsigned long l;
- int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+ int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+ const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead;
+
+ if (send)
+ rec = &s->s3->wrec;
+ else
+ rec = &s->s3->rrec;
+
+ if (send)
+ aead = s->aead_write_ctx;
+ else
+ aead = s->aead_read_ctx;
+
+ if (aead)
+ {
+ unsigned char ad[13], *seq, *in, *out, nonce[16];
+ unsigned nonce_used;
+ ssize_t n;
+
+ seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+ memcpy(ad, dtlsseq, 8);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(ad, seq, 8);
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ad[8] = rec->type;
+ ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+ ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+
+ if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) ||
+ aead->variable_nonce_len > 8)
+ return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */
+
+ memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, aead->fixed_nonce_len);
+ nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ size_t len = rec->length;
+ size_t eivlen = 0;
+ in = rec->input;
+ out = rec->data;
+
+ /* When sending we use the sequence number as the
+ * variable part of the nonce. */
+ if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
+ nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+
+ /* in do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by
+ * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the
+ * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number
+ * bytes into place without overwriting any of the
+ * plaintext. */
+ if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
+ {
+ memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
+ len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ }
+
+ ad[11] = len >> 8;
+ ad[12] = len & 0xff;
+
+ n = EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx,
+ out + eivlen, len + aead->tag_len,
+ nonce, nonce_used,
+ in + eivlen, len,
+ ad, sizeof(ad));
+ if (n >= 0 && aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
+ n += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* receive */
+ size_t len = rec->length;
+
+ if (rec->data != rec->input)
+ return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */
+ out = in = rec->input;
+
+ if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(nonce + nonce_used,
+ aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record ? in : ad,
+ aead->variable_nonce_len);
+ nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+
+ if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
+ {
+ in += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ out += aead->variable_nonce_len;
+ }
+
+ if (len < aead->tag_len)
+ return 0;
+ len -= aead->tag_len;
+
+ ad[11] = len >> 8;
+ ad[12] = len & 0xff;
+
+ n = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, len, nonce, nonce_used,
+ in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, sizeof(ad));
+
+ rec->data = rec->input = out;
+ }
+
+ if (n == -1)
+ return -1;
+ rec->length = n;
+ return 1;
+ }
if (send)
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
{
- n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
}
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
int ivlen;
enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+ && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
else
ivlen = 0;
if (ivlen > 1)
{
if ( rec->data != rec->input)
- /* we can't write into the input stream:
- * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
- */
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ /* we can't write into the input stream:
+ * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__);
else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
return -1;
}
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
{
- n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
}
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
- (enc == NULL))
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
{
memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
rec->input=rec->data;
+ ret = 1;
}
else
{
l=rec->length;
bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
- if ((bs != 1) && send)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+ {
+ unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
+
+ seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
+ memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
+ memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(buf,seq,8);
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0) break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf[8]=rec->type;
+ buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+ buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
+ buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
+ buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
+ pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
+ if (send)
+ {
+ l+=pad;
+ rec->length+=pad;
+ }
+ }
+ else if ((bs != 1) && send)
{
i=bs-((int)l%bs);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
- unsigned long ui;
+ unsigned long ui;
printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
- ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
- DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
- ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+ ds->cipher->iv_len);
printf("\t\tIV: ");
for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
printf("\n");
if (!send)
{
if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
return 0;
- }
}
- EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+ ?(i<0)
+ :(i==0))
+ return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
+ {
+ rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ }
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
- unsigned long i;
- printf("\trec->data=");
+ unsigned long i;
+ printf("\trec->data=");
for (i=0; i<l; i++)
- printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
- }
+ printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
+ }
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ ret = 1;
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- {
- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
- i++;
- /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
- * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
- * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
- * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
- * now or no buggy implementation supports compression
- * [steve]
- */
- if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
- && !s->expand)
- {
- /* First packet is even in size, so check */
- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- i--;
- }
- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
- if (i > (int)rec->length)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
- return -1;
- }
- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
- {
- if (rec->data[j] != ii)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- rec->length -=i;
- if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
- {
- rec->data += bs; /* skip the explicit IV */
- rec->input += bs;
- rec->length -= bs;
- }
- }
+ ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+ if (pad && !send)
+ rec->length -= pad;
}
- return(1);
+ return ret;
}
+
int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
{
unsigned int ret;
for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
{
- if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)
+ if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
{
int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
}
}
- if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *seq;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- size_t md_size;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
int i;
EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
- unsigned char buf[5];
+ unsigned char header[13];
int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
int t;
OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
md_size=t;
- buf[0]=rec->type;
- buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
- buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
- buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
- buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
-
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
if (stream_mac)
{
mac_ctx = &hmac;
}
- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
{
unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+ memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
}
else
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+ memcpy(header, seq, 8);
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
- t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+ /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+ header[8]=rec->type;
+ header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+ header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+ header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+ header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+ if (!send &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+ {
+ /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+ * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+ * timing-oracle. */
+ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+ mac_ctx,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+ 0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+ t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+ tls_fips_digest_extra(
+ ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+ mac_ctx, rec->input,
+ rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
+ }
- if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("sec=");
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
#endif
- if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
{
for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
{
const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
int col = 0, sol = 0;
+
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
}
#endif
- tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
co, col,
so, sol,
p,len,
s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ {
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
+ p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
}
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buff;
+ unsigned char *val = NULL;
+ size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+ int rv;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+ if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
+
+ /* construct PRF arguments
+ * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
+ * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
+ * does not create a prohibited label.
+ */
+ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+ if (use_context)
+ {
+ vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+ }
+
+ val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+ if (val == NULL) goto err2;
+ currentvalpos = 0;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
+ currentvalpos += llen;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ if (use_context)
+ {
+ val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
+ {
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* disallow prohibited labels
+ * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
+ * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
+ * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+ */
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+
+ rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ val, vallen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+ out,buff,olen);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ goto ret;
+err1:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+ rv = 0;
+ goto ret;
+err2:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rv = 0;
+ret:
+ if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
+ if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
+ return(rv);
+ }
+
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
{
switch (code)
default: return(-1);
}
}
-
-int SSL_tls1_key_exporter(SSL *s, unsigned char *label, int label_len,
- unsigned char *context, int context_len,
- unsigned char *out, int olen)
- {
- unsigned char *tmp;
- int rv;
-
- tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-
- if (!tmp)
- return 0;
-
- rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
- label, label_len,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- context, context_len, NULL, 0,
- s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
- out, tmp, olen);
-
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- return rv;
- }