* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#endif
-static void tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
- int sec_len, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
+ int sec_len,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
unsigned char *out, int olen)
{
- int chunk,n;
- unsigned int j;
- HMAC_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
- unsigned char A1[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
- unsigned int A1_len;
+ int chunk;
+ size_t j;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+ unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t A1_len;
+ int ret = 0;
chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+ if (!mac_key)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ goto err;
- HMAC_Init(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
-
- n=0;
for (;;)
{
- HMAC_Init(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL); /* re-init */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len);
- memcpy(&ctx_tmp,&ctx,sizeof(ctx)); /* Copy for A2 */ /* not needed for last one */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
+ /* Reinit mac contexts */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ goto err;
if (olen > chunk)
{
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j);
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
+ goto err;
out+=j;
olen-=j;
- HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len); /* calc the next A1 value */
+ /* calc the next A1 value */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
+ goto err;
}
else /* last one */
{
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ goto err;
memcpy(out,A1,olen);
break;
}
}
- HMAC_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
- memset(A1,0,sizeof(A1));
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
+ return ret;
}
-static void tls1_PRF(const EVP_MD *md5, const EVP_MD *sha1,
- unsigned char *label, int label_len,
- const unsigned char *sec, int slen, unsigned char *out1,
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
+ unsigned char *out1,
unsigned char *out2, int olen)
{
- int len,i;
- const unsigned char *S1,*S2;
-
- len=slen/2;
+ int len,i,idx,count;
+ const unsigned char *S1;
+ long m;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
+ count=0;
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
+ if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
+ }
+ len=slen/count;
+ if (count == 1)
+ slen = 0;
S1=sec;
- S2= &(sec[len]);
- len+=(slen&1); /* add for odd, make longer */
-
-
- tls1_P_hash(md5 ,S1,len,label,label_len,out1,olen);
- tls1_P_hash(sha1,S2,len,label,label_len,out2,olen);
-
- for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
- out1[i]^=out2[i];
+ memset(out1,0,olen);
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
+ if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
+ if (!md) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
+ seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
+ out2,olen))
+ goto err;
+ S1+=len;
+ for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
+ {
+ out1[i]^=out2[i];
+ }
+ }
}
-
-static void tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
unsigned char *tmp, int num)
{
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+
- TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE];
- p=buf;
-
- memcpy(p,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE);
- p+=TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),
+ int ret;
+ ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL,0,NULL,0,
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
km,tmp,num);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
}
printf("\n"); }
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return ret;
}
int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
static const unsigned char empty[]="";
- unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret;
- unsigned char *exp_label,buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2];
+ unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
+ unsigned char *exp_label;
unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
+ unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
int client_write;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
const EVP_MD *m;
- int _exp,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
-
- _exp=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ int mac_type;
+ int *mac_secret_size;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+ int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+ is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+ mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
- key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
- printf("\talg= %ld, comp= %p\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms,
- comp);
+ printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
+ comp);
printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
{
int i;
for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n");
+ printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
{
- if ((s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) &&
- ((s->enc_read_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
- s->read_hash=m;
+ mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
goto err;
}
- memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
+#endif
+ /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
}
else
{
- if ((s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) &&
- ((s->enc_write_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash=m;
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
goto err2;
}
}
- memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
+#endif
+ /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(dd);
+ if (reuse_dd)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
- i=EVP_MD_size(m);
+ i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j=_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
- cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
- er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+ /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
{
}
memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
+
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ {
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+ mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
+ EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
#endif
- if (_exp)
+ if (is_export)
{
/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
* same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
*/
- p=buf;
- memcpy(p,exp_label,exp_label_len);
- p+=exp_label_len;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),key,j,
- tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c));
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ exp_label,exp_label_len,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL,0,NULL,0,
+ key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ goto err2;
key=tmp1;
if (k > 0)
{
- p=buf;
- memcpy(p,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE);
- p+=TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,p-buf,empty,0,
- iv1,iv2,k*2);
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL,0,NULL,0,
+ empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
+ goto err2;
if (client_write)
iv=iv1;
else
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
int i;
- printf("EVP_CipherInit(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
+ printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
printf("\n");
printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- EVP_CipherInit(dd,c,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ {
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
+ }
+ else
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+ /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ *mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif
- memset(tmp1,0,sizeof(tmp1));
- memset(tmp2,0,sizeof(tmp1));
- memset(iv1,0,sizeof(iv1));
- memset(iv2,0,sizeof(iv2));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
return(1);
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned char *p1,*p2;
+ unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
+ int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
+ int ret=0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return(1);
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&comp))
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return(0);
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
-
- num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+EVP_MD_size(hash)+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+ num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num*=2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
- if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- goto err;
+ }
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
+ if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("client random\n");
printf("pre-master\n");
{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
#endif
- tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num);
- memset(p2,0,num);
- OPENSSL_free(p2);
+ if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
+ goto err;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("\nkey block\n");
{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
#endif
- return(1);
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
+ && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
+ * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
+ if (p2)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(p2);
+ }
+ return(ret);
}
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * short etc).
+ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ * an internal error occured.
+ */
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
unsigned long l;
- int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+ int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
if (send)
{
- if (s->write_hash != NULL)
- n=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
+ {
+ int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
enc=NULL;
else
+ {
+ int ivlen;
enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+ && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+ else
+ ivlen = 0;
+ if (ivlen > 1)
+ {
+ if ( rec->data != rec->input)
+ /* we can't write into the input stream:
+ * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
}
else
{
- if (s->read_hash != NULL)
- n=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
+ {
+ int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
- (enc == NULL))
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
{
memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
rec->input=rec->data;
+ ret = 1;
}
else
{
l=rec->length;
bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
- if ((bs != 1) && send)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+ {
+ unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
+
+ seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
+ memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
+ memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(buf,seq,8);
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0) break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf[8]=rec->type;
+ buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+ buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
+ buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
+ buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
+ pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
+ if (send)
+ {
+ l+=pad;
+ rec->length+=pad;
+ }
+ }
+ else if ((bs != 1) && send)
{
i=bs-((int)l%bs);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
- unsigned long i;
+ unsigned long ui;
printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
- ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
- DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
- ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+ ds->cipher->iv_len);
printf("\t\tIV: ");
for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
printf("\n");
printf("\trec->input=");
- for (i=0; i<l; i++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[i]);
+ for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (!send)
{
if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- return(0);
- }
+ return 0;
}
- EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+ ?(i<0)
+ :(i==0))
+ return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
+ {
+ rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ }
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
- unsigned long i;
- printf("\trec->data=");
+ unsigned long i;
+ printf("\trec->data=");
for (i=0; i<l; i++)
- printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
- }
+ printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
+ }
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ ret = 1;
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- {
- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
- i++;
- if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
- {
- /* First packet is even in size, so check */
- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- i--;
- }
- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
- if (i > (int)rec->length)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- return(0);
- }
- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
- {
- if (rec->data[j] != ii)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- return(0);
- }
- }
- rec->length-=i;
- }
+ ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+ if (pad && !send)
+ rec->length -= pad;
}
- return(1);
+ return ret;
}
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx, unsigned char *out)
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
{
unsigned int ret;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
+ int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&ctx,in_ctx);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,out,&ret);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
+ {
+ d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return((int)ret);
}
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in1_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *in2_ctx,
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
{
unsigned int i;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
+ int idx;
+ long mask;
+ int err=0;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
q=buf;
- memcpy(q,str,slen);
- q+=slen;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&ctx,in1_ctx);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,q,&i);
- q+=i;
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&ctx,in2_ctx);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,q,&i);
- q+=i;
-
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(q-buf),
- s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
- out,buf2,12);
- memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
-
- return((int)12);
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
+ {
+ if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
+ {
+ int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+ {
+ /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
+ if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
+ err = 1;
+ q+=i;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+ out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
+ err = 1;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ if (err)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return sizeof buf2;
}
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
- unsigned int md_size;
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
int i;
- HMAC_CTX hmac;
- unsigned char buf[5];
+ EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
+ unsigned char header[13];
+ int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+ int t;
if (send)
{
rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
- mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
hash=ssl->write_hash;
}
else
{
rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
- mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
hash=ssl->read_hash;
}
- md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash);
-
- buf[0]=rec->type;
- buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
- buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
- buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
- buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ md_size=t;
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
- HMAC_Init(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash);
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8);
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5);
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length);
- HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size);
+ if (stream_mac)
+ {
+ mac_ctx = hash;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash);
+ mac_ctx = &hmac;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
+
+ memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
+ }
+ else
+ memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+ /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+ header[8]=rec->type;
+ header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+ header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+ header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+ header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+ if (!send &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+ {
+ /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+ * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+ * timing-oracle. */
+ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+ mac_ctx,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+ 0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+ t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+ tls_fips_digest_extra(
+ ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+ mac_ctx, rec->input,
+ rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("sec=");
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
#endif
- for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
+ if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0) break;
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0) break;
+ }
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
int len)
{
- unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE];
unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
+ int col = 0, sol = 0;
+
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- /* Setup the stuff to munge */
- memcpy(buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE);
- memcpy(&(buf[TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- memcpy(&(buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,
- buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE+SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2,p,len,
- s->session->master_key,buff,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
+ {
+ co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
+ col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
+ sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ co, col,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ so, sol,
+ p,len,
+ s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
+
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
}
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buff;
+ unsigned char *val = NULL;
+ size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+ int rv;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+ if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
+
+ /* construct PRF arguments
+ * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
+ * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
+ * does not create a prohibited label.
+ */
+ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+ if (use_context)
+ {
+ vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+ }
+
+ val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+ if (val == NULL) goto err2;
+ currentvalpos = 0;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
+ currentvalpos += llen;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ if (use_context)
+ {
+ val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
+ {
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* disallow prohibited labels
+ * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
+ * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
+ * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+ */
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+
+ rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ val, vallen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+ out,buff,olen);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ goto ret;
+err1:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+ rv = 0;
+ goto ret;
+err2:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rv = 0;
+ret:
+ if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
+ if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
+ return(rv);
+ }
+
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
{
switch (code)
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
+ (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
default: return(-1);
}
}
-