*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
default:
break;
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ /*
+ * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
+ * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
+ */
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return 1;
}
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
int ske_expected;
/*
- * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
- * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
+ * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
+ * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
}
+ } else {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ return 1;
+ }
}
break;
return 1;
}
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
+ /*
+ * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
+ * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
+ * HelloRetryRequest.
+ */
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
}
err:
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
- * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
- */
-
- /*
- * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
- * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
- * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
+ * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
+ * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
+ * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
*/
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
: TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to read from the server instead */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
}
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
+ /*
+ * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
+ * actually selected a version yet.
+ */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
+ if (!s->renegotiate) {
+ /*
+ * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
+ * received a message from the server. Better read it.
+ */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
/* Renegotiation - fall through */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
+ /*
+ * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
+ * actually selected a version yet.
+ */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
/*
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
* we will be sent
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
+ /*
+ * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
+ * convenient time.
+ */
+ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
+ if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_OK:
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* client to the server.
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
s->first_packet = 1;
}
+
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ && s->max_early_data > 0) {
+ /*
+ * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
+ * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
+ * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
+ */
+ if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
*confunc = tls_construct_finished;
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
+ break;
}
return 1;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
+
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
}
}
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
+
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
+ return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
+
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
}
}
}
/* Session ID */
- if (s->new_session)
+ if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
sess_id_len = 0;
else
sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
+ if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
+ && s->ctx->comp_methods
+ && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
+ /*
+ * This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end. We set
+ * this here so that we are after any early_data
+ */
+ s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
+ /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
if (protverr != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
- s->hit = 0;
-
/* Get the session-id. */
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
goto f_err;
}
- /*
- * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
- * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
- * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
- * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
- * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
- * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
- * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
- * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
- * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
- * server wants to resume.
- */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ compression = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
+ PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
+ } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
+ goto f_err;
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
+ EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
+ extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
/*
- * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
- * backwards compat reasons
+ * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
+ * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+ * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+ * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+ * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+ * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
+ * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
+ * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
+ * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
+ * message to see if the server wants to resume.
*/
- int master_key_length;
- master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
- &master_key_length,
- NULL, &pref_cipher,
- s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
- && master_key_length > 0) {
- s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
- s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
- pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
+ && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+ /*
+ * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
+ * backwards compat reasons
+ */
+ int master_key_length;
+ master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &master_key_length,
+ NULL, &pref_cipher,
+ s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
+ && master_key_length > 0) {
+ s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+ pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
+
+ if (session_id_len != 0
+ && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
+ && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
+ session_id_len) == 0)
+ s->hit = 1;
}
- if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
- && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
- session_id_len) == 0) {
+ if (s->hit) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
- || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
- s->hit = 1;
} else {
/*
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
- * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+ * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
- if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->session->ext.tick_identity
+ != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
goto f_err;
goto f_err;
}
- c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
- /* lets get the compression algorithm */
- /* COMPRESSION */
- if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- compression = 0;
- }
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (compression != 0) {
}
#endif
- /* TLS extensions */
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
- PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
- } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)
- || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
+ if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
goto f_err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ unsigned int sversion;
+ int errorcode;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
+ int al;
+ PACKET extpkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->hello_retry_request = 1;
+
+ /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
+ errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
+ if (errorcode != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ &extensions, &al, NULL)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
+ goto f_err;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(extensions);
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ OPENSSL_free(extensions);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
goto f_err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- &rawexts, &al)
+ &rawexts, &al, NULL)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- rawexts, x, chainidx, &al))
+ rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
goto f_err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
-
- exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
- && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
- (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
- && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
+ /*
+ * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
+ * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
+ * type.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
+ && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
+ (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
+ && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
s->session->peer_type = i;
DH *dh = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
+ int check_bits = 0;
+
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
goto err;
}
- if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
+ /* test non-zero pupkey */
+ if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
p = g = NULL;
+ if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
int al = -1;
long alg_k;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
PACKET params;
int maxsig;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
/*
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+ unsigned int sigalg;
int rv;
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
- rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
if (rv == -1) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- md = EVP_md5_sha1();
- } else {
- md = EVP_sha1();
+ } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
}
+ md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
+
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
- PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
- (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
- pkey) <= 0) {
+ if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
+ RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
+ PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
+ PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ md_ctx = NULL;
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
if (al != -1)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
+ unsigned int i, name_len;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- const unsigned char *data;
const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
+ PACKET cadns;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- /* get the certificate types */
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
- s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
- if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
- /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
- s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
- if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ PACKET reqctx;
+
+ /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PACKET ctypes;
+
+ /* get the certificate types */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
- s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
- ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
}
- for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
- s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
+ PACKET sigalgs;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
- /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
+ /* Clear certificate validity flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
- }
- if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
+ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- } else {
- ssl_set_default_md(s);
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
- while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
xn = NULL;
}
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ PACKET reqexts;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
- s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int al;
+ int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
unsigned int ticklen;
- unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
unsigned int sess_len;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
+ /*
+ * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
+ * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
+ * be 0 here in that instance
+ */
if (ticklen == 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
s->session = new_sess;
}
+ /*
+ * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
+ * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
+ */
+ s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
+
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
}
s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ PACKET extpkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
+ || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
+ EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ &exts, &al, NULL)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
goto err;
}
s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
+
+ /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(exts);
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
+
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ OPENSSL_free(exts);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
return 1;
}
-
+
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
-# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
- (*p)[1]++;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
- tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
-# endif
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+ /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
+ if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
+ goto err;
+
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
- if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
- return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
+ if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
}
#endif
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ /* should contain no data */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
+ * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
+ * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
+ * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
+ * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ SSL_renegotiate(s);
+ else
+ SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+}
+
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- &rawexts, &al)
+ &rawexts, &al, NULL)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
goto err;