-/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
-#include "o_dir.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "internal/o_dir.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+ int bits, int nid, void *other,
+ void *ex);
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+
+static void ssl_x509_store_ctx_init(void)
+{
+ ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "SSL for verify callback",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
- {
- static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
- {
- ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
- 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
- }
- }
-
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
- }
-
-void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
- {
- /* Set digest values to defaults */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
- }
+{
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init);
+ return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+}
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
- {
- CERT *ret;
-
- ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(NULL);
- }
- memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
-
- ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- ret->references=1;
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback;
+ ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL;
+ ret->sec_ex = NULL;
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
- {
- CERT *ret;
- int i;
-
- ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(NULL);
- }
-
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
-
- ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
- /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
- * if you find that more readable */
-
- ret->valid = cert->valid;
- ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
- ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
- ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
- ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
- {
- RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
- ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
- }
- ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
-#endif
+{
+ CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ int i;
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys];
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
- {
- ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
- if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
- {
- BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
- if (!b)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
- {
- BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
- if (!b)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
- }
- }
- ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
- {
- ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
- if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
- ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+ ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp);
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+ ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto;
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
- CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL)
- {
- rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
- CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
-
- if (cpk->privatekey != NULL)
- {
- rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
- CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
- switch(i)
- {
- /* If there was anything special to do for
- * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
- * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
-
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
- /* We have an RSA key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
- /* We have a DSA key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
- /* We have a DH key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
- /* We have an ECC key */
- break;
-
- default:
- /* Can't happen. */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- }
- }
-
- if (cpk->chain)
- {
- int j;
- rpk->chain = sk_X509_dup(cpk->chain);
- if (!rpk->chain)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(rpk->chain); j++)
- {
- X509 *x = sk_X509_value(rpk->chain, j);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
- }
- rpk->valid_flags = 0;
- if (cert->pkeys[i].authz != NULL)
- {
- /* Just copy everything. */
- ret->pkeys[i].authz_length =
- cert->pkeys[i].authz_length;
- ret->pkeys[i].authz =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ret->pkeys[i].authz_length);
- if (ret->pkeys[i].authz == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(NULL);
- }
- memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].authz,
- cert->pkeys[i].authz,
- cert->pkeys[i].authz_length);
- }
- }
-
- ret->references=1;
- /* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
- * will be set during handshake.
- */
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
- /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
- ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
- /* Configure sigalgs however we copy across */
- if (cert->conf_sigalgs)
- {
- ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen
- * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
- if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
- goto err;
- memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs,
- cert->conf_sigalgslen * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
- ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
- }
- else
- ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
- /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
- ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
-
- ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
-
- return(ret);
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
-err:
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
+ CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
+ rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
+ X509_up_ref(rpk->x509);
+ }
+
+ if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey);
+ }
+
+ if (cpk->chain) {
+ rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
+ if (!rpk->chain) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) {
+ /* Just copy everything. */
+ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length =
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+ memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Configured sigalgs copied across */
+ if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+ if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+ ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+
+ if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
+ ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
+ if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
+ cert->client_sigalgslen);
+ ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else
+ ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
+ /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
+ ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ /* Copy any custom client certificate types */
+ if (cert->ctypes) {
+ ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
+ if (ret->ctypes == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
+ ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
+ }
+
+ ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
+
+ ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+ ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+ if (cert->verify_store) {
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store);
+ ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+ }
+
+ if (cert->chain_store) {
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store);
+ ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
+ }
+
+ ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb;
+ ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level;
+ ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex;
+
+ if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext))
+ goto err;
+ if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext))
+ goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (cert->psk_identity_hint) {
+ ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
#endif
+ return ret;
- ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
+ err:
+ ssl_cert_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
+ return NULL;
+}
/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
- {
- int i;
- if (c == NULL)
- return;
- for (i = 0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
- if (cpk->x509)
- {
- X509_free(cpk->x509);
- cpk->x509 = NULL;
- }
- if (cpk->privatekey)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
- cpk->privatekey = NULL;
- }
- if (cpk->chain)
- {
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
- cpk->chain = NULL;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (cpk->authz != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(cpk->authz);
-#endif
- cpk->valid_flags = 0;
- }
- }
+{
+ int i;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ X509_free(cpk->x509);
+ cpk->x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+ cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ cpk->chain = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
+ cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
+ cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
+ }
+}
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
- {
- int i;
-
- if(c == NULL)
- return;
-
- i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
-#endif
- if (i > 0) return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
+{
+ int i;
- ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
- if (c->peer_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
- if (c->conf_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
- if (c->shared_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
- OPENSSL_free(c);
- }
-
-int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
- {
- /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
- * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
- * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
- * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
- * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
- * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
- * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
- * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
- */
-
- if (o == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return(0);
- }
- if (*o == NULL)
- {
- if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- }
- return(1);
- }
-
-int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
- if (!cpk)
- return 0;
- if (cpk->chain)
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
- cpk->chain = chain;
- return 1;
- }
-
-int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
- {
- STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
- X509 *x;
- int i;
- if (!chain)
- return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
- dchain = sk_X509_dup(chain);
- if (!dchain)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dchain); i++)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(dchain, i);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
- if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain))
- {
- sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
-int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
- if (!cpk)
- return 0;
- if (!cpk->chain)
- cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
- if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
-
-int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
- {
- if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x))
- return 0;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- return 1;
- }
-
-SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
- {
- SESS_CERT *ret;
-
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
- ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- ret->references = 1;
-
- return ret;
- }
-
-void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
- {
- int i;
-
- if (sc == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
- /* i == 0 */
- if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
-#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just
- * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
- * data structure. */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#endif
- }
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c);
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp);
#endif
- OPENSSL_free(sc);
- }
-
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
- {
- sc->peer_cert_type = type;
- return(1);
- }
-
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
- {
- X509 *x;
- int i;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
- return(0);
-
- x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
- if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return(0);
- }
-#if 0
- if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
-#endif
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
-
- /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
- * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
- * or vice versa.
- */
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
- s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
- /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
- * ctx.
- */
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
-
- if (s->verify_callback)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
-
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
-#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
- i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
-#else
- i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+ X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+ X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
+ custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
+ custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
- else
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
- i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
-#else
- i=0;
- ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
-#endif
- }
-
- s->verify_result=ctx.error;
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- return(i);
- }
-
-static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
- {
- if (*ca_list != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
-
- *ca_list=name_list;
- }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ int i, r;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+ if (!cpk)
+ return 0;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ cpk->chain = chain;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+ if (!chain)
+ return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL);
+ dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
+ if (!dchain)
+ return 0;
+ if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ int r;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+ if (!cpk)
+ return 0;
+ r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!cpk->chain)
+ cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x))
+ return 0;
+ X509_up_ref(x);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
+{
+ int i, idx;
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+ if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
+ idx = 0;
+ else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) {
+ idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
+ if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ c->cert_cb = cb;
+ c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ int i = 0;
+ X509_STORE *verify_store;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->cert->verify_store)
+ verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
+ else
+ verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+ ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
+ /*
+ * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some
+ * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto
+ * and PKI authentication.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
+
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+
+ /* Verify via DANE if enabled */
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+ * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
+ * vice versa.
+ */
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+ /*
+ * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param);
+
+ if (s->verify_callback)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+ i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+ else
+ i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+
+ s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
+ s->verified_chain = NULL;
+ if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) {
+ s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
+ if (s->verified_chain == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ i = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param);
+
+end:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return i;
+}
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
+ *ca_list = name_list;
+}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
- {
- int i;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
- X509_NAME *name;
-
- ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
- {
- name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
- if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
- {
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
- return(NULL);
- }
- }
- return(ret);
- }
-
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
- {
- set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
- }
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
- {
- set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
- }
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
+ if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
+}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return(ctx->client_CA);
- }
+{
+ return (ctx->client_CA);
+}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- { /* we are in the client */
- if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
- (s->s3 != NULL))
- return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
- else
- return(NULL);
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->client_CA != NULL)
- return(s->client_CA);
- else
- return(s->ctx->client_CA);
- }
- }
-
-static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
- {
- X509_NAME *name;
-
- if (x == NULL) return(0);
- if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
- return(0);
-
- if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
- return(0);
-
- if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
- {
- X509_NAME_free(name);
- return(0);
- }
- return(1);
- }
-
-int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
- {
- return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
- }
-
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
- {
- return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
- }
-
-static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-/*!
+{
+ if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */
+ if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
+ return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+ return (s->client_CA);
+ else
+ return (s->ctx->client_CA);
+ }
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+ return (0);
+
+ if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+ return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b);
+}
+
+static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a);
+}
+
+/**
* Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
* for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
* \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
*/
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
- {
- BIO *in;
- X509 *x=NULL;
- X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
-
- sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
-
- in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-
- if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
- break;
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
- /* check for duplicates */
- xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
- if (xn == NULL) goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else
- {
- sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
- sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
- }
- }
-
- if (0)
- {
-err:
- if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
- ret=NULL;
- }
- if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
- if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
- if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
- if (ret != NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- return(ret);
- }
-#endif
-
-/*!
+{
+ BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL;
+ LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash =
+ lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
+
+ if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* check for duplicates */
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ } else {
+ lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
+ }
+ }
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ ret = NULL;
+ done:
+ BIO_free(in);
+ X509_free(x);
+ lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/**
* Add a file of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to add to.
* \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
*/
int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
- const char *file)
- {
- BIO *in;
- X509 *x=NULL;
- X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
- int ret=1;
- int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
-
- oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
-
- in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-
- if (in == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
- break;
- if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
- xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
- if (xn == NULL) goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else
- sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
- }
-
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- if (0)
- {
-err:
- ret=0;
- }
- if(in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if(x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
-
- (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
-
- return ret;
- }
-
-/*!
+ const char *file)
+{
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+
+ oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp);
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ else
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ ret = 0;
+ done:
+ BIO_free(in);
+ X509_free(x);
+ (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to append to.
* \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
*/
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
- const char *dir)
- {
- OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
- const char *filename;
- int ret = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+ const char *dir)
+{
+ OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+ const char *filename;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+
+ while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
+ char buf[1024];
+ int r;
+
+ if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+ SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename);
+#else
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+#endif
+ if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+ goto err;
+ if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf))
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+ if (errno) {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+ ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
- {
- char buf[1024];
- int r;
+ ret = 1;
- if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
+ err:
+ if (d)
+ OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
-#else
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
-#endif
- if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
- goto err;
- if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (errno)
- {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
- return ret;
- }
+ return ret;
+}
/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
- {
- int n;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
- l2n3(n,p);
- i2d_X509(x,&p);
- *l+=n+3;
-
- return 1;
- }
-
-/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+{
+ int n;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+ if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+ l2n3(n, p);
+ n = i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *l += n + 3;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
- {
- BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
- int no_chain;
- int i;
-
- X509 *x;
- STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
-
- if (cpk)
- x = cpk->x509;
- else
- x = NULL;
-
- /* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use
- * parent ctx.
- */
- if (cpk && cpk->chain)
- extra_certs = cpk->chain;
- else
- extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
-
- if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
- no_chain = 1;
- else
- no_chain = 0;
-
- /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (x != NULL)
- {
- if (no_chain)
- {
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
- return 0;
- }
- else
- {
- X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
-
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return(0);
- }
- X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
- /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
- ERR_clear_error();
- for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
-
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
- {
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
- }
- }
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++)
- {
- x=sk_X509_value(extra_certs,i);
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
+ int i, chain_count;
+ X509 *x;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *chain_store;
+
+ /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpk || !cpk->x509)
+ return 1;
+
+ x = cpk->x509;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (cpk->chain)
+ extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+ else
+ extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+
+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
+ chain_store = NULL;
+ else if (s->cert->chain_store)
+ chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+ else
+ chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+ if (chain_store) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX* xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+
+ if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
+ * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
+ * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
+ * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
+ */
+ (void) X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
+ i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
+ if (i != 1) {
+#if 0
+ /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+#endif
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
+ for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
+ if (i != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+ CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+ X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int i, rv = 0;
+ unsigned long error;
+
+ if (!cpk->x509) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
+ chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (chain_store == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) {
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+ ERR_GET_REASON(error) !=
+ X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) {
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+ ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (c->chain_store)
+ chain_store = c->chain_store;
+ else if (s)
+ chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+ else
+ chain_store = ctx->cert_store;
+
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
+ untrusted = cpk->chain;
+ }
+
+ xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx,
+ c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
+
+ i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = 1;
+ rv = 2;
+ }
+ if (i > 0)
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Remove EE certificate from chain */
+ x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) {
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
+ /* See if last cert is self signed */
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+ if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) {
+ x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
+ X509_free(x);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check security level of all CA certificates: EE will have been checked
+ * already.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
+ if (rv != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+ rv = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ cpk->chain = chain;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
+ X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
+{
+ X509_STORE **pstore;
+ if (chain)
+ pstore = &c->chain_store;
+ else
+ pstore = &c->verify_store;
+ X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+ *pstore = store;
+ if (ref && store)
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(store);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+ int bits, int nid, void *other,
+ void *ex)
+{
+ int level, minbits;
+ static const int minbits_table[5] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
+ if (ctx)
+ level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx);
+ else
+ level = SSL_get_security_level(s);
+
+ if (level <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise,
+ * anything goes.
+ */
+ if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (level > 5)
+ level = 5;
+ minbits = minbits_table[level - 1];
+ switch (op) {
+ case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED:
+ case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED:
+ case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK:
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = other;
+ /* No ciphers below security level */
+ if (bits < minbits)
+ return 0;
+ /* No unauthenticated ciphersuites */
+ if (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* No MD5 mac ciphersuites */
+ if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5)
+ return 0;
+ /* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */
+ if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1)
+ return 0;
+ /* Level 2: no RC4 */
+ if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ return 0;
+ /* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */
+ if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */
+ if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2)
+ return 0;
+ /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */
+ if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3)
+ return 0;
+ /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
+ if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
+ if (level >= 2)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SECOP_TICKET:
+ if (level >= 3)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (bits < minbits)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+{
+ return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
+}
+
+int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+{
+ return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other,
+ ctx->cert->sec_ex);
+}