* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+
+#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
* list if we requested a certificate)
*/
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
- } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
+ if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
err:
/* No valid transition found */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ BIO *rbio;
+
+ /*
+ * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
+ * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
+ */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
+ return 0;
+ }
SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
*/
static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
- && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
*/
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
+ && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
+ && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
return 1;
}
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
/*
* Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
- * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
+ * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
* immediately.
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
- * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
- * session ticket?
*/
- if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
- if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
+ /*
+ * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
+ * handshake at this point.
+ */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
- /* Fall through */
+ if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
+ * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
+ * been configured for.
+ */
+ if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
+ /* We've written enough tickets out. */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
} else {
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+ if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
/*
* Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
* straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
break;
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
- && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
+ && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through */
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
+static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
+{
+ switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
+#if defined(EPIPE)
+ case EPIPE:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(ECONNRESET)
+ case ECONNRESET:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
+ case WSAECONNRESET:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* server to the client.
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+ labellen, NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
}
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
- * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
- * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
- * something clever in the record layer for this.
- */
+
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
+ /*
+ * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
+ * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
+ * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
+ */
+ s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
break;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
+ if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+ && conn_is_closed()) {
+ /*
+ * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
+ * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
+ * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
+ * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
+ * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ break;
+ }
+
return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
break;
}
int ret;
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+ if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
/*
ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
+ s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
ext_len);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
goto err;
}
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
- || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
+ || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
&& (s->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
* So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
+ if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
}
}
}
/* Set up the client_random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* Choose the version */
goto err;
}
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
/* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
if (scsvs != NULL) {
for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
} else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
/*
goto err;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
+ && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
+ || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
/*
* A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
* just selected. Something must have changed.
SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
}
/* We need to do this before getting the session */
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
-#endif
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+ }
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
-#endif
+ if (trc_out != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
+ OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
}
for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
- pos = s->s3->server_random;
+ pos = s->s3.server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
* options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
break;
}
if (done)
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
- if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
int ret;
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
/*
* Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
* et al can pick it up.
*/
- s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
switch (ret) {
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
unsigned char selected_len = 0;
- if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
+ s->s3.alpn_proposed,
+ (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
+ s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
#endif
/* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
- int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+ int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
- if (rv < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_B;
+ if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
}
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
/* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
s->session->not_resumable =
s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
+ ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
if (s->session->not_resumable)
/* do not send a session ticket */
}
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
/*-
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
+ * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/*
*/
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
+ ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
compm = 0;
#else
- if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
compm = 0;
else
- compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+ compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
- || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
- || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- s->hello_retry_request
- == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
- : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
- NULL, 0)) {
+ || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+ : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
+ NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
size_t encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
#endif
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
int i;
unsigned long type;
const BIGNUM *r[4];
goto err;
}
- type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+ dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
pkdh = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
/* Generate a new key for this curve */
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key. */
- encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
+ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
&encodedPoint);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
goto err;
}
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
- || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
+ if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
+ || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
lu = NULL;
} else if (lu == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
/* not anonymous */
if (lu != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
size_t siglen, tbslen;
}
}
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
done:
s->certreqs_sent++;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
+ s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
- if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
return 1;
#else
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
- skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+
cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
-
- if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
+ if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- if (pub_key != NULL)
- BN_free(pub_key);
+ BN_free(pub_key);
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
}
ret = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
PACKET encdata;
/* Get our certificate private key */
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
/*
* New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
{
unsigned long alg_k;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+ labellen, NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
- if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
size_t chainidx;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
+ /*
+ * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
+ * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
+ * TLSv1.3
+ */
+ s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
+
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
*/
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
- int m = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
-
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
goto err;
}
- if (m & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) {
- /*
- * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
- */
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
- }
-
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
sk = NULL;
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
- sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
- &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
+ sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
+ &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Resend session tickets */
+ s->sent_tickets = 0;
}
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
if (cpk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+ unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+ /*
+ * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
+ * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
+ * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
+ * timeout.
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
+ (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+ unsigned char *tick_nonce)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
- int iv_len;
+ int iv_len, ok = 0;
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
- union {
- unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
- uint32_t age_add;
- } age_add_u;
-
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED) {
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
-
- /*
- * This is the first session ticket we've sent. In the state
- * machine we "cheated" and tacked this onto the end of the first
- * handshake. From an info callback perspective this should appear
- * like the start of a new handshake.
- */
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- }
-
- if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
- /*
- * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
- * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
- * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
- */
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
- s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
- if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
- s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
- OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
- if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
- }
- s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
- }
-
- if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
- tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
- goto err;
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (senc == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
if (sess == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
/* shouldn't ever happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
}
if (ret < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
|| !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
- /*
- * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
- * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
- * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
- * timeout.
- */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
- (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
- ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
- s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
- /* Now the actual ticket data */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
+ if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
/* Output key name */
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
/* output IV */
|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
- || macdata1 != macdata2
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ || macdata1 != macdata2) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+ unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+ if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
+ s->session->session_id_length)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+ unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
+ union {
+ unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+ uint32_t age_add;
+ } age_add_u;
+
+ age_add_u.age_add = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ size_t i, hashlen;
+ uint64_t nonce;
+ static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+
+ /*
+ * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
+ * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
+ * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
+ */
+ if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
+
+ if (new_sess == NULL) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
+
+ nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
+ for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
+ tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
+ nonce >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
+ nonce_label,
+ sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
+ tick_nonce,
+ TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
+
+ s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
+ OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
+ tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
+ * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
+ * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
+ || (s->max_early_data > 0
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
+ if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
+ tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
+ /*
+ * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
+ * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
+ * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
+ */
+ s->sent_tickets++;
+ s->next_ticket_nonce++;
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
return 1;
err:
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return 0;
}
projects / oweals / openssl.git / blobdiff