#include <openssl/md5.h>
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
-static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
- PACKET *cipher_suites,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
- **skp, int sslv2format,
- int *al);
+static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
/*
* ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
- * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
- */
-
/*
* Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
* not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
default:
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
return 1;
}
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ /*
+ * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
+ * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
+ */
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
+ break;
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* during re-negotiation:
*/
- && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
+ && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
- * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
- */
-
/*
* No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
* TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Try to read from the client instead */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+ if (s->hello_retry_request)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- st->hand_state = s->tlsext_status_expected ? TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
- : TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+ /*
+ * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
+ * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
+ * immediately.
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
+ * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
+ * session ticket?
+ */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
+ /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
+ st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
+ if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+ if (s->ext.status_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
- * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
+ * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
*/
st->use_timer = 1;
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
+ * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
+ * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
+ */
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
+ } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ /* Fall through */
+
case TLS_ST_OK:
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* No post work to be done */
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+
+ if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
+ && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
- return WORK_ERROR;
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
#endif
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
+ s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
&s->session->master_key_length)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ break;
+
+
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
break;
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ *confunc = NULL;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
*confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
*mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
+ break;
}
return 1;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
+
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
}
}
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
+
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
+
}
}
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
- BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
- /* Are we renegotiating? */
- && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- } else {
- ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
- }
-#endif
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* ec_point_formats
+ * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
*
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
*/
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
- unsigned int type;
- PACKET sni, tmppkt;
- size_t ext_len;
-
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
-
/* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
+ unsigned int type;
+ PACKET sni, tmppkt;
+ size_t ext_len;
tmppkt = hello->extensions;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-/*
- * Process all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier and
- * haven't already processed.
- *
- * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
- * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
- * ignored. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. Upon failure, sets |al| to
- * the appropriate alert.
- */
-static int tls_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
-{
- /* Reset various flags that might get set by extensions during parsing */
- s->servername_done = 0;
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
- s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
- s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-#endif
-
- s->srtp_profile = NULL;
-
- /*
- * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
- * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
- */
- if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- hello->pre_proc_exts, hello->num_extensions, al)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
- && tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
- hello->num_extensions,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, hello->pre_proc_exts,
- hello->num_extensions, al);
-}
-
-/*
- * Check the results of extension parsing. Currently just calls the servername
- * callback. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
- */
-static int tls_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse the extensions in the ClientHello that were collected earlier. Returns
- * 1 for success or 0 for failure.
- */
-static int tls_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
-{
- int al = -1;
-
- custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
-
- if (tls_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!tls_check_clienthello_tlsext(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- unsigned int j;
- size_t loop;
- unsigned long id;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
-#endif
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
- int protverr;
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
- CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
+ CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
+
+ clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
+ if (clienthello == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
+ if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ s->new_session = 1;
+ }
/*
* First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
*/
- memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
- clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
+ clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
- if (clienthello.isv2) {
+ if (clienthello->isv2) {
unsigned int mt;
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
}
}
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
/* Parse the message and load client random. */
- if (clienthello.isv2) {
+ if (clienthello->isv2) {
/*
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
goto f_err;
}
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
ciphersuite_len)
- || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
+ || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
/* No extensions. */
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
+ clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
/* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
+ * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
* for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
- * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
+ * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
*/
challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
- memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
- clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+ clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
challenge_len, challenge_len)
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
goto f_err;
}
- PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
+ PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
} else {
/* Regular ClientHello. */
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
- || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
+ || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
- &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
+ &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
+ if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
- &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
+ &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
* So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
+ if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
return 1;
}
}
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
/* Could be empty. */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
- PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
+ PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
} else {
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
}
- if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
+ if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
- &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
+ &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
- extensions = clienthello.extensions;
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
- &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
+ extensions = clienthello->extensions;
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al,
+ &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
/* SSLerr already been called */
goto f_err;
}
+ s->clienthello = clienthello;
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *pal)
+{
+ unsigned int j;
+ int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int protverr;
+ size_t loop;
+ unsigned long id;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+#endif
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
+ CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
+ DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
/* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
+ /* Give the early callback a crack at things */
+ if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) {
+ int code;
+ /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */
+ code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg);
+ if (code == 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (code < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK;
+ return code;
+ }
+ }
/* Set up the client_random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* Choose the version */
- if (clienthello.isv2) {
- if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
- || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
+ if (clienthello->isv2) {
+ if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
+ || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
!= (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
/*
* This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
* support it.
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
/* SSLv3/TLS */
- s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
+ s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
}
/*
* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
* versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
+ protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
} else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
- DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
+ DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
} else {
protverr = 0;
}
if (protverr) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
- if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
- s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
+ s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
- clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
+ clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
- } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
- || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
+ || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
}
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
+ protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
if (protverr != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
}
}
s->hit = 0;
/* We need to do this before getting the session */
- if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
- clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
}
/*
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
* ignored.
*/
- if (clienthello.isv2 ||
+ if (clienthello->isv2 ||
(s->new_session &&
(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
- /*
- * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version.
- * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
- * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
- * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
- * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
- * will abort the handshake with an error.
- */
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, &al);
+ if (i == 1) {
/* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
}
}
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
- clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
- goto f_err;
+ if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
+ clienthello->isv2, &al) ||
+ !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
+ clienthello->isv2, &al)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+ /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
+ if (scsvs != NULL) {
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
+ if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
+ !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
+ /*
+ * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
+ * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
+ * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
+ * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
+ * an insecure downgrade.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
}
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
* to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
}
- for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
- if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
+ for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
+ if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
break;
}
- if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
+ if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
/* TLS extensions */
- if (!tls_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
- /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
- /* No suitable share */
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
- goto f_err;
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
}
}
- if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
/*
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
int master_key_length;
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
- s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
+ s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->hit = 1;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
- pref_cipher =
- pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
- s->
- session->ciphers,
- SSL_get_ciphers
- (s));
+ if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+ pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
+ SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
- if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
unsigned int k;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
- if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
+ for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
+ if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
break;
}
- if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
+ if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
- } else if (s->hit)
+ } else if (s->hit) {
comp = NULL;
- else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
+ } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods
+ && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, v, done = 0;
unsigned int o;
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
- for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
- if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
+ for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
+ if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto err;
}
#endif
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
- if (!s->hit) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
-#else
- s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
-#endif
+ if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+ s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
+#endif
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
- return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
+ s->clienthello = NULL;
+ return 1;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ *pal = al;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
+ s->clienthello = NULL;
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
+ * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
+ */
+static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+ s->ext.status_expected = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
+ * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
+ * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
+ * influence which certificate is sent
+ */
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
+ && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
+ * et al can pick it up.
+ */
+ s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
+ switch (ret) {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->ext.status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
+ s->ext.status_expected = 1;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ default:
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
- if (!s->hit) {
+ int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ /* SSLErr() was already called */
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+ if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_A;
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
+ && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id) {
+ /*
+ * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
+ * just selected. Something must have changed.
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
- /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
- if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
- s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
- ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
- if (s->session->not_resumable)
- /* do not send a session ticket */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
+ goto f_err;
+ /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
+ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session->not_resumable =
+ s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
+ & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
+ != 0));
+ if (s->session->not_resumable)
+ /* do not send a session ticket */
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
+ }
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
- if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
*/
- /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
+ * certificate callbacks etc above.
+ */
+ if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
}
- wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+ wst = WORK_MORE_C;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
int ret;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
/*
* callback indicates further work to be done
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_B;
+ return WORK_MORE_C;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
/*
}
}
#endif
- s->renegotiate = 2;
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
f_err:
|| !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
|| (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we add all 1.2 and 1.3 extensions. Later
- * we will do this based on the actual protocol
- */
|| !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, &al)) {
+ SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
+ NULL, 0, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+ && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
return 1;
err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
size_t encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
#endif
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
unsigned long type;
const BIGNUM *r[4];
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
goto f_err;
}
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
- if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
- == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- pkey = NULL;
+ if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
+ || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
+ lu = NULL;
+ } else if (lu == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
#endif
/* not anonymous */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (lu != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
+ unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/*
* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
* points to the space at the end.
*/
- if (md) {
- unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
- unsigned int siglen;
- /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* send signature algorithm */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- /*
- * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
- * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
- * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
- * afterwards.
- */
- if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
- &sigbytes1)
- || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
- paramlen) <= 0
- || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
- || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
+ /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
+ if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* send signature algorithm */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
+ * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
+ * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
+ * afterwards.
+ */
+ siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
+ || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
- } else {
- /* Is this error check actually needed? */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
+ s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
+ paramlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
+ || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
}
int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- int i;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
+ 0, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
- || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- const unsigned char *psigs;
- size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
+ const uint16_t *psigs;
+ size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
+
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
}
}
- /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
- if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- if (sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- unsigned char *namebytes;
- X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- int namelen;
-
- if (name == NULL
- || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
- &namebytes)
- || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- /* else no CA names */
-
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ done:
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
-
return 1;
err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
if (rsa == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return WORK_ERROR;;
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
- wst = WORK_MORE_B;
- }
-
- if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
- /* Is this SCTP? */
- && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
- /* Are we renegotiating? */
- && s->renegotiate
- /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
- && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
- && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
- return WORK_MORE_B;
- } else {
- ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
}
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const unsigned char *sig, *data;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
-#endif
- int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- int type = 0, j;
- unsigned int len;
- X509 *peer;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-
- if (mctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- peer = s->session->peer;
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
- type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
-
- if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
- /*
- * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
- * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
- && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- len = 64;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int rv;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
- if (rv == -1) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (rv == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- } else {
- /* Use default digest for this key type */
- int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
- if (idx >= 0)
- md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
- if (md == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
- || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- {
- int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
- if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
- || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
- || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
- if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
- data = gost_data;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- (int)s->session->master_key_length,
- s->session->master_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- }
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
-#endif
- return ret;
-}
-
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
unsigned long l, llen;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- PACKET spkt;
+ PACKET spkt, context;
+ size_t chainidx;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
+ if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
+ for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+ PACKET extensions;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
+ &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
+ PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ }
+
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED;
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
sk = NULL;
+
+ /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
+ sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
+ &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
if (cpk == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
+ * for the server Certificate message
+ */
+ if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
+ || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
- int iv_len;
+ int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
+ union {
+ unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+ uint32_t age_add;
+ } age_add_u;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
+ s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
+ OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
+ }
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (senc == NULL) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
}
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
- int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
hctx, 1);
if (ret == 0) {
if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
+ tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL))
goto err;
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
- sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
/*
- * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
- * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
- * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
+ * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
+ * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
+ * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
+ * timeout.
*/
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
+ (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
/* Now the actual ticket data */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
|| macdata1 != macdata2
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ NULL, 0, &al))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
+ * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+ */
+int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
goto err;
}
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
+ s->ext.npn_len = 0;
goto err;
}
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
+ s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Zero length encrypted extensions message for now */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ int al;
+
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
- PACKET *cipher_suites,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
- int sslv2format, int *al)
+static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- int n;
- /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
- unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t len = 0;
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
+ * (should be s->version)
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+ || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
+ || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
- n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
+ /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ s->hit = 0;
- if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return NULL;
- }
+ /*
+ * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
+ * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
+ */
+ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s))
+ goto err;
- if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return NULL;
- }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+}
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
- sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
- if (sk == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return NULL;
- }
- } else {
- sk = *skp;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
- &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
- /*
- * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
- * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
- * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
- */
- if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
- continue;
-
- /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
- if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
- /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
- if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
- /*
- * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
- * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
- * downgrade.
- */
- if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
- goto err;
- }
- continue;
- }
-
- /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
- c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
- if (c != NULL) {
- if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- }
+ /*
+ * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
+ * a record boundary.
+ */
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ goto err;
}
- if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (skp != NULL)
- *skp = sk;
- return (sk);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
- return NULL;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}