#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
-int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
if (!s->renegotiate)
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
|| c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
- break;
+ return 1;
}
- return i < end;
+ return 0;
}
-int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char *pformats;
size_t num_formats;
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
+int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp;
* Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
*/
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
- pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
/* Copy curve ID if supported */
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
- if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
+int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
size_t ticklen;
return 1;
if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
- && s->session->ext.tick != NULL) {
+ && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
+ && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
} else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
&& s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
size_t salglen;
- const unsigned int *salg;
+ const uint16_t *salg;
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
+int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
int i;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0)
+ if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
/*
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
- /*
- * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
- * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
- */
- if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0)
+ if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
int i, end;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
-int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
return 1;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
+int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
}
/*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
* we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
* reviewed later.
*/
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+/*
+ * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. We only have two modes we know about
+ * at this stage, so we send both.
+ */
+int tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
- size_t i, sharessent = 0, num_curves = 0;
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Do we want this list to be configurable? For now we always
+ * just send both supported modes
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
+{
+ unsigned char *encoded_point;
+ EVP_PKEY *key_share_key;
+ size_t encodedlen;
+
+ key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
+ if (key_share_key == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key. */
+ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
+ &encoded_point);
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Create KeyShareEntry */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
+ * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
+ * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
+ s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ size_t i, num_curves = 0;
const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
+ unsigned int curve_id = 0;
/* key_share extension */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
return 0;
}
- pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen! */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
* now, just send one
*/
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- unsigned int curve_id = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
- size_t encodedlen;
-
- if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
- continue;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- /* Shouldn't happen! */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Generate a key for this key_share */
- curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
- key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
- if (key_share_key == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
+ curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
- /* Encode the public key. */
- encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
- &encodedPoint);
- if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
+ continue;
- /* Create KeyShareEntry */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- return 0;
+ curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves);
+ break;
}
+ }
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
- * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
- * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
- */
- s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
- sharessent++;
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (curve_id == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
}
+ if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id))
+ return 0;
+
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
return 1;
}
+int tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
+ if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
+ /* Extension data sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ end:
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
+ s->max_early_data = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ s->max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
+ * extension, we set it to accepted.
+ */
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
-int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+/*
+ * PSK pre binder overhead =
+ * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
+ * 2 bytes for extension length
+ * 2 bytes for identities list length
+ * 2 bytes for identity length
+ * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
+ * 2 bytes for binder list length
+ * 1 byte for binder length
+ * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
+ * subsequent binder bytes
+ */
+#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
+
+int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned char *padbytes;
size_t hlen;
return 1;
/*
- * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
- * code calculates the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
- * appear last.
+ * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
+ * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
+ * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
+ * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
*/
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
+ * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
+ */
+ if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
+ && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
+ && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+
+ if (md != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
+ * length.
+ */
+ hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
+ + EVP_MD_size(md);
+ }
+ }
+
if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
- /* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */
+ /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
/*
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
+ */
+int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ uint32_t now, agesec, agems;
+ size_t hashsize, binderoffset, msglen;
+ unsigned char *binder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
+ * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
+ * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
+ * so don't add this extension.
+ */
+ if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
+ || s->session->ext.ticklen == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request && md != ssl_handshake_md(s)) {
+ /*
+ * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session so
+ * we can't use it.
+ */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
+ * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations
+ * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch.
+ * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places
+ * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue.
+ */
+ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+ agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
+
+ if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
+ /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
+ * good enough.
+ */
+ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
+
+ if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
+ /*
+ * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If
+ * so we just ignore it.
+ */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to
+ * be mod 2^32.
+ */
+ agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
+
+ hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+ /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
+ s->session->ext.ticklen)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, hashsize, &binder)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
+ /*
+ * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
+ * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
+
+ if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, binder,
+ s->session, 1) != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
-int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned int ecpointformats_len;
PACKET ecptformatlist;
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
!s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/*
* MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
* request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
*/
- if (s->ext.status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
|| (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
- * the chain. We ignore any other repsonses.
+ * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
*/
if (chainidx != 0)
return 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
-int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/*
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
PACKET tmppkt;
/* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
- if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0)
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
/* We must have requested it. */
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
size_t len;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned int id, ct, mki;
int i;
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ s->ext.use_etm = 1;
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int group_id;
return 0;
}
+ if ((context & EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
+ unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL;
+ size_t i, num_curves;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
+ * already sent in the first ClientHello
+ */
+ if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
+ if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i >= num_curves
+ || !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->group_id = group_id;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
/*
* This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
return 1;
}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ PACKET cookie;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
+ || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
+ &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (context == EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+ unsigned long max_early_data;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
+ || !s->hit
+ || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
+ * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it.
+ */
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ unsigned int identity;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->hit = 1;
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}