hostapd: Update to version 2.8 (2019-04-21)

[oweals/openwrt.git] / package / network / services / hostapd / patches / 064-0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch

diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/064-0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/064-0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 9c7707a..0000000
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/064-0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From 8ad8585f91823ddcc3728155e288e0f9f872e31a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
-Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:43:44 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 13/14] EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element
-
-When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, the server's scalar and element
-(elliptic curve point) were not validated. This allowed an adversary to
-bypass authentication, and act as a rogue Access Point (AP) if the
-crypto implementation did not verify the validity of the EC point.
-
-Fix this vulnerability by assuring the received scalar lies within the
-valid range, and by checking that the received element is not the point
-at infinity and lies on the elliptic curve being used. (CVE-2019-9499)
-
-The vulnerability is only exploitable if OpenSSL version 1.0.2 or lower
-is used, or if LibreSSL or wolfssl is used. Newer versions of OpenSSL
-(and also BoringSSL) implicitly validate the elliptic curve point in
-EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(), preventing the attack.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
-
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -594,6 +594,26 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct e
-               goto fin;
-       }
- 
-+      /* verify received scalar */
-+      if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(data->server_scalar) ||
-+          crypto_bignum_is_one(data->server_scalar) ||
-+          crypto_bignum_cmp(data->server_scalar,
-+                            crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) >= 0) {
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                         "EAP-PWD (peer): received scalar is invalid");
-+              goto fin;
-+      }
-+
-+      /* verify received element */
-+      if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(data->grp->group,
-+                                       data->server_element) ||
-+          crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group,
-+                                         data->server_element)) {
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                         "EAP-PWD (peer): received element is invalid");
-+              goto fin;
-+      }
-+
-       /* check to ensure server's element is not in a small sub-group */
-       if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
-               if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->server_element,