* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "evp.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-/* SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICION);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCLED);
- * SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- */
-
-#ifndef NOPROTO
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len);
-static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len);
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
-static int do_compress(SSL *ssl);
-static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
-static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
-#else
-static int do_ssl3_write();
-static int ssl3_write_pending();
-static int ssl3_get_record();
-static int do_compress();
-static int do_uncompress();
-static int do_change_cipher_spec();
-#endif
-static int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
{
- int i,off,newb;
+ /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
+ * packet by another n bytes.
+ * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
+ * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
+ * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
+ * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
+ */
+ int i,len,left;
+ long align=0;
+ unsigned char *pkt;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+ if (n <= 0) return n;
+
+ rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
+ if (rb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ left = rb->left;
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
- /* if there is stuff still in the buffer from a previous read,
- * and there is more than we want, take some. */
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
+ if (!extend)
{
- if (extend)
- s->packet_length+=n;
- else
+ /* start with empty packet ... */
+ if (left == 0)
+ rb->offset = align;
+ else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
- s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[s->s3->rbuf.offset]);
- s->packet_length=n;
+ /* check if next packet length is large
+ * enough to justify payload alignment... */
+ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
+ {
+ /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
+ * and its length field is insane, we can
+ * only be led to wrong decision about
+ * whether memmove will occur or not.
+ * Header values has no effect on memmove
+ * arguments and therefore no buffer
+ * overrun can be triggered. */
+ memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
+ rb->offset = align;
+ }
}
- s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
- s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
+ s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
+ }
+
+ /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
+ * because the read operation returns the whole packet
+ * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if (left > 0 && n > left)
+ n = left;
+ }
+
+ /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
+ if (left >= n)
+ {
+ s->packet_length+=n;
+ rb->left=left-n;
+ rb->offset+=n;
return(n);
}
/* else we need to read more data */
- if (!s->read_ahead) max=n;
- if (max > SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
- max=SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE;
-
- /* First check if there is some left or we want to extend */
- off=0;
- if ( (s->s3->rbuf.left != 0) ||
- ((s->packet_length != 0) && extend))
+
+ len = s->packet_length;
+ pkt = rb->buf+align;
+ /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
+ * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
+ * 'left' extra ones at the end */
+ if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
{
- newb=s->s3->rbuf.left;
- if (extend)
- {
- /* Copy bytes back to the front of the buffer
- * Take the bytes already pointed to by 'packet'
- * and take the extra ones on the end. */
- off=s->packet_length;
- if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
- memcpy(s->s3->rbuf.buf,s->packet,newb+off);
- }
- else if (s->s3->rbuf.offset != 0)
- { /* so the data is not at the start of the buffer */
- memcpy(s->s3->rbuf.buf,
- &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[s->s3->rbuf.offset]),newb);
- s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
- }
+ memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
+ s->packet = pkt;
+ rb->offset = len + align;
+ }
- s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
+ if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
}
- else
- newb=0;
- /* So we now have 'newb' bytes at the front of
- * s->s3->rbuf.buf and need to read some more in on the end
- * We start reading into the buffer at 's->s3->rbuf.offset'
- */
- s->packet=s->s3->rbuf.buf;
+ if (!s->read_ahead)
+ /* ignore max parameter */
+ max = n;
+ else
+ {
+ if (max < n)
+ max = n;
+ if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
+ max = rb->len - rb->offset;
+ }
- while (newb < n)
+ while (left < n)
{
+ /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
+ * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
+ * len+max if possible) */
+
clear_sys_error();
if (s->rbio != NULL)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
- i=BIO_read(s->rbio,
- (char *)&(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]),
- max-newb);
+ i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
- i= -1;
+ i = -1;
}
if (i <= 0)
{
- s->s3->rbuf.left+=newb;
+ rb->left = left;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (len+left == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
return(i);
}
- newb+=i;
- }
-
- /* record used data read */
- if (newb > n)
- {
- s->s3->rbuf.offset=n+off;
- s->s3->rbuf.left=newb-n;
- }
- else
- {
- s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
- s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
+ left+=i;
+ /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
+ * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
+ * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if (n > left)
+ n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
+ }
}
- if (extend)
- s->packet_length+=n;
- else
- s->packet_length+=n;
+ /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
+ rb->offset += n;
+ rb->left = left - n;
+ s->packet_length += n;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(n);
}
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
* ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
*/
+/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
- int n,i,ret= -1;
- SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+ int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
- unsigned int mac_size;
- int clear=0,extra;
+ int mac_size;
+ int clear=0;
+ size_t extra;
+ int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
- rb= &(s->s3->rbuf);
sess=s->session;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
else
extra=0;
+ if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
+ {
+ /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+ * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
- n=ssl3_read_n(s,SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE,0);
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
n2s(p,rr->length);
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
/* Lets check version */
- if (s->first_packet)
- {
- s->first_packet=0;
- }
- else
+ if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- /* Send back error using their
- * version number :-) */
- s->version=version;
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
+ /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
+ s->version = (unsigned short)version;
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
goto err;
}
- if (rr->length >
- (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
- /* get and decode the data */
- if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
- if (rr->length > (s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
- {
- i=rr->length;
- /*-(s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); */
- n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
- if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
- }
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i=rr->length;
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+ /* now n == rr->length,
+ * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
- /* At this point, we have the data in s->packet and there should be
- * s->packet_length bytes, we must not 'overrun' this buffer :-)
- * One of the following functions will copy the data from the
- * s->packet buffer */
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+ /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
* When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
* rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
- /* Set the state for the following operations */
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-
/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
* rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
- /* check is not needed I belive */
- if (rr->length > (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0))
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
+ if (enc_err <= 0)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ if (enc_err == 0)
+ /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
+ * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
+ * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
+ * the MAC computation anyway. */
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
+
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif
+
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
- (s->read_hash == NULL))
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
clear=1;
if (!clear)
{
- mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+ /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
{
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
+#else
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+#endif
}
- /* check MAC for rr->input' */
- if (rr->length < mac_size)
+ /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
+ if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
{
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
+#else
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+ rr->length = 0;
+#endif
}
- rr->length-=mac_size;
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
- if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
{
- al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
- ret= -1;
- goto f_err;
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
}
+ if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+ {
+ /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
+ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
+ * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
+ * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
+ al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
- if (rr->length >
- (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!do_uncompress(s))
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
}
}
- if (rr->length > (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
+
return(1);
+
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(ret);
}
-static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
else
rr->length=i;
rr->data=rr->comp;
-
+#endif
return(1);
}
-static int do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
wr->length=i;
wr->input=wr->data;
+#endif
return(1);
}
-/* Call this to write data
+/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
* It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
*/
-int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *_buf, int len)
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
{
- const unsigned char *buf=_buf;
+ const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
unsigned int tot,n,nw;
int i;
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return(-1);
+ return -1;
}
}
n=(len-tot);
for (;;)
{
- if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
+ nw=s->max_send_fragment;
else
nw=n;
-
- i=do_ssl3_write(s,type,&(buf[tot]),nw);
+
+ i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->s3->wnum=tot;
- return(i);
+ return i;
}
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- ssl3_finish_mac(s,&(buf[tot]),i);
-
- if (i == (int)n) return(tot+i);
+ if ((i == (int)n) ||
+ (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
+ {
+ /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
+ * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
+
+ return tot+i;
+ }
n-=i;
tot+=i;
}
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len)
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
{
unsigned char *p,*plen;
int i,mac_size,clear=0;
+ int prefix_len=0;
+ long align=0;
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- /* first check is there is a SSL3_RECORD still being written
+ if (wb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
* out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
- if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
+ if (wb->left != 0)
return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
{
- i=ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
+ i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0)
return(i);
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
- if (len <= 0) return(len);
-
+ if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ return 0;
+
wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
- wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
sess=s->session;
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
- (s->write_hash == NULL))
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
clear=1;
if (clear)
mac_size=0;
else
- mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
+ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
+ {
+ /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
- p=wb->buf;
+ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
+ * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
+ * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
+ * together with the actual payload) */
+ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
+ if (prefix_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (prefix_len >
+ (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
+ {
+ /* insufficient space */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
+ * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
+ * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
+ * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
+ align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
+ else if (prefix_len)
+ {
+ p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
/* write the header */
+
*(p++)=type&0xff;
wr->type=type;
*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
- /* record where we are to write out packet length */
+
+ /* field where we are to write out packet length */
plen=p;
p+=2;
-
+
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
wr->data=p;
wr->length=(int)len;
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
- if (!do_compress(s))
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
if (mac_size != 0)
{
- s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
+ goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
wr->input=p;
wr->data=p;
wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- /* Now lets setup wb */
- wb->left=wr->length;
- wb->offset=0;
+ if (create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+ /* we are in a recursive call;
+ * just return the length, don't write out anything here
+ */
+ return wr->length;
+ }
+
+ /* now let's set up wb */
+ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
+ /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
s->s3->wpend_type=type;
s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
- return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
err:
- return(-1);
+ return -1;
}
/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
-static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len)
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int i;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
/* XXXX */
- if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf)
+ if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
+ || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
+ !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
{
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
- (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
- (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
+ (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
+ (unsigned int)wb->left);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
i= -1;
}
- if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
+ if (i == wb->left)
{
- s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
+ wb->left=0;
+ wb->offset+=i;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
}
- else if (i <= 0)
+ else if (i <= 0) {
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+ s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
+ point in using a datagram service */
+ wb->left = 0;
+ }
return(i);
- s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
- s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
+ }
+ wb->offset+=i;
+ wb->left-=i;
}
}
-int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len)
+/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
+ * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ * Change cipher spec protocol
+ * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ * Alert protocol
+ * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ * Handshake protocol
+ * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ * Application data protocol
+ * none of our business
+ */
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
{
- int al,i,j,n,ret;
+ int al,i,j,ret;
+ unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
- BIO *bio;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialize yet */
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return(-1);
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+ (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+ {
+ unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ unsigned char *dst = buf;
+ unsigned int k;
+
+ /* peek == 0 */
+ n = 0;
+ while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
+ n++;
+ }
+ /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
+
if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
{
+ /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
start:
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
- * s->s3->rrec.off, - ofset into 'data' for next read
- * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
- rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
+ /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
+ * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
+ rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
- /* get new packet */
+ /* get new packet if necessary */
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
{
ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
}
- /* If the other end has shutdown, throw anything we read away */
+ /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
+ * (even in 'peek' mode) */
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
{
rr->length=0;
return(0);
}
- /* Check for an incoming 'Client Request' message */
- if ((rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (rr->length == 4) &&
- (rr->data[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_REQUEST) &&
+
+ if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
+ {
+ /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
+ * are doing a handshake for the first time */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0) return(len);
+
+ if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
+ n = rr->length;
+ else
+ n = (unsigned int)len;
+
+ memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
+ if (!peek)
+ {
+ rr->length-=n;
+ rr->off+=n;
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ rr->off=0;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ }
+ }
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+
+ /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
+ * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
+
+ /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
+ * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+ unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
+ }
+ else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+ {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
+ }
+
+ if (dest_maxlen > 0)
+ {
+ n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
+ if (rr->length < n)
+ n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
+
+ /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+ while (n-- > 0)
+ {
+ dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
+ rr->length--;
+ }
+
+ if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
+ goto start; /* fragment was too small */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+ * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
+
+ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+ if ((!s->server) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
{
- if ((rr->data[1] != 0) || (rr->data[2] != 0) ||
- (rr->data[3] != 0))
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CLIENT_REQUEST);
- goto err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ goto f_err;
}
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate)
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
{
- n=s->handshake_func(s);
- if (n < 0) return(n);
- if (n == 0)
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+ {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
}
}
- rr->length=0;
-/* ZZZ */ goto start;
+ /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
+ * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
+ goto start;
}
-
- /* if it is not the type we want, or we have shutdown and want
- * the peer shutdown */
- if ((rr->type != type) || (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
+ /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+ * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
+ * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
+ */
+ if (s->server &&
+ SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
+ !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+
{
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
- {
- if ((rr->length != 2) || (rr->off != 0))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
+ rr->length = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto start;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
+ {
+ int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
+ int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
- i=rr->data[0];
- n=rr->data[1];
+ s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
- /* clear from buffer */
- rr->length=0;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
- if (cb != NULL)
- {
- j=(i<<8)|n;
- cb(s,SSL_CB_READ_ALERT,j);
- }
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ {
+ j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ }
- if (i == 1)
- {
- s->s3->warn_alert=n;
- if (n == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
- {
- s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return(0);
- }
- }
- else if (i == 2)
+ if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
+ {
+ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+ if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
{
- char tmp[16];
-
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- s->s3->fatal_alert=n;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET+n);
- sprintf(tmp,"%d",n);
- ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
- s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return(0);
}
- else
+ /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+ * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
+ * a fatal alert because if application tried to
+ * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
+ * expects it to succeed.
+ *
+ * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
+ * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
+ */
+ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
{
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto f_err;
}
-
- rr->length=0;
- goto start;
}
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
+ else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
{
+ char tmp[16];
+
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- rr->length=0;
+ s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
+ s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
return(0);
}
-
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ else
{
- if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
- (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
- {
- i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto err;
- }
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- rr->length=0;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
- if (!do_change_cipher_spec(s))
- goto err;
- else
- goto start;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ rr->length=0;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
+ * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
+ if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
+ (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ goto f_err;
}
- /* else we have a handshake */
- if ((rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
- !s->in_handshake)
+ /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
{
- if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
- {
- s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
- ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
- :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
- s->new_session=1;
- }
- n=s->handshake_func(s);
- if (n < 0) return(n);
- if (n == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return(-1);
- }
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- /* In the case where we try to read application data
- * the first time, but we trigger an SSL handshake, we
- * return -1 with the retry option set. I do this
- * otherwise renegotiation can cause nasty problems
- * in the non-blocking world */
+ rr->length=0;
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
+ if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+ goto err;
+ else
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
+ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
+ {
+#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
+ * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
+ * protocol violations): */
+ s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
+ ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
+ :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#else
+ s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#endif
+ s->new_session=1;
+ }
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
- switch (rr->type)
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
{
- default:
-#ifndef NO_TLS
- /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
- if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
{
- goto start;
- }
-#endif
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
- /* At this point, we were expecting something else,
- * but have application data. What we do is set the
- * error, and return -1. On the way out, if the
- * library was running inside ssl3_read() and it makes
- * sense to read application data at this point, we
- * will indulge it. This will mostly happen during
- * session renegotiation.
- */
- if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
- (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
- ((
- (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
- (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
- (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
- ) || (
- (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
- (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
- (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
- )
- ))
- {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
- else
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- }
}
+ goto start;
}
- /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
- * are doing a handshake for the first time */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
+ switch (rr->type)
{
+ default:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
+ /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
+ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+#endif
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
+ * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
+ * should not happen when type != rr->type */
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
+ * but have application data. If the library was
+ * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
+ * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
+ * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
+ * we will indulge it.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
+ (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
+ ((
+ (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ ) || (
+ (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ )
+ ))
+ {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
+ /* not reached */
- if (len <= 0) return(len);
-
- if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
- n=rr->length;
- else
- n=len;
-
- memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),(unsigned int)n);
- rr->length-=n;
- rr->off+=n;
- if (rr->length <= 0)
- {
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- rr->off=0;
- }
-
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- ssl3_finish_mac(s,buf,n);
- return(n);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
-static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
{
int i;
- unsigned char *sender;
+ const char *sender;
int slen;
if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
{
+ if (s->session == NULL)
+ {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
}
* the finished message */
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{
- sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished;
- slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_len;
+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
}
else
{
- sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished;
- slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_len;
+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
- s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- sender,slen,&(s->s3->tmp.finish_md[0]));
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
return(1);
}
-int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
- {
- int ret;
-
- ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- s->init_num);
- if (ret == s->init_num)
- return(1);
- if (ret < 0) return(-1);
- s->init_off+=ret;
- s->init_num-=ret;
- return(0);
- }
-
-void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
{
/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
- if (desc < 0) return;
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+ desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
+ if (desc < 0) return -1;
/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
- if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out */
- ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
+ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
/* else data is still being written out, we will get written
* some time in the future */
+ return -1;
}
int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
{
int i,j;
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
- i=do_ssl3_write(s,SSL3_RT_ALERT,&s->s3->send_alert[0],2);
+ i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
}
else
{
- /* If it is important, send it now. If the message
- * does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will
- * not worry too much. */
+ /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
+ * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
+ * we will not worry too much. */
if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
- BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
+
if (cb != NULL)
{
j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
}
return(i);
}
-