#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef NO_KRB5
-#include "kssl.h"
-#endif
-
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
static int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
sk=NULL;
- /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end */
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- need_cert =
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
- printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
- printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
+ if ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
}
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
- if (need_cert && i < 0)
+ if (i < 0)
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
goto f_err;
}
- if (need_cert)
- {
- sc->peer_cert_type=i;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- /* Why would the following ever happen?
- * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
- sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer=x;
- }
- else
- {
- sc->peer_cert_type=i;
- sc->peer_key= NULL;
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer=NULL;
- }
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) /* Why would this ever happen?
+ * We just created sc a couple of
+ * lines ago. */
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
+ sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer=x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* NO_KRB5 */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
- /* Fool emacs indentation */
- if (0) {}
#ifndef NO_RSA
- else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
+ if (l & SSL_kRSA)
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
tmp_buf,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
memset(tmp_buf,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
}
-#endif
-#ifndef NO_KRB5
- else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
- {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- krb5_data krb5_ap_req;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- l, SSL_kKRB5);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- /*
- ** Tried to send random tmp_buf[] as PMS in Kerberos ticket
- ** by passing krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx,authctx,opts, tmp_buf, ...)
- ** but: I can't retrieve the PMS on the other side! There is
- ** some indication in the krb5 source that this is only used
- ** to generate a checksum. OTOH, the Tung book shows data
- ** ("GET widget01.txt") being passed in krb5_mk_req_extended()
- ** by way of krb5_sendauth(). I don't get it.
- ** Until Kerberos goes 3DES, the big PMS secret would only be
- ** encrypted in 1-DES anyway. So losing the PMS shouldn't be
- ** a big deal.
- */
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &krb5_ap_req,
- &kssl_err);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc)
- {
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- */
- n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
-
- /* 19991013 VRS - 3DES is kind of bogus here,
- ** at least until Kerberos supports 3DES. The only
- ** real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key;
- ** the other key material ((s->) client_random, server_random)
- ** could be sniffed. Mixing in these nonces should help
- ** protect against replay attacks, however.
- **
- ** Alternate code for Kerberos Purists:
- **
- ** memcpy(s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
- ** s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length;
- */
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key,kssl_ctx->length);
- }
+ else
#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
- else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
}
-#endif
else
+#endif
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
algs=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
/* we don't have a certificate */
- if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5))
+ if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL))
return(1);
#ifndef NO_RSA
projects / oweals / openssl.git / blobdiff