int enc_err;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- unsigned int mac_size;
+ unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
- rr->orig_len=rr->length;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
/* enc_err is:
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+ orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
- if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+ if (orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
+ orig_len < mac_size+1))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
* */
mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
rr->length -= mac_size;
}
else
{
- /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
+ /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
rr->length -= mac_size;
}
}
+ if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate)
{
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
s->new_session = 1;
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))