OPENSSL_NO_XXX cleanup: OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS

[oweals/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_clnt.c

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 900389e9dfb76276631a66f78955501ad03a727f..a383eee70aceaab01a08d747e22aad5a8d021086 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -725,36 +725,36 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
         /* Do the message type and length last */
         d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
 
-               /*-
-                * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
-                * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
-                * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
-                * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
-                * choke if we initially report a higher version then
-                * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
-                * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
-                * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
-                * 1.0.
-                *
-                * Possible scenario with previous logic:
-                *      1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
-                *      2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
-                *      3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
-                *      4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
-                *      5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
-                *      6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
-                *         know that is maximum server supports.
-                *      7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
-                *         containing version 1.0.
-                *
-                * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
-                * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
-                * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
-                * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
-                * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
-                * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
-                * the negotiated version.
-                */
+        /*-
+         * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+         * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+         * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+         * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+         * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+         * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+         * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+         * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+         * 1.0.
+         *
+         * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+         *      1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+         *      2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+         *      3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+         *      4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+         *      5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+         *      6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+         *         know that is maximum server supports.
+         *      7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+         *         containing version 1.0.
+         *
+         * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+         * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+         * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+         * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+         * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+         * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+         * the negotiated version.
+         */
 #if 0
         *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
         *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
@@ -2225,11 +2225,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
      */
     EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
                s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
                EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-# else
-               EVP_sha1(), NULL);
-# endif
     ret = 1;
     return (ret);
  f_err:
@@ -2514,13 +2510,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
                 goto err;
 
-                       /*-
-                        * 20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
-                        *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
-                        *      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
-                        *                              kssl_ctx->length);
-                        *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
-                        */
+            /*-
+             * 20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
+             *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+             *      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+             *                              kssl_ctx->length);
+             *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+             */
 
             memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
             EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);