&& (s)->method->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION)
# define SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) \
- (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING)
+ (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING \
+ || (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY)
# define SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(S) ((s)->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
int tick_identity;
/* Max number of bytes that can be sent as early data */
uint32_t max_early_data;
+ /* The ALPN protocol selected for this session */
+ unsigned char *alpn_selected;
+ size_t alpn_selected_len;
} ext;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
char *srp_username;
SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING,
SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY,
SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING,
- SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
+ SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING,
+ SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING,
+ SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY,
+ SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING,
+ SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY,
+ SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING,
+ SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
} SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE;
+/*
+ * We check that the amount of unreadable early data doesn't exceed
+ * max_early_data. max_early_data is given in plaintext bytes. However if it is
+ * unreadable then we only know the number of ciphertext bytes. We also don't
+ * know how much the overhead should be because it depends on the ciphersuite.
+ * We make a small allowance. We assume 5 records of actual data plus the end
+ * of early data alert record. Each record has a tag and a content type byte.
+ * The longest tag length we know of is EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN. We don't count the
+ * content of the alert record either which is 2 bytes.
+ */
+# define EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD ((6 * (EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN + 1)) + 2)
+
+/*
+ * The allowance we have between the client's calculated ticket age and our own.
+ * We allow for 10 seconds (units are in ms). If a ticket is presented and the
+ * client's age calculation is different by more than this than our own then we
+ * do not allow that ticket for early_data.
+ */
+# define TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE (10 * 1000)
+
#define MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE 255
struct ssl_comp_st {
unsigned char client_finished_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char server_finished_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char server_finished_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char handshake_traffic_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char client_app_traffic_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char server_app_traffic_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
/* Set to one if we have negotiated ETM */
int use_etm;
- /* Set to 1 if we are expecting to receive early data */
- int expect_early_data;
+ /* Are we expecting to receive early data? */
+ int early_data;
+ /* Is the session suitable for early data? */
+ int early_data_ok;
+
+ /* May be sent by a server in HRR. Must be echoed back in ClientHello */
+ unsigned char *tls13_cookie;
+ size_t tls13_cookie_len;
} ext;
/* Parsed form of the ClientHello, kept around across early_cb calls. */
ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx;
size_t asyncrw;
- /* The maximum number of bytes that can be sent as early data */
+ /* The maximum number of plaintext bytes that can be sent as early data */
uint32_t max_early_data;
+ /*
+ * The number of bytes of early data received so far. If we accepted early
+ * data then this is a count of the plaintext bytes. If we rejected it then
+ * this is a count of the ciphertext bytes.
+ */
+ uint32_t early_data_count;
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
};
} SSL3_COMP;
# endif
+typedef enum downgrade_en {
+ DOWNGRADE_NONE,
+ DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2,
+ DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
+} DOWNGRADE;
+
/*
* Extension index values NOTE: Any updates to these defines should be mirrored
* with equivalent updates to ext_defs in extensions.c
TLSEXT_IDX_renegotiate,
TLSEXT_IDX_server_name,
TLSEXT_IDX_srp,
- TLSEXT_IDX_early_data_info,
- TLSEXT_IDX_early_data,
TLSEXT_IDX_ec_point_formats,
TLSEXT_IDX_supported_groups,
TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket,
TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
TLSEXT_IDX_psk_kex_modes,
TLSEXT_IDX_key_share,
+ TLSEXT_IDX_cookie,
TLSEXT_IDX_cryptopro_bug,
+ TLSEXT_IDX_early_data,
+ TLSEXT_IDX_certificate_authorities,
TLSEXT_IDX_padding,
TLSEXT_IDX_psk
} TLSEXT_INDEX;
/* A dummy signature value not valid for TLSv1.2 signature algs */
#define TLSEXT_signature_rsa_pss 0x0101
+/* TLSv1.3 downgrade protection sentinel values */
+extern const unsigned char tls11downgrade[8];
+extern const unsigned char tls12downgrade[8];
extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method;
void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void);
void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
__owur int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field,
- size_t len);
+ size_t len, DOWNGRADE dgrd);
__owur int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen,
int free_pms);
__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm);
__owur int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound);
-__owur int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello);
-__owur int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version);
+__owur int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
+ DOWNGRADE *dgrd);
+__owur int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd,
+ int *al);
int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
int *max_version);
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