#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef NO_KRB5
+#include "kssl.h"
+#endif
+
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
static int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-static int ca_dn_cmp(X509_NAME **a,X509_NAME **b);
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
static int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;;
- RAND_seed(&Time,sizeof(Time));
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
- abort();
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_len);
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
p=s->s3->client_random;
Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
X509 *x=NULL;
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
- CERT *c;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i))
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i))
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
- c=ssl_cert_new();
- if (c == NULL) goto err;
+ sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (sc == NULL) goto err;
- if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
- s->session->sess_cert=c;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert=sc;
- c->cert_chain=sk;
+ sc->cert_chain=sk;
+ /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
+ * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
sk=NULL;
+ /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end */
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
- if ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ need_cert =
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
+ printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
+ printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
}
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
- if (i < 0)
+ if (need_cert && i < 0)
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
goto f_err;
}
- c->cert_type=i;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
- c->pkeys[i].x509=x;
- c->key= &(c->pkeys[i]);
-
- if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->peer != NULL))
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer=x;
+ if (need_cert)
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /* Why would the following ever happen?
+ * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
+ sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer=x;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ sc->peer_key= NULL;
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer=NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
ret=1;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef NO_RSA
- if (s->session->sess_cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
- RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->rsa_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->rsa_tmp=NULL;
+ RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
- if (s->session->sess_cert->dh_tmp)
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
- DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->dh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->dh_tmp=NULL;
+ DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
}
else
{
- s->session->sess_cert=ssl_cert_new();
+ s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
param_len=0;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- s->session->sess_cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
+ rsa=NULL;
}
- else
+#else /* NO_RSA */
+ if (0)
+ ;
#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
- if (alg & SSL_kEDH)
+ else if (alg & SSL_kEDH)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
#ifndef NO_RSA
if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- else
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+#else
+ if (0)
+ ;
#endif
#ifndef NO_DSA
- if (alg & SSL_aDSS)
- pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
+ else if (alg & SSL_aDSS)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
- s->session->sess_cert->dh_tmp=dh;
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg & SSL_kDHr) || (alg & SSL_kDHd))
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* !NO_DH */
if (alg & SSL_aFZA)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
- i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)n,p,p,pkey->pkey.rsa,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
+ i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((j != i) || (memcmp(p,md_buf,i) != 0))
+ if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+#ifndef NO_RSA
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_DH
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ DH_free(dh);
+#endif
return(-1);
}
if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
{
- /* If netscape tollerance is on, ignore errors */
+ /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
goto cont;
else
ERR_clear_error();
}
- /* we should setup a certficate to return.... */
+ /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
return(ret);
}
-static int ca_dn_cmp(X509_NAME **a, X509_NAME **b)
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
+#ifndef NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* NO_KRB5 */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {}
#ifndef NO_RSA
- if (l & SSL_kRSA)
+ else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- if (s->session->sess_cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
- rsa=s->session->sess_cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
{
- pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
goto err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
- RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH-2);
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH-2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
s->session->master_key_length=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
tmp_buf,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
memset(tmp_buf,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
}
- else
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_KRB5
+ else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ krb5_data krb5_ap_req;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ l, SSL_kKRB5);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ /*
+ ** Tried to send random tmp_buf[] as PMS in Kerberos ticket
+ ** by passing krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx,authctx,opts, tmp_buf, ...)
+ ** but: I can't retrieve the PMS on the other side! There is
+ ** some indication in the krb5 source that this is only used
+ ** to generate a checksum. OTOH, the Tung book shows data
+ ** ("GET widget01.txt") being passed in krb5_mk_req_extended()
+ ** by way of krb5_sendauth(). I don't get it.
+ ** Until Kerberos goes 3DES, the big PMS secret would only be
+ ** encrypted in 1-DES anyway. So losing the PMS shouldn't be
+ ** a big deal.
+ */
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &krb5_ap_req,
+ &kssl_err);
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ */
+ n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+
+ /* 19991013 VRS - 3DES is kind of bogus here,
+ ** at least until Kerberos supports 3DES. The only
+ ** real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key;
+ ** the other key material ((s->) client_random, server_random)
+ ** could be sniffed. Mixing in these nonces should help
+ ** protect against replay attacks, however.
+ **
+ ** Alternate code for Kerberos Purists:
+ **
+ ** memcpy(s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
+ ** s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length;
+ */
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key,kssl_ctx->length);
+ }
#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
- if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
- if (s->session->sess_cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
- dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->dh_tmp;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
{
/* we get them from the cert */
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
}
- else
#endif
+ else
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
#ifndef NO_RSA
- int i=0;
+ unsigned u=0;
#endif
unsigned long n;
#ifndef NO_DSA
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),&(data[0]));
- i=RSA_private_encrypt(
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- data,&(p[2]),pkey->pkey.rsa,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
- s2n(i,p);
- n=i+2;
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n=u+2;
}
else
#endif
int i,idx;
long algs;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- CERT *c;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
#endif
DH *dh;
#endif
- c=s->session->sess_cert;
+ sc=s->session->sess_cert;
- if (c == NULL)
+ if (sc == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
algs=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
/* we don't have a certificate */
- if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL))
+ if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5))
return(1);
#ifndef NO_RSA
- rsa=s->session->sess_cert->rsa_tmp;
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
- dh=s->session->sess_cert->dh_tmp;
+ dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
- idx=c->cert_type;
- pkey=X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[idx].x509);
- i=X509_certificate_type(c->pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
+ idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#endif
#endif
- if (SSL_IS_EXPORT(algs) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
{
#ifndef NO_RSA
if (algs & SSL_kRSA)
{
if (rsa == NULL
- || RSA_size(rsa) > SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(algs))
+ || RSA_size(rsa) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
if (algs & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
if (dh == NULL
- || DH_size(dh) > SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(algs))
+ || DH_size(dh) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;