-/*
- * ! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c
- */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
-#include "o_dir.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "internal/o_dir.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
int bits, int nid, void *other,
void *ex);
-int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
-{
- static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
- ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback",
+static void ssl_x509_store_ctx_init(void)
+{
+ ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "SSL for verify callback",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
- }
-
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
-void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
{
- /* Set digest values to defaults */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init);
+ return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
{
- CERT *ret;
+ CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
- ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references = 1;
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback;
ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL;
ret->sec_ex = NULL;
- return (ret);
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
{
- CERT *ret;
+ CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
int i;
- ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
-
- ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
- /*
- * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
- * more readable
- */
-
- ret->valid = cert->valid;
- ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
- ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
- ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
- ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) {
- RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
- ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys];
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
}
- ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
- ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
- if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) {
- BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
- if (!b) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) {
- BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
- if (!b) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
- }
+ ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp);
}
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (cert->ecdh_tmp) {
- ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
- if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
- ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
-#endif
-
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
- CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ X509_up_ref(rpk->x509);
}
if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
- CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey);
}
if (cpk->chain) {
goto err;
}
}
- rpk->valid_flags = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) {
/* Just copy everything. */
ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
}
-#endif
}
- ret->references = 1;
- /*
- * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
- * will be set during handshake.
- */
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
- /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
- ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
- /* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */
-
+ /* Configured sigalgs copied across */
if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
- if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
+ if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
- if (!ret->client_sigalgs)
+ if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
cert->client_sigalgslen);
/* Copy any custom client certificate types */
if (cert->ctypes) {
ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
- if (!ret->ctypes)
+ if (ret->ctypes == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
if (cert->verify_store) {
- CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store);
ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
}
if (cert->chain_store) {
- CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store);
ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
}
- ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
-
ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb;
ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level;
ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext))
goto err;
if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext))
goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (cert->psk_identity_hint) {
+ ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
#endif
-
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
err:
ssl_cert_free(ret);
return;
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
- if (cpk->x509) {
- X509_free(cpk->x509);
- cpk->x509 = NULL;
- }
- if (cpk->privatekey) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
- cpk->privatekey = NULL;
- }
- if (cpk->chain) {
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
- cpk->chain = NULL;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (cpk->serverinfo) {
- OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
- cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
- cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
- }
-#endif
- /* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */
- cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ X509_free(cpk->x509);
+ cpk->x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+ cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ cpk->chain = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
+ cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
+ cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
}
}
if (c == NULL)
return;
- i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("CERT", c);
-#endif
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c);
if (i > 0)
return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (c->rsa_tmp)
- RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (c->dh_tmp)
- DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (c->ecdh_tmp)
- EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp);
#endif
ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
- if (c->peer_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
- if (c->conf_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
- if (c->client_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
- if (c->shared_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
- if (c->ctypes)
- OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
- if (c->verify_store)
- X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
- if (c->chain_store)
- X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
- if (c->ciphers_raw)
- OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+ X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+ X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
- if (c->pms) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(c->pms, c->pmslen);
- OPENSSL_free(c->pms);
- c->pms = NULL;
- }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
-int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
-{
- /*
- * Create a CERT if there isn't already one (which cannot really happen,
- * as it is initially created in SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code
- * usually allows for that one being non-existant, so we follow that
- * behaviour, as it might turn out that there actually is a reason for it
- * -- but I'm not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
- * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the initialization
- * in SSL_CTX_new).
- */
-
- if (o == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (*o == NULL) {
- if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
int i, r;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
if (!cpk)
return 0;
- if (cpk->chain)
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0);
if (r != 1) {
{
if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x))
return 0;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ X509_up_ref(x);
return 1;
}
c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
}
-SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
-{
- SESS_CERT *ret;
-
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
- if (ret == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
- ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- ret->references = 1;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (sc == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
- /* i == 0 */
- if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
-#if 0
- /*
- * We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just
- * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
- * data structure.
- */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#endif
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(sc);
-}
-
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type)
-{
- sc->peer_cert_type = type;
- return (1);
-}
-
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
- int i;
+ int i = 0;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+ return 0;
if (s->cert->verify_store)
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
else
verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
- return (0);
+ ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return (0);
+ goto end;
}
+ param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
+ /*
+ * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some
+ * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto
+ * and PKI authentication.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
+
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+
+ /* Verify via DANE if enabled */
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane);
/*
* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
* vice versa.
*/
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
/*
- * Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+ * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
*/
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param);
if (s->verify_callback)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
- i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
- else {
- i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
-# if 0
- /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
-# endif
- if (i > 0)
- i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1);
+ i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+ else
+ i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+
+ s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
+ s->verified_chain = NULL;
+ if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) {
+ s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
+ if (s->verified_chain == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ i = 0;
+ }
}
- s->verify_result = ctx.error;
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param);
- return (i);
+end:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return i;
}
static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
- if (*ca_list != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
-
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
*ca_list = name_list;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
{
- if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { /* we are in the client */
+ if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */
if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
else
return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
}
-static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b);
+}
+
+static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a);
+}
+
/**
* Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
*/
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
{
- BIO *in;
+ BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
-
- sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL;
+ LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash =
+ lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
- if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
+ if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL)
goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0)
+ if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else {
- sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
+ } else {
+ lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
}
}
+ goto done;
- if (0) {
err:
- if (ret != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
- ret = NULL;
- }
- if (sk != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ ret = NULL;
+ done:
+ BIO_free(in);
+ X509_free(x);
+ lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
if (ret != NULL)
ERR_clear_error();
return (ret);
}
-#endif
/**
* Add a file of certs to a stack.
int ret = 1;
int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
- oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
+ oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp);
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
}
ERR_clear_error();
+ goto done;
- if (0) {
err:
ret = 0;
- }
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
-
+ done:
+ BIO_free(in);
+ X509_free(x);
(void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
-
return ret;
}
const char *filename;
int ret = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
-
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
err:
if (d)
OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+
return ret;
}
unsigned char *p;
n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+ if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
l2n3(n, p);
- i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ n = i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
*l += n + 3;
return 1;
}
-/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
- int i;
-
+ int i, chain_count;
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
X509_STORE *chain_store;
/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
if (chain_store) {
- X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX* xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+ if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return (0);
}
- X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ /*
+ * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
+ * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
+ * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
+ * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
+ */
+ (void) X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
ERR_clear_error();
- i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0);
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
+ i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
if (i != 1) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+#if 0
+ /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+#endif
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
return 0;
}
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+ chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
+ for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
return 0;
}
}
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
} else {
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
if (i != 1) {
CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
X509 *x;
int i, rv = 0;
/* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
- if (!chain_store)
+ if (chain_store == NULL)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
untrusted = cpk->chain;
}
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
+ xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx,
c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
- i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
ERR_clear_error();
rv = 2;
}
if (i > 0)
- chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
+ i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
goto err;
}
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
/* Remove EE certificate from chain */
x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
X509_free(x);
if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
/* See if last cert is self signed */
x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) {
+ if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) {
x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
X509_free(x);
}
goto err;
}
}
- if (cpk->chain)
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
cpk->chain = chain;
if (rv == 0)
rv = 1;
err:
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
return rv;
}
pstore = &c->chain_store;
else
pstore = &c->verify_store;
- if (*pstore)
- X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+ X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
*pstore = store;
if (ref && store)
- CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(store);
return 1;
}
-static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
int bits, int nid, void *other,
void *ex)
{
level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx);
else
level = SSL_get_security_level(s);
- /* Level 0: anything goes */
- if (level <= 0)
+
+ if (level <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise,
+ * anything goes.
+ */
+ if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80)
+ return 0;
return 1;
+ }
if (level > 5)
level = 5;
minbits = minbits_table[level - 1];
break;
}
case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
- /* SSLv3 not allowed on level 2 */
- if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2)
- return 0;
- /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */
- if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3)
- return 0;
- /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
- if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4)
- return 0;
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */
+ if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2)
+ return 0;
+ /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */
+ if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3)
+ return 0;
+ /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
+ if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4)
+ return 0;
+ }
break;
case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
return 1;
}
-int ssl_security(SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
{
return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
}
-int ssl_ctx_security(SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
{
return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other,
ctx->cert->sec_ex);