rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
- switch(i)
- {
- /* If there was anything special to do for
- * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
- * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
-
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
- /* We have an RSA key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
- /* We have a DSA key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
- /* We have a DH key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
- /* We have an ECC key */
- break;
-
- default:
- /* Can't happen. */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- }
}
if (cpk->chain)
ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext))
+ goto err;
+ if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext))
+ goto err;
+#endif
+
return(ret);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ custom_exts_free(&ret->cli_ext);
+ custom_exts_free(&ret->srv_ext);
+#endif
+
ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
return NULL;
X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
if (c->ciphers_raw)
OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
+ custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
+#endif
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
return 0;
for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key + i;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey)
{
c->key = cpk;
return(1);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
-static void tlsa_free(void *parent,void *ptr,CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,int idx,long argl,void *argp)
- {
- TLSA_EX_DATA *ex = ptr;
-
- if (ex!=NULL)
- {
- if (ex->tlsa_record!=NULL && ex->tlsa_record!=(void *)-1)
- OPENSSL_free(ex->tlsa_record);
-
- OPENSSL_free(ex);
- }
- }
-
-int SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx(void)
- {
- static volatile int ssl_tlsa_idx= -1;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
-
- if (((size_t)&ssl_tlsa_idx&(sizeof(ssl_tlsa_idx)-1))
- ==0) /* check alignment, practically always true */
- {
- int ret;
-
- if ((ret=ssl_tlsa_idx) < 0)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if ((ret=ssl_tlsa_idx) < 0)
- {
- ret=ssl_tlsa_idx=SSL_get_ex_new_index(
- 0,"per-SSL TLSA",NULL,NULL,tlsa_free);
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- }
-
- return ret;
- }
- else /* commonly eliminated */
- {
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ssl_tlsa_idx < 0)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (ssl_tlsa_idx < 0)
- {
- ssl_tlsa_idx=SSL_get_ex_new_index(
- 0,"pre-SSL TLSA",NULL,NULL,tlsa_free);
- }
- }
-
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- return ssl_tlsa_idx;
- }
- }
-
-TLSA_EX_DATA *SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data(SSL *ssl)
- {
- int idx = SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx();
- TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
-
- if ((ex=SSL_get_ex_data(ssl,idx)) == NULL)
- {
- ex = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLSA_EX_DATA));
- ex->tlsa_record = NULL;
- ex->tlsa_witness = -1;
- SSL_set_ex_data(ssl,idx,ex);
- }
-
- return ex;
- }
-
-/*
- * return value:
- * -1: format or digest error
- * 0: match
- * 1: no match
- */
-static int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen)
- {
- const EVP_MD *md;
- unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int len, selector, matching_type;
- int ret;
-
- if (reclen<3 || tlsa_record[0]>3) return -1;
-
- selector = tlsa_record[1];
- matching_type = tlsa_record[2];
- tlsa_record += 3;
- reclen -= 3;
-
- switch (matching_type) {
- case 0: /* exact match */
- if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */
- ret = EVP_Digest(tlsa_record,reclen,digest,&len,EVP_sha1(),NULL);
- return ret ? memcmp(cert->sha1_hash,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
- }
- else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert);
-
- if (key == NULL) return -1;
- if (key->length != reclen) return 1;
-
- return memcmp(key->data,tlsa_record,reclen)!=0;
- }
- return -1;
-
- case 1: /* SHA256 */
- case 2: /* SHA512 */
- md = matching_type==1 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha512();
-
- if (reclen!=EVP_MD_size(md)) return -1;
-
- if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */
- ret = X509_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
- }
- else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
- ret = X509_pubkey_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
- }
- else
- return -1;
-
- return ret ? memcmp(tlsa_record,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
-static int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
- int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
- X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth);
- TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
- const unsigned char *tlsa_record;
- int tlsa_ret=-1, mask=1;
-
-
- if ((ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx())) == NULL ||
- (tlsa_record=ex->tlsa_record) == NULL ||
- (tlsa_record==(void *)-1 && (ok=0,ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA)) || /* temporary code? */
- /*
- * X509_verify_cert initially starts throwing ok=0 upon
- * failure to build certificate chain. As all certificate
- * usages except for 3 require verifiable chain, ok=0 at
- * non-zero depth is fatal. More specifically ok=0 at zero
- * depth is allowed only for usage 3. Special note about
- * usage 2. The chain is supposed to be filled by
- * dane_get_issuer, or once again we should tolerate ok=0
- * only in usage 3 case.
- */
- (!ok && depth!=0)) {
- if (s->verify_callback) return s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
- else return ok;
- }
-
- while (1) {
- unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage;
-
- memcpy(&reclen,tlsa_record,sizeof(reclen));
-
- if (reclen==0) break;
-
- tlsa_record += sizeof(reclen);
-
- if (!(ex->tlsa_mask&mask)) { /* not matched yet */
- /*
- * tlsa_record[0] Certificate Usage field
- * tlsa_record[1] Selector field
- * tlsa_record[2] Matching Type Field
- * tlsa_record+3 Certificate Association data
- */
- certificate_usage = tlsa_record[0];
-
- if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) {
- tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen);
- if (tlsa_ret==0) {
- ex->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage;
- ex->tlsa_mask |= mask;
- break;
- }
- else if (tlsa_ret==-1) {
- ex->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */
- ex->tlsa_mask |= mask;
- }
- }
-
- }
- tlsa_record += reclen;
- mask <<= 1;
- }
-
- if (depth==0) {
- if (ex->tlsa_witness==-1) /* no match */
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, ok=0;
- else
- ctx->error = X509_V_OK, ok=1;
- }
-
- if (s->verify_callback) return s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
- else return ok;
- }
-
-static int dane_get_issuer(X509 **issuer,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
- {
- SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
- TLSA_EX_DATA *ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx());
-
- /* XXX TODO */
-
- return ex->get_issuer(issuer,ctx,x);
- }
-#endif
-
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
int i;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
- TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
-#endif
if (s->cert->verify_store)
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
- if (!s->server &&
- (ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx()))!=NULL)
- {
- const unsigned char *tlsa_record = ex->tlsa_record;
-
- /*
- * See if there are usable certificates we can add
- * to chain.
- */
- while (tlsa_record!=(void *)-1)
- {
- unsigned int reclen;
-
- memcpy (&reclen,tlsa_record,sizeof(reclen));
-
- if (reclen==0) break;
-
- tlsa_record += sizeof(reclen);
-
- if (tlsa_record[0]==2 &&
- tlsa_record[1]==0 && /* full certificate */
- tlsa_record[2]==0) /* itself */
- {
- ex->get_issuer = ctx.get_issuer;
- ctx.get_issuer = dane_get_issuer;
-
- break;
- }
- tlsa_record += reclen;
- }
-
- ex->tlsa_mask = 0;
- ex->tlsa_witness = -1;
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback);
- }
- else
-#endif
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
X509 *x;
int i, rv = 0;
+ unsigned long error;
if (!cpk->x509)
{
{
x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x))
- goto err;
+ {
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+ ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
}
/* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509))
- goto err;
+ {
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+ ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
}
else
{
i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR)
{
- ERR_clear_error();
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
+ ERR_clear_error();
i = 1;
+ rv = 2;
}
if (i > 0)
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
}
}
cpk->chain = chain;
- rv = 1;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ rv = 1;
err:
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
projects / oweals / openssl.git / blobdiff