static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl_set_authz(CERT *c, unsigned char *authz,
+ size_t authz_length);
+#endif
int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
{
if (x == NULL)
static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
int i;
-
- i=ssl_cert_type(NULL,pkey);
+ /* Special case for DH: check two DH certificate types for a match.
+ * This means for DH certificates we must set the certificate first.
+ */
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DH)
+ {
+ X509 *x;
+ i = -1;
+ x = c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA].x509;
+ if (x && X509_check_private_key(x, pkey))
+ i = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+ x = c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA].x509;
+ if (i == -1 && x && X509_check_private_key(x, pkey))
+ i = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ else
+ i=ssl_cert_type(NULL,pkey);
if (i < 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
c->pkeys[i].x509=x;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* Free the old authz data, if it exists. */
+ if (c->pkeys[i].authz != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->pkeys[i].authz);
+ c->pkeys[i].authz = NULL;
+ c->pkeys[i].authz_length = 0;
+ }
+#endif
c->key= &(c->pkeys[i]);
c->valid=0;
ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
- in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
if (in == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto end;
}
- x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
if (x == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
goto end;
}
- ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+
if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
ret = 0; /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply ret==0 ... */
if (ret)
int r;
unsigned long err;
- if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
+ if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
}
- while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
+ while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
!= NULL)
{
r = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
return(ret);
}
#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/* authz_validate returns true iff authz is well formed, i.e. that it meets the
+ * wire format as documented in the CERT_PKEY structure and that there are no
+ * duplicate entries. */
+static char authz_validate(const unsigned char *authz, size_t length)
+ {
+ unsigned char types_seen_bitmap[32];
+
+ if (!authz)
+ return 1;
+
+ memset(types_seen_bitmap, 0, sizeof(types_seen_bitmap));
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ unsigned char type, byte, bit;
+ unsigned short len;
+
+ if (!length)
+ return 1;
+
+ type = *(authz++);
+ length--;
+
+ byte = type / 8;
+ bit = type & 7;
+ if (types_seen_bitmap[byte] & (1 << bit))
+ return 0;
+ types_seen_bitmap[byte] |= (1 << bit);
+
+ if (length < 2)
+ return 0;
+ len = ((unsigned short) authz[0]) << 8 |
+ ((unsigned short) authz[1]);
+ authz += 2;
+ length -= 2;
+
+ if (length < len)
+ return 0;
+
+ authz += len;
+ length -= len;
+ }
+ }
+
+static const unsigned char *authz_find_data(const unsigned char *authz,
+ size_t authz_length,
+ unsigned char data_type,
+ size_t *data_length)
+ {
+ if (authz == NULL) return NULL;
+ if (!authz_validate(authz, authz_length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_AUTHZ_FIND_DATA,SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ unsigned char type;
+ unsigned short len;
+ if (!authz_length)
+ return NULL;
+
+ type = *(authz++);
+ authz_length--;
+
+ /* We've validated the authz data, so we don't have to
+ * check again that we have enough bytes left. */
+ len = ((unsigned short) authz[0]) << 8 |
+ ((unsigned short) authz[1]);
+ authz += 2;
+ authz_length -= 2;
+ if (type == data_type)
+ {
+ *data_length = len;
+ return authz;
+ }
+ authz += len;
+ authz_length -= len;
+ }
+ /* No match */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+static int ssl_set_authz(CERT *c, unsigned char *authz, size_t authz_length)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *current_key = c->key;
+ if (current_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!authz_validate(authz, authz_length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_AUTHZ,SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ current_key->authz = OPENSSL_realloc(current_key->authz, authz_length);
+ current_key->authz_length = authz_length;
+ memcpy(current_key->authz, authz, authz_length);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_authz(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *authz,
+ size_t authz_length)
+ {
+ if (authz == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_AUTHZ,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_AUTHZ,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ssl_set_authz(ctx->cert, authz, authz_length);
+ }
+
+int SSL_use_authz(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *authz, size_t authz_length)
+ {
+ if (authz == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_AUTHZ,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_AUTHZ,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ssl_set_authz(ssl->cert, authz, authz_length);
+ }
+
+const unsigned char *SSL_CTX_get_authz_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char type,
+ size_t *data_length)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *current_key;
+
+ if (ctx->cert == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ current_key = ctx->cert->key;
+ if (current_key->authz == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return authz_find_data(current_key->authz,
+ current_key->authz_length, type, data_length);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/* read_authz returns a newly allocated buffer with authz data */
+static unsigned char *read_authz(const char *file, size_t *authz_length)
+ {
+ BIO *authz_in = NULL;
+ unsigned char *authz = NULL;
+ /* Allow authzs up to 64KB. */
+ static const size_t authz_limit = 65536;
+ size_t read_length;
+ unsigned char *ret = NULL;
+
+ authz_in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (authz_in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_AUTHZ,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(authz_in,file) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_AUTHZ,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ authz = OPENSSL_malloc(authz_limit);
+ read_length = BIO_read(authz_in, authz, authz_limit);
+ if (read_length == authz_limit || read_length <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_AUTHZ,SSL_R_AUTHZ_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ OPENSSL_free(authz);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ *authz_length = read_length;
+ ret = authz;
+end:
+ if (authz_in != NULL) BIO_free(authz_in);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_authz_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
+ {
+ unsigned char *authz = NULL;
+ size_t authz_length = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ authz = read_authz(file, &authz_length);
+ if (authz == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_authz(ctx, authz, authz_length);
+ /* SSL_CTX_use_authz makes a local copy of the authz. */
+ OPENSSL_free(authz);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+int SSL_use_authz_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file)
+ {
+ unsigned char *authz = NULL;
+ size_t authz_length = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ authz = read_authz(file, &authz_length);
+ if (authz == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = SSL_use_authz(ssl, authz, authz_length);
+ /* SSL_use_authz makes a local copy of the authz. */
+ OPENSSL_free(authz);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */