//config:config TLS
//config: bool #No description makes it a hidden option
//config: default n
+//Note:
+//Config.src also defines FEATURE_TLS_SHA1 option
//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o
//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm.o
//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_montgomery_reduce.o
//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_mul_comba.o
//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_sqr_comba.o
-//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_rsa.o
//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aes.o
-////kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aes_gcm.o
+//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aesgcm.o
+//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_rsa.o
+//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_fe.o
#include "tls.h"
+// works against "openssl s_server -cipher NULL"
+// and against wolfssl-3.9.10-stable/examples/server/server.c:
+#define ALLOW_RSA_NULL_SHA256 0 // for testing (does everything except encrypting)
+
//Tested against kernel.org:
-//TLS 1.2
-#define TLS_MAJ 3
-#define TLS_MIN 3
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** matrixssl uses this on my box
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
-//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** select this?
-
-// works against "openssl s_server -cipher NULL"
-// and against wolfssl-3.9.10-stable/examples/server/server.c:
-//#define CIPHER_ID1 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 // for testing (does everything except encrypting)
+//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
// works against wolfssl-3.9.10-stable/examples/server/server.c
// works for kernel.org
// does not work for cdn.kernel.org (e.g. downloading an actual tarball, not a web page)
// getting alert 40 "handshake failure" at once
// with GNU Wget 1.18, they agree on TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xC02F) cipher
-// fail: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES256-SHA256
-// fail: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES256-GCM-SHA384
-// fail: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES128-SHA256
-// ok: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES128-GCM-SHA256
-// ok: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES128-SHA
+// fail: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -cipher AES256-SHA256
+// fail: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -cipher AES256-GCM-SHA384
+// fail: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -cipher AES128-SHA256
+// ok: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -cipher AES128-GCM-SHA256
+// ok: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -cipher AES128-SHA
// (TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - in TLS 1.2 it's mandated to be always supported)
-#define CIPHER_ID1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE from peer
+//#define CIPHER_ID1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 //0x003D
// Works with "wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/linux-4.9.5.tar.xz"
-#define CIPHER_ID2 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+//#define CIPHER_ID2 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA //0x002F
+
+// bug #11456:
+// ftp.openbsd.org only supports ECDHE-RSA-AESnnn-GCM-SHAnnn or ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305
+//#define CIPHER_ID3 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 //0xC02F
+// host is.gd accepts only ECDHE-ECDSA-foo (the simplest which works: ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA 0xC009)
+//#define CIPHER_ID4 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA //0xC009
#define TLS_DEBUG 0
# define dbg_der(...) ((void)0)
#endif
+
+//TLS 1.2
+#define TLS_MAJ 3
+#define TLS_MIN 3
+
#define RECORD_TYPE_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20 /* 0x14 */
#define RECORD_TYPE_ALERT 21 /* 0x15 */
#define RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE 22 /* 0x16 */
#define HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 /* 0x10 */
#define HANDSHAKE_FINISHED 20 /* 0x14 */
+#define TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV 0x00FF /* not a real cipher id... */
+
#define SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL 0x0000
#define SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x0001
#define SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0002
#define SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0004
#define SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0005
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA 0x0007 /* 7 */
#define SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x000A /* 10 */
-#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x002F /* 47 */
-#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0035 /* 53 */
-#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x003B /* 59 */
-
-#define TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV 0x00FF
-#define TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA 0x0007 /* 7 */
#define SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0016 /* 22 */
#define SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0018 /* 24 */
#define SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x001B /* 27 */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x002F /*SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 */
#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0033 /* 51 */
-#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0039 /* 57 */
-#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0067 /* 103 */
-#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006B /* 107 */
#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0034 /* 52 */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0035 /* 53 */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0039 /* 57 */
#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x003A /* 58 */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x003B /* 59 */
#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x003C /* 60 */
#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x003D /* 61 */
-#define TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA 0x0096 /* 150 */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0067 /* 103 */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006B /* 107 */
#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x008C /* 140 */
-#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x00AE /* 174 */
-#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0x00AF /* 175 */
#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x008D /* 141 */
#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0090 /* 144 */
#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0091 /* 145 */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA 0x0096 /* 150 */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009C /*TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009D /*TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009E /*TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009F /*TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x00A6 /* RFC 5288 */
+#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x00A7 /* RFC 5288 */
+#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x00AE /* 174 */
+#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0x00AF /* 175 */
#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /* 49156 */
#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /* 49157 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /* 49161 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /* 49162 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /* 49170 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /* 49171 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /* 49172 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /*TLSv1 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /*TLSv1 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 */
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /* 49166 */
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /* 49167 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /* 49187 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /* 49188 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /* 49170 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /*TLSv1 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /*TLSv1 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 */
+#define TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC018 /* RFC 4492 */
+#define TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC019 /* RFC 4492 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 */
#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC025 /* 49189 */
#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC026 /* 49190 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 /* 49191 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 /* 49192 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 */
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029 /* 49193 */
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A /* 49194 */
-
/* RFC 5288 "AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS" */
-#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009C /* 156 */
-#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009D /* 157 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /* 49195 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C /* 49196 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD */
#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D /* 49197 */
#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02E /* 49198 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F /* 49199 */
-#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 /* 49200 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD */
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /* 49201 */
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /* 49202 */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035
+#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036
+#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037
+#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038
+
+/* From http://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS */
+/* and 'openssl ciphers -V -stdname' */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C /*TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESCCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D /*TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESCCM(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09E /*TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESCCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09F /*TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESCCM(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A0 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESCCM8(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A1 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESCCM8(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A2 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESCCM8(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A3 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESCCM8(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0AC /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESCCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0AD /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESCCM(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AE /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESCCM8(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AF /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESCCM8(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA8 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA9 /*TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAA /*TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD */
+
+#define TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x1301 /*TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x1302 /*TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x1303 /*TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD */
+#define TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 0x1304 /*TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=AESCCM(128) Mac=AEAD */
/* Might go to libbb.h */
#define TLS_MAX_CRYPTBLOCK_SIZE 16
SHA1_OUTSIZE = 20,
SHA256_OUTSIZE = 32,
- AES_BLOCKSIZE = 16,
AES128_KEYSIZE = 16,
AES256_KEYSIZE = 32,
RECHDR_LEN = 5,
/* 8 = 3+5. 3 extra bytes result in record data being 32-bit aligned */
- OUTBUF_PFX = 8 + AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* header + IV */
+ OUTBUF_PFX = 8 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* header + IV */
OUTBUF_SFX = TLS_MAX_MAC_SIZE + TLS_MAX_CRYPTBLOCK_SIZE, /* MAC + padding */
- // RFC 5246
+ // RFC 5246:
// | 6.2.1. Fragmentation
// | The record layer fragments information blocks into TLSPlaintext
// | records carrying data in chunks of 2^14 bytes or less. Client
// | The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCiphertext.fragment.
// | The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 2048.
MAX_INBUF = RECHDR_LEN + (1 << 14) + 2048,
+
+ /* Bits for tls->flags */
+ NEED_EC_KEY = 1 << 0,
+ GOT_CERT_RSA_KEY_ALG = 1 << 1,
+ GOT_CERT_ECDSA_KEY_ALG = 1 << 2, // so far unused
+ GOT_EC_KEY = 1 << 3,
+ ENCRYPTION_AESGCM = 1 << 4, // else AES-SHA (or NULL-SHA if ALLOW_RSA_NULL_SHA256=1)
+ ENCRYPT_ON_WRITE = 1 << 5,
};
struct record_hdr {
uint8_t client_and_server_rand32[2 * 32];
uint8_t master_secret[48];
+
//TODO: store just the DER key here, parse/use/delete it when sending client key
//this way it will stay key type agnostic here.
psRsaKey_t server_rsa_pub_key;
+ uint8_t ecc_pub_key32[32];
- unsigned saved_client_hello_size;
- uint8_t saved_client_hello[1];
+/* HANDSHAKE HASH: */
+ //unsigned saved_client_hello_size;
+ //uint8_t saved_client_hello[1];
};
}
#if TLS_DEBUG
+/* Nondestructively see the current hash value */
+# if TLS_DEBUG_HASH
+static unsigned sha_peek(md5sha_ctx_t *ctx, void *buffer)
+{
+ md5sha_ctx_t ctx_copy = *ctx; /* struct copy */
+ return sha_end(&ctx_copy, buffer);
+}
+# endif
+
static void dump_hex(const char *fmt, const void *vp, int len)
{
char hexbuf[32 * 1024 + 4];
# define dump_tls_record(...) ((void)0)
#endif
-void tls_get_random(void *buf, unsigned len)
+void FAST_FUNC tls_get_random(void *buf, unsigned len)
{
if (len != open_read_close("/dev/urandom", buf, len))
xfunc_die();
}
-/* Nondestructively see the current hash value */
-static unsigned sha_peek(md5sha_ctx_t *ctx, void *buffer)
+static void xorbuf3(void *dst, const void *src1, const void *src2, unsigned count)
{
- md5sha_ctx_t ctx_copy = *ctx; /* struct copy */
- return sha_end(&ctx_copy, buffer);
+ uint8_t *d = dst;
+ const uint8_t *s1 = src1;
+ const uint8_t* s2 = src2;
+ while (count--)
+ *d++ = *s1++ ^ *s2++;
+}
+
+void FAST_FUNC xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, unsigned count)
+{
+ xorbuf3(dst, dst, src, count);
}
-static ALWAYS_INLINE unsigned get_handshake_hash(tls_state_t *tls, void *buffer)
+void FAST_FUNC xorbuf_aligned_AES_BLOCK_SIZE(void *dst, const void *src)
{
- return sha_peek(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx, buffer);
+ unsigned long *d = dst;
+ const unsigned long *s = src;
+ d[0] ^= s[0];
+#if ULONG_MAX <= 0xffffffffffffffff
+ d[1] ^= s[1];
+ #if ULONG_MAX == 0xffffffff
+ d[2] ^= s[2];
+ d[3] ^= s[3];
+ #endif
+#endif
}
#if !TLS_DEBUG_HASH
dump_hex(fmt, buffer, len);
dbg(" (%u bytes) ", (int)len);
len = sha_peek(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx, h);
- if (len == SHA1_OUTSIZE)
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1 && len == SHA1_OUTSIZE)
dump_hex("sha1:%s\n", h, len);
else
if (len == SHA256_OUTSIZE)
#endif
}
-// RFC 2104
+#if !ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+# define TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls) SHA256_OUTSIZE
+#else
+# define TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls) (tls)->MAC_size
+#endif
+
+// RFC 2104:
// HMAC(key, text) based on a hash H (say, sha256) is:
// ipad = [0x36 x INSIZE]
// opad = [0x5c x INSIZE]
md5sha_ctx_t hashed_key_xor_opad;
} hmac_precomputed_t;
-static unsigned hmac_sha_precomputed_v(
- hmac_precomputed_t *pre,
- uint8_t *out,
- va_list va)
-{
- uint8_t *text;
- unsigned len;
-
- /* pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad contains unclosed "H((key XOR ipad) +" state */
- /* pre->hashed_key_xor_opad contains unclosed "H((key XOR opad) +" state */
-
- /* calculate out = H((key XOR ipad) + text) */
- while ((text = va_arg(va, uint8_t*)) != NULL) {
- unsigned text_size = va_arg(va, unsigned);
- md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, text, text_size);
- }
- len = sha_end(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, out);
-
- /* out = H((key XOR opad) + out) */
- md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, out, len);
- return sha_end(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, out);
-}
-
typedef void md5sha_begin_func(md5sha_ctx_t *ctx) FAST_FUNC;
+#if !ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+#define hmac_begin(pre,key,key_size,begin) \
+ hmac_begin(pre,key,key_size)
+#define begin sha256_begin
+#endif
static void hmac_begin(hmac_precomputed_t *pre, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, md5sha_begin_func *begin)
{
uint8_t key_xor_ipad[SHA_INSIZE];
uint8_t key_xor_opad[SHA_INSIZE];
- uint8_t tempkey[SHA1_OUTSIZE < SHA256_OUTSIZE ? SHA256_OUTSIZE : SHA1_OUTSIZE];
+// uint8_t tempkey[SHA1_OUTSIZE < SHA256_OUTSIZE ? SHA256_OUTSIZE : SHA1_OUTSIZE];
unsigned i;
// "The authentication key can be of any length up to INSIZE, the
// than INSIZE bytes will first hash the key using H and then use the
// resultant OUTSIZE byte string as the actual key to HMAC."
if (key_size > SHA_INSIZE) {
- md5sha_ctx_t ctx;
- begin(&ctx);
- md5sha_hash(&ctx, key, key_size);
- key_size = sha_end(&ctx, tempkey);
+ bb_simple_error_msg_and_die("HMAC key>64"); //does not happen (yet?)
+// md5sha_ctx_t ctx;
+// begin(&ctx);
+// md5sha_hash(&ctx, key, key_size);
+// key_size = sha_end(&ctx, tempkey);
+// //key = tempkey; - right? RIGHT? why does it work without this?
+// // because SHA_INSIZE is 64, but hmac() is always called with
+// // key_size = tls->MAC_size = SHA1/256_OUTSIZE (20 or 32),
+// // and prf_hmac_sha256() -> hmac_sha256() key sizes are:
+// // - RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE is 48
+// // - CURVE25519_KEYSIZE is 32
+// // - master_secret[] is 48
}
for (i = 0; i < key_size; i++) {
md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, key_xor_ipad, SHA_INSIZE);
md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, key_xor_opad, SHA_INSIZE);
}
+#undef begin
-static unsigned hmac(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, ...)
+static unsigned hmac_sha_precomputed_v(
+ hmac_precomputed_t *pre,
+ uint8_t *out,
+ va_list va)
+{
+ uint8_t *text;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ /* pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad contains unclosed "H((key XOR ipad) +" state */
+ /* pre->hashed_key_xor_opad contains unclosed "H((key XOR opad) +" state */
+
+ /* calculate out = H((key XOR ipad) + text) */
+ while ((text = va_arg(va, uint8_t*)) != NULL) {
+ unsigned text_size = va_arg(va, unsigned);
+ md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, text, text_size);
+ }
+ len = sha_end(&pre->hashed_key_xor_ipad, out);
+
+ /* out = H((key XOR opad) + out) */
+ md5sha_hash(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, out, len);
+ return sha_end(&pre->hashed_key_xor_opad, out);
+}
+
+static unsigned hmac_sha_precomputed(hmac_precomputed_t *pre_init, uint8_t *out, ...)
{
hmac_precomputed_t pre;
va_list va;
unsigned len;
- va_start(va, key_size);
-
- hmac_begin(&pre, key, key_size,
- (tls->MAC_size == SHA256_OUTSIZE)
- ? sha256_begin
- : sha1_begin
- );
+ va_start(va, out);
+ pre = *pre_init; /* struct copy */
len = hmac_sha_precomputed_v(&pre, out, va);
-
va_end(va);
return len;
}
-static unsigned hmac_sha256(/*tls_state_t *tls,*/ uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, ...)
+#if !ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+#define hmac(tls,out,key,key_size,...) \
+ hmac(out,key,key_size, __VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+static unsigned hmac(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, ...)
{
hmac_precomputed_t pre;
va_list va;
va_start(va, key_size);
- hmac_begin(&pre, key, key_size, sha256_begin);
+ hmac_begin(&pre, key, key_size,
+ (ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1 && tls->MAC_size == SHA1_OUTSIZE)
+ ? sha1_begin
+ : sha256_begin
+ );
len = hmac_sha_precomputed_v(&pre, out, va);
va_end(va);
// document and in TLS documents published prior to this document when
// TLS 1.2 is negotiated.
// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ IMPORTANT!
-// PRF uses sha256 regardless of cipher (at least for all ciphers
-// defined by RFC5246). It's not sha1 for AES_128_CBC_SHA!
+// PRF uses sha256 regardless of cipher for all ciphers
+// defined by RFC 5246. It's not sha1 for AES_128_CBC_SHA!
+// However, for _SHA384 ciphers, it's sha384. See RFC 5288,5289.
//...
// P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
// HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) +
// PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
//
// The label is an ASCII string.
+//
+// RFC 5288:
+// For cipher suites ending with _SHA256, the PRF is the TLS PRF
+// with SHA-256 as the hash function.
+// For cipher suites ending with _SHA384, the PRF is the TLS PRF
+// with SHA-384 as the hash function.
static void prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls_state_t *tls,*/
uint8_t *outbuf, unsigned outbuf_size,
uint8_t *secret, unsigned secret_size,
const char *label,
uint8_t *seed, unsigned seed_size)
{
+ hmac_precomputed_t pre;
uint8_t a[TLS_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
uint8_t *out_p = outbuf;
unsigned label_size = strlen(label);
/* In P_hash() calculation, "seed" is "label + seed": */
#define SEED label, label_size, seed, seed_size
-#define SECRET secret, secret_size
#define A a, MAC_size
+ hmac_begin(&pre, secret, secret_size, sha256_begin);
+
/* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, seed) */
- hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ a, SECRET, SEED, NULL);
-//TODO: convert hmac to precomputed
+ hmac_sha_precomputed(&pre, a, SEED, NULL);
for (;;) {
/* HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) */
if (outbuf_size <= MAC_size) {
/* Last, possibly incomplete, block */
/* (use a[] as temp buffer) */
- hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ a, SECRET, A, SEED, NULL);
+ hmac_sha_precomputed(&pre, a, A, SEED, NULL);
memcpy(out_p, a, outbuf_size);
return;
}
/* Not last block. Store directly to result buffer */
- hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ out_p, SECRET, A, SEED, NULL);
+ hmac_sha_precomputed(&pre, out_p, A, SEED, NULL);
out_p += MAC_size;
outbuf_size -= MAC_size;
/* A(2) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1)) */
- hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/ a, SECRET, A, NULL);
+ hmac_sha_precomputed(&pre, a, A, NULL);
}
#undef A
#undef SECRET
return tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX;
}
-static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
+static void *tls_get_zeroed_outbuf(tls_state_t *tls, int len)
+{
+ void *record = tls_get_outbuf(tls, len);
+ memset(record, 0, len);
+ return record;
+}
+
+static void xwrite_encrypted_and_hmac_signed(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
{
uint8_t *buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX;
struct record_hdr *xhdr;
uint8_t padding_length;
xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN);
- if (CIPHER_ID1 != TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 /* if "no encryption" can't be selected */
+ if (!ALLOW_RSA_NULL_SHA256 /* if "no encryption" can't be selected */
|| tls->cipher_id != TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 /* or if it wasn't selected */
) {
- xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN - AES_BLOCKSIZE); /* place for IV */
+ xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN - AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* place for IV */
}
xhdr->type = type;
/* Calculate MAC signature */
hmac(tls, buf + size, /* result */
- tls->client_write_MAC_key, tls->MAC_size,
+ tls->client_write_MAC_key, TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls),
&tls->write_seq64_be, sizeof(tls->write_seq64_be),
xhdr, RECHDR_LEN,
buf, size,
);
tls->write_seq64_be = SWAP_BE64(1 + SWAP_BE64(tls->write_seq64_be));
- size += tls->MAC_size;
+ size += TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls);
- // RFC 5246
+ // RFC 5246:
// 6.2.3.1. Null or Standard Stream Cipher
//
// Stream ciphers (including BulkCipherAlgorithm.null; see Appendix A.6)
// -------- ----------- ---------- --------------
// SHA HMAC-SHA1 20 20
// SHA256 HMAC-SHA256 32 32
- if (CIPHER_ID1 == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+ if (ALLOW_RSA_NULL_SHA256
&& tls->cipher_id == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
) {
/* No encryption, only signing */
// AES_128_CBC Block 16 16 16
// AES_256_CBC Block 32 16 16
- tls_get_random(buf - AES_BLOCKSIZE, AES_BLOCKSIZE); /* IV */
+ tls_get_random(buf - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* IV */
dbg("before crypt: 5 hdr + %u data + %u hash bytes\n",
- size - tls->MAC_size, tls->MAC_size);
+ size - TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls), TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls));
/* Fill IV and padding in outbuf */
// RFC is talking nonsense:
// If you need no bytes to reach BLOCKSIZE, you have to pad a full
// BLOCKSIZE with bytes of value (BLOCKSIZE-1).
// It's ok to have more than minimum padding, but we do minimum.
- padding_length = (~size) & (AES_BLOCKSIZE - 1);
+ padding_length = (~size) & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
do {
buf[size++] = padding_length; /* padding */
- } while ((size & (AES_BLOCKSIZE - 1)) != 0);
+ } while ((size & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)) != 0);
/* Encrypt content+MAC+padding in place */
aes_cbc_encrypt(
- tls->client_write_key, tls->key_size, /* selects 128/256 */
- buf - AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* IV */
+ &tls->aes_encrypt, /* selects 128/256 */
+ buf - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* IV */
buf, size, /* plaintext */
buf /* ciphertext */
);
/* Write out */
dbg("writing 5 + %u IV + %u encrypted bytes, padding_length:0x%02x\n",
- AES_BLOCKSIZE, size, padding_length);
- size += AES_BLOCKSIZE; /* + IV */
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE, size, padding_length);
+ size += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* + IV */
xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", (int)RECHDR_LEN + size);
}
+/* Example how GCM encryption combines nonce, aad, input and generates
+ * "header | exp_nonce | encrypted output | tag":
+ * nonce:0d 6a 26 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 (implicit 4 bytes (derived from master secret), then explicit 8 bytes)
+ * aad: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 17 03 03 00 1c
+ * in: 47 45 54 20 2f 69 6e 64 65 78 2e 68 74 6d 6c 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 30 0d 0a 0d 0a "GET /index.html HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n" (0x1c bytes)
+ * out: f7 8a b2 8f 78 0e f6 d5 76 17 2e b5 6d 46 59 56 8b 46 9f 0b d9 2c 35 28 13 66 19 be
+ * tag: c2 86 ce 4a 50 4a d0 aa 50 b3 76 5c 49 2a 3f 33
+ * sent: 17 03 03 00 34|00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01|f7 8a b2 8f 78 0e f6 d5 76 17 2e b5 6d 46 59 56 8b 46 9f 0b d9 2c 35 28 13 66 19 be|c2 86 ce 4a 50 4a d0 aa 50 b3 76 5c 49 2a 3f 33
+ * .............................................^^ buf points here
+ */
+static void xwrite_encrypted_aesgcm(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
+{
+#define COUNTER(v) (*(uint32_t*)(v + 12))
+
+ uint8_t aad[13 + 3] ALIGNED_long; /* +3 creates [16] buffer, simplifying GHASH() */
+ uint8_t nonce[12 + 4] ALIGNED_long; /* +4 creates space for AES block counter */
+ uint8_t scratch[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] ALIGNED_long; //[16]
+ uint8_t authtag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] ALIGNED_long; //[16]
+ uint8_t *buf;
+ struct record_hdr *xhdr;
+ unsigned remaining;
+ unsigned cnt;
+ uint64_t t64;
+
+ buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX; /* see above for the byte it points to */
+ dump_hex("xwrite_encrypted_aesgcm plaintext:%s\n", buf, size);
+
+ xhdr = (void*)(buf - 8 - RECHDR_LEN);
+ xhdr->type = type; /* do it here so that "type" param no longer used */
+
+ aad[8] = type;
+ aad[9] = TLS_MAJ;
+ aad[10] = TLS_MIN;
+ aad[11] = size >> 8;
+ /* set aad[12], and clear aad[13..15] */
+ COUNTER(aad) = SWAP_LE32(size & 0xff);
+
+ memcpy(nonce, tls->client_write_IV, 4);
+ t64 = tls->write_seq64_be;
+ move_to_unaligned64(nonce + 4, t64);
+ move_to_unaligned64(aad, t64);
+ move_to_unaligned64(buf - 8, t64);
+ /* seq64 is not used later in this func, can increment here */
+ tls->write_seq64_be = SWAP_BE64(1 + SWAP_BE64(t64));
+
+ cnt = 1;
+ remaining = size;
+ while (remaining != 0) {
+ unsigned n;
+
+ cnt++;
+ COUNTER(nonce) = htonl(cnt); /* yes, first cnt here is 2 (!) */
+ aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_encrypt, nonce, scratch);
+ n = remaining > AES_BLOCK_SIZE ? AES_BLOCK_SIZE : remaining;
+ xorbuf(buf, scratch, n);
+ buf += n;
+ remaining -= n;
+ }
+
+ aesgcm_GHASH(tls->H, aad, /*sizeof(aad),*/ tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX, size, authtag /*, sizeof(authtag)*/);
+ COUNTER(nonce) = htonl(1);
+ aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_encrypt, nonce, scratch);
+ xorbuf_aligned_AES_BLOCK_SIZE(authtag, scratch);
+
+ memcpy(buf, authtag, sizeof(authtag));
+
+ /* Write out */
+ xhdr = (void*)(tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX - 8 - RECHDR_LEN);
+ size += 8 + sizeof(authtag);
+ /*xhdr->type = type; - already is */
+ xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ;
+ xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN;
+ xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
+ xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
+ size += RECHDR_LEN;
+ dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, size);
+ xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, size);
+ dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", size);
+#undef COUNTER
+}
+
+static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
+{
+ if (!(tls->flags & ENCRYPTION_AESGCM)) {
+ xwrite_encrypted_and_hmac_signed(tls, size, type);
+ return;
+ }
+ xwrite_encrypted_aesgcm(tls, size, type);
+}
+
static void xwrite_handshake_record(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size)
{
- //if (!tls->encrypt_on_write) {
- uint8_t *buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX;
- struct record_hdr *xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN);
+ uint8_t *buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX;
+ struct record_hdr *xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN);
- xhdr->type = RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE;
- xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ;
- xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN;
- xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
- xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
- dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
- xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
- dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", (int)RECHDR_LEN + size);
- // return;
- //}
- //xwrite_encrypted(tls, size, RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE);
+ xhdr->type = RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE;
+ xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ;
+ xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN;
+ xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
+ xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
+ dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
+ xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
+ dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", (int)RECHDR_LEN + size);
}
static void xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size)
{
- if (!tls->encrypt_on_write) {
+ if (!(tls->flags & ENCRYPT_ON_WRITE)) {
uint8_t *buf;
xwrite_handshake_record(tls, size);
return itoa(code);
}
+static void tls_aesgcm_decrypt(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *buf, int size)
+{
+#define COUNTER(v) (*(uint32_t*)(v + 12))
+
+ //uint8_t aad[13 + 3] ALIGNED_long; /* +3 creates [16] buffer, simplifying GHASH() */
+ uint8_t nonce[12 + 4] ALIGNED_long; /* +4 creates space for AES block counter */
+ uint8_t scratch[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] ALIGNED_long; //[16]
+ //uint8_t authtag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] ALIGNED_long; //[16]
+ unsigned remaining;
+ unsigned cnt;
+
+ //memcpy(aad, buf, 8);
+ //aad[8] = type;
+ //aad[9] = TLS_MAJ;
+ //aad[10] = TLS_MIN;
+ //aad[11] = size >> 8;
+ ///* set aad[12], and clear aad[13..15] */
+ //COUNTER(aad) = SWAP_LE32(size & 0xff);
+
+ memcpy(nonce, tls->server_write_IV, 4);
+ memcpy(nonce + 4, buf, 8);
+
+ cnt = 1;
+ remaining = size;
+ while (remaining != 0) {
+ unsigned n;
+
+ cnt++;
+ COUNTER(nonce) = htonl(cnt); /* yes, first cnt here is 2 (!) */
+ aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_decrypt, nonce, scratch);
+ n = remaining > AES_BLOCK_SIZE ? AES_BLOCK_SIZE : remaining;
+ xorbuf3(buf, scratch, buf + 8, n);
+ buf += n;
+ remaining -= n;
+ }
+
+ //aesgcm_GHASH(tls->H, aad, tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN, size, authtag);
+ //COUNTER(nonce) = htonl(1);
+ //aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_encrypt, nonce, scratch);
+ //xorbuf_aligned_AES_BLOCK_SIZE(authtag, scratch);
+
+ //memcmp(buf, authtag, sizeof(authtag)) || DIE("HASH DOES NOT MATCH!");
+#undef COUNTER
+}
+
static int tls_xread_record(tls_state_t *tls, const char *expected)
{
struct record_hdr *xhdr;
sz = target - RECHDR_LEN;
/* Needs to be decrypted? */
- if (tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read > tls->MAC_size) {
- uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN;
- int padding_len;
-
- if (sz & (AES_BLOCKSIZE-1)
- || sz < (int)tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read
- ) {
- bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u < %u",
- sz, tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read);
+ if (tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read != 0) {
+ if (sz < (int)tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read)
+ bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u", sz);
+
+ if (tls->flags & ENCRYPTION_AESGCM) {
+ /* AESGCM */
+ uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN;
+
+ sz -= 8 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* we will overwrite nonce, drop hash */
+ tls_aesgcm_decrypt(tls, p, sz);
+ dbg("encrypted size:%u\n", sz);
+ } else
+ if (tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read > TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls)) {
+ /* AES+SHA */
+ uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN;
+ int padding_len;
+
+ if (sz & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1))
+ bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u", sz);
+
+ /* Decrypt content+MAC+padding, moving it over IV in the process */
+ sz -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* we will overwrite IV now */
+ aes_cbc_decrypt(
+ &tls->aes_decrypt, /* selects 128/256 */
+ p, /* IV */
+ p + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, sz, /* ciphertext */
+ p /* plaintext */
+ );
+ padding_len = p[sz - 1];
+ dbg("encrypted size:%u type:0x%02x padding_length:0x%02x\n", sz, p[0], padding_len);
+ padding_len++;
+ sz -= TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls) + padding_len; /* drop MAC and padding */
+ } else {
+ /* if nonzero, then it's TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: drop MAC */
+ /* else: no encryption yet on input, subtract zero = NOP */
+ sz -= tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read;
}
- /* Decrypt content+MAC+padding, moving it over IV in the process */
- sz -= AES_BLOCKSIZE; /* we will overwrite IV now */
- aes_cbc_decrypt(
- tls->server_write_key, tls->key_size, /* selects 128/256 */
- p, /* IV */
- p + AES_BLOCKSIZE, sz, /* ciphertext */
- p /* plaintext */
- );
- padding_len = p[sz - 1];
- dbg("encrypted size:%u type:0x%02x padding_length:0x%02x\n", sz, p[0], padding_len);
- padding_len++;
- sz -= tls->MAC_size + padding_len; /* drop MAC and padding */
- //if (sz < 0)
- // bb_error_msg_and_die("bad padding size:%u", padding_len);
- } else {
- /* if nonzero, then it's TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: drop MAC */
- /* else: no encryption yet on input, subtract zero = NOP */
- sz -= tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read;
}
if (sz < 0)
- bb_error_msg_and_die("encrypted data too short");
+ bb_simple_error_msg_and_die("encrypted data too short");
//dump_hex("<< %s\n", tls->inbuf, RECHDR_LEN + sz);
* in our FINISHED record must include data of incoming packets too!
*/
if (tls->inbuf[0] == RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE
- && tls->MAC_size != 0 /* do we know which hash to use? (server_hello() does not!) */
+/* HANDSHAKE HASH: */
+ // && do_we_know_which_hash_to_use /* server_hello() might not know it in the future! */
) {
hash_handshake(tls, "<< hash:%s", tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN, sz);
}
return sz;
}
+static void binary_to_pstm(pstm_int *pstm_n, uint8_t *bin_ptr, unsigned len)
+{
+ pstm_init_for_read_unsigned_bin(/*pool:*/ NULL, pstm_n, len);
+ pstm_read_unsigned_bin(pstm_n, bin_ptr, len);
+ //return bin_ptr + len;
+}
+
/*
* DER parsing routines
*/
unsigned len = get_der_len(&bin_ptr, der, end);
dbg_der("binary bytes:%u, first:0x%02x\n", len, bin_ptr[0]);
- pstm_init_for_read_unsigned_bin(/*pool:*/ NULL, pstm_n, len);
- pstm_read_unsigned_bin(pstm_n, bin_ptr, len);
- //return bin + len;
+ binary_to_pstm(pstm_n, bin_ptr, len);
}
static void find_key_in_der_cert(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *der, int len)
* publicKey (BIT STRING)
*
* We need Certificate.tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey
+ *
+ * Example of an ECDSA key:
+ * SEQ 0x59 bytes (subjectPublicKeyInfo): 3059
+ * SEQ 0x13 bytes (algorithm): 3013
+ * OID 7 bytes: 0607 2a8648ce3d0201 (OID_ECDSA_KEY_ALG 42.134.72.206.61.2.1)
+ * OID 8 bytes: 0608 2a8648ce3d030107 (OID_EC_prime256v1 42.134.72.206.61.3.1.7)
+ * BITSTRING 0x42 bytes (publicKey): 0342
+ * 0004 53af f65e 50cc 7959 7e29 0171 c75c
+ * 7335 e07d f45b 9750 b797 3a38 aebb 2ac6
+ * 8329 2748 e77e 41cb d482 2ce6 05ec a058
+ * f3ab d561 2f4c d845 9ad3 7252 e3de bd3b
+ * 9012
*/
uint8_t *end = der + len;
- uint8_t tag_class, pc, tag_number;
- int version_present;
/* enter "Certificate" item: [der, end) will be only Cert */
der = enter_der_item(der, &end);
* (constructed), and a tag number of 0 (see ITU-T X.690 sections 8.1.2
* and 8.14).
*/
- tag_class = der[0] >> 6; /* bits 8-7 */
- pc = (der[0] & 32) >> 5; /* bit 6 */
- tag_number = der[0] & 31; /* bits 5-1 */
- version_present = tag_class == 2 && pc == 1 && tag_number == 0;
- if (version_present) {
+ /* bits 7-6: 10 */
+ /* bit 5: 1 */
+ /* bits 4-0: 00000 */
+ if (der[0] == 0xa0)
der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* version */
- }
/* skip up to subjectPublicKeyInfo */
der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* serialNumber */
/* enter subjectPublicKeyInfo */
der = enter_der_item(der, &end);
{ /* check subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm */
- static const uint8_t expected[] = {
+ static const uint8_t OID_RSA_KEY_ALG[] ALIGN1 = {
0x30,0x0d, // SEQ 13 bytes
- 0x06,0x09, 0x2a,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xf7,0x0d,0x01,0x01,0x01, // OID RSA_KEY_ALG 42.134.72.134.247.13.1.1.1
+ 0x06,0x09, 0x2a,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xf7,0x0d,0x01,0x01,0x01, //OID_RSA_KEY_ALG 42.134.72.134.247.13.1.1.1
//0x05,0x00, // NULL
};
- if (memcmp(der, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0)
- bb_error_msg_and_die("not RSA key");
+ static const uint8_t OID_ECDSA_KEY_ALG[] ALIGN1 = {
+ 0x30,0x13, // SEQ 0x13 bytes
+ 0x06,0x07, 0x2a,0x86,0x48,0xce,0x3d,0x02,0x01, //OID_ECDSA_KEY_ALG 42.134.72.206.61.2.1
+ //allow any curve code for now...
+ // 0x06,0x08, 0x2a,0x86,0x48,0xce,0x3d,0x03,0x01,0x07, //OID_EC_prime256v1 42.134.72.206.61.3.1.7
+ //RFC 3279:
+ //42.134.72.206.61.3 is ellipticCurve
+ //42.134.72.206.61.3.0 is c-TwoCurve
+ //42.134.72.206.61.3.1 is primeCurve
+ //42.134.72.206.61.3.1.7 is curve_secp256r1
+ };
+ if (memcmp(der, OID_RSA_KEY_ALG, sizeof(OID_RSA_KEY_ALG)) == 0) {
+ dbg("RSA key\n");
+ tls->flags |= GOT_CERT_RSA_KEY_ALG;
+ } else
+ if (memcmp(der, OID_ECDSA_KEY_ALG, sizeof(OID_ECDSA_KEY_ALG)) == 0) {
+ dbg("ECDSA key\n");
+ //UNUSED: tls->flags |= GOT_CERT_ECDSA_KEY_ALG;
+ } else
+ bb_simple_error_msg_and_die("not RSA or ECDSA cert");
}
- /* skip subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm */
- der = skip_der_item(der, end);
- /* enter subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey */
-// die_if_not_this_der_type(der, end, 0x03); /* must be BITSTRING */
- der = enter_der_item(der, &end);
- /* parse RSA key: */
-//based on getAsnRsaPubKey(), pkcs1ParsePrivBin() is also of note
- dbg("key bytes:%u, first:0x%02x\n", (int)(end - der), der[0]);
- if (end - der < 14) xfunc_die();
- /* example format:
- * ignore bits: 00
- * SEQ 0x018a/394 bytes: 3082018a
- * INTEGER 0x0181/385 bytes (modulus): 02820181 XX...XXX
- * INTEGER 3 bytes (exponent): 0203 010001
+ if (tls->flags & GOT_CERT_RSA_KEY_ALG) {
+ /* parse RSA key: */
+ //based on getAsnRsaPubKey(), pkcs1ParsePrivBin() is also of note
+ /* skip subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm */
+ der = skip_der_item(der, end);
+ /* enter subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey */
+ //die_if_not_this_der_type(der, end, 0x03); /* must be BITSTRING */
+ der = enter_der_item(der, &end);
+
+ dbg("key bytes:%u, first:0x%02x\n", (int)(end - der), der[0]);
+ if (end - der < 14)
+ xfunc_die();
+ /* example format:
+ * ignore bits: 00
+ * SEQ 0x018a/394 bytes: 3082018a
+ * INTEGER 0x0181/385 bytes (modulus): 02820181 XX...XXX
+ * INTEGER 3 bytes (exponent): 0203 010001
+ */
+ if (*der != 0) /* "ignore bits", should be 0 */
+ xfunc_die();
+ der++;
+ der = enter_der_item(der, &end); /* enter SEQ */
+ /* memset(tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key, 0, sizeof(tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key)); - already is */
+ der_binary_to_pstm(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.N, der, end); /* modulus */
+ der = skip_der_item(der, end);
+ der_binary_to_pstm(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.e, der, end); /* exponent */
+ tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.size = pstm_unsigned_bin_size(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.N);
+ dbg("server_rsa_pub_key.size:%d\n", tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.size);
+ }
+ /* else: ECDSA key. It is not used for generating encryption keys,
+ * it is used only to sign the EC public key (which comes in ServerKey message).
+ * Since we do not verify cert validity, verifying signature on EC public key
+ * wouldn't add any security. Thus, we do nothing here.
*/
- if (*der != 0) /* "ignore bits", should be 0 */
- xfunc_die();
- der++;
- der = enter_der_item(der, &end); /* enter SEQ */
- /* memset(tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key, 0, sizeof(tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key)); - already is */
- der_binary_to_pstm(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.N, der, end); /* modulus */
- der = skip_der_item(der, end);
- der_binary_to_pstm(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.e, der, end); /* exponent */
- tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.size = pstm_unsigned_bin_size(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.N);
- dbg("server_rsa_pub_key.size:%d\n", tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.size);
}
/*
static void send_client_hello_and_alloc_hsd(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni)
{
+#define NUM_CIPHERS (7 + 6 * ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1 + ALLOW_RSA_NULL_SHA256)
+ static const uint8_t ciphers[] = {
+ 0x00,2 + NUM_CIPHERS*2, //len16_be
+ 0x00,0xFF, //not a cipher - TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
+ /* ^^^^^^ RFC 5746 Renegotiation Indication Extension - some servers will refuse to work with us otherwise */
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+ 0xC0,0x09, // 1 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - ok: wget https://is.gd/
+ 0xC0,0x0A, // 2 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - ok: wget https://is.gd/
+ 0xC0,0x13, // 3 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
+ 0xC0,0x14, // 4 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (might fail with older openssl)
+ // 0xC0,0x18, // TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ // 0xC0,0x19, // TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+#endif
+ 0xC0,0x23, // 5 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - ok: wget https://is.gd/
+ // 0xC0,0x24, // TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 - can't do SHA384 yet
+ 0xC0,0x27, // 6 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
+ // 0xC0,0x28, // TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 - can't do SHA384 yet
+ 0xC0,0x2B, // 7 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ok: wget https://is.gd/
+ // 0xC0,0x2C, // TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - wget https://is.gd/: "TLS error from peer (alert code 20): bad MAC"
+//TODO: GCM_SHA384 ciphers can be supported, only need sha384-based PRF?
+ 0xC0,0x2F, // 8 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ // 0xC0,0x30, // TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384: "decryption failed or bad record mac"
+ //possibly these too:
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+ // 0xC0,0x35, // TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ // 0xC0,0x36, // TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+#endif
+ // 0xC0,0x37, // TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ // 0xC0,0x38, // TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 - can't do SHA384 yet
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+ 0x00,0x2F, // 9 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES128-SHA
+ 0x00,0x35, //10 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES256-SHA
+#endif
+ 0x00,0x3C, //11 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES128-SHA256
+ 0x00,0x3D, //12 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES256-SHA256
+ 0x00,0x9C, //13 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ // 0x00,0x9D, // TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - openssl s_server ... -cipher AES256-GCM-SHA384: "decryption failed or bad record mac"
+#if ALLOW_RSA_NULL_SHA256
+ 0x00,0x3B, // TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+#endif
+ 0x01,0x00, //not a cipher - comprtypes_len, comprtype
+ };
+ static const uint8_t supported_groups[] = {
+ 0x00,0x0a, //extension_type: "supported_groups"
+ 0x00,0x04, //ext len
+ 0x00,0x02, //list len
+ 0x00,0x1d, //curve_x25519 (RFC 7748)
+ //0x00,0x1e, //curve_x448 (RFC 7748)
+ //0x00,0x17, //curve_secp256r1
+ //0x00,0x18, //curve_secp384r1
+ //0x00,0x19, //curve_secp521r1
+//TODO: implement secp256r1 (at least): dl.fedoraproject.org immediately aborts
+//if only x25519/x448 are advertised, seems to support only secpNNNr1 curves:
+// openssl s_client -connect dl.fedoraproject.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+//Peer signing digest: SHA512
+//Peer signature type: RSA
+//Server Temp Key: ECDH, P-256, 256 bits
+//TLSv1.2, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ };
+ //static const uint8_t signature_algorithms[] = {
+ // 000d
+ // 0020
+ // 001e
+ // 0601 0602 0603 0501 0502 0503 0401 0402 0403 0301 0302 0303 0201 0202 0203
+ //};
+
struct client_hello {
uint8_t type;
uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo;
uint8_t session_id_len;
/* uint8_t session_id[]; */
uint8_t cipherid_len16_hi, cipherid_len16_lo;
- uint8_t cipherid[2 * (2 + !!CIPHER_ID2)]; /* actually variable */
+ uint8_t cipherid[2 + NUM_CIPHERS*2]; /* actually variable */
uint8_t comprtypes_len;
uint8_t comprtypes[1]; /* actually variable */
/* Extensions (SNI shown):
// 0017 0000 - extended master secret
};
struct client_hello *record;
+ uint8_t *ptr;
int len;
- int sni_len = sni ? strnlen(sni, 127 - 9) : 0;
+ int ext_len;
+ int sni_len = sni ? strnlen(sni, 127 - 5) : 0;
- len = sizeof(*record);
+ ext_len = 0;
+ /* is.gd responds with "handshake failure" to our hello if there's no supported_groups element */
+ ext_len += sizeof(supported_groups);
if (sni_len)
- len += 11 + sni_len;
- record = tls_get_outbuf(tls, len);
- memset(record, 0, len);
+ ext_len += 9 + sni_len;
+
+ /* +2 is for "len of all extensions" 2-byte field */
+ len = sizeof(*record) + 2 + ext_len;
+ record = tls_get_zeroed_outbuf(tls, len);
fill_handshake_record_hdr(record, HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO, len);
record->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ; /* the "requested" version of the protocol, */
memset(record->rand32, 0x11, sizeof(record->rand32));
/* record->session_id_len = 0; - already is */
- /* record->cipherid_len16_hi = 0; */
- record->cipherid_len16_lo = sizeof(record->cipherid);
- /* RFC 5746 Renegotiation Indication Extension - some servers will refuse to work with us otherwise */
- /*record->cipherid[0] = TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV >> 8; - zero */
- record->cipherid[1] = TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV & 0xff;
- if ((CIPHER_ID1 >> 8) != 0) record->cipherid[2] = CIPHER_ID1 >> 8;
- /*************************/ record->cipherid[3] = CIPHER_ID1 & 0xff;
-#if CIPHER_ID2
- if ((CIPHER_ID2 >> 8) != 0) record->cipherid[4] = CIPHER_ID2 >> 8;
- /*************************/ record->cipherid[5] = CIPHER_ID2 & 0xff;
-#endif
-
- record->comprtypes_len = 1;
- /* record->comprtypes[0] = 0; */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ciphers) != 2 + 2 + NUM_CIPHERS*2 + 2);
+ memcpy(&record->cipherid_len16_hi, ciphers, sizeof(ciphers));
+ ptr = (void*)(record + 1);
+ *ptr++ = ext_len >> 8;
+ *ptr++ = ext_len;
if (sni_len) {
- uint8_t *p = (void*)(record + 1);
- //p[0] = 0; //
- p[1] = sni_len + 9; //ext_len
- //p[2] = 0; //
- //p[3] = 0; //extension_type
- //p[4] = 0; //
- p[5] = sni_len + 5; //list len
- //p[6] = 0; //
- p[7] = sni_len + 3; //len of 1st SNI
- //p[8] = 0; //name type
- //p[9] = 0; //
- p[10] = sni_len; //name len
- memcpy(&p[11], sni, sni_len);
+ //ptr[0] = 0; //
+ //ptr[1] = 0; //extension_type
+ //ptr[2] = 0; //
+ ptr[3] = sni_len + 5; //list len
+ //ptr[4] = 0; //
+ ptr[5] = sni_len + 3; //len of 1st SNI
+ //ptr[6] = 0; //name type
+ //ptr[7] = 0; //
+ ptr[8] = sni_len; //name len
+ ptr = mempcpy(&ptr[9], sni, sni_len);
}
+ memcpy(ptr, supported_groups, sizeof(supported_groups));
- dbg(">> CLIENT_HELLO\n");
- /* Can hash it only when we know which MAC hash to use */
- /*xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls, len); - WRONG! */
- xwrite_handshake_record(tls, len);
-
- tls->hsd = xzalloc(sizeof(*tls->hsd) + len);
+ tls->hsd = xzalloc(sizeof(*tls->hsd));
+ /* HANDSHAKE HASH: ^^^ + len if need to save saved_client_hello */
+ memcpy(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32, record->rand32, sizeof(record->rand32));
+/* HANDSHAKE HASH:
tls->hsd->saved_client_hello_size = len;
memcpy(tls->hsd->saved_client_hello, record, len);
- memcpy(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32, record->rand32, sizeof(record->rand32));
+ */
+ dbg(">> CLIENT_HELLO\n");
+ /* Can hash immediately only if we know which MAC hash to use.
+ * So far we do know: it's sha256:
+ */
+ sha256_begin(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx);
+ xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls, len);
+ /* if this would become infeasible: save tls->hsd->saved_client_hello,
+ * use "xwrite_handshake_record(tls, len)" here,
+ * and hash saved_client_hello later.
+ */
}
static void get_server_hello(tls_state_t *tls)
struct server_hello *hp;
uint8_t *cipherid;
- unsigned cipher;
+ uint8_t cipherid1;
int len, len24;
len = tls_xread_handshake_block(tls, 74 - 32);
len24 += 32; /* what len would be if session id would be present */
}
- if (len24 < 70
-// || cipherid[0] != (CIPHER_ID >> 8)
-// || cipherid[1] != (CIPHER_ID & 0xff)
-// || cipherid[2] != 0 /* comprtype */
- ) {
+ if (len24 < 70)
bad_record_die(tls, "'server hello'", len);
- }
dbg("<< SERVER_HELLO\n");
memcpy(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32 + 32, hp->rand32, sizeof(hp->rand32));
- tls->cipher_id = cipher = 0x100 * cipherid[0] + cipherid[1];
- dbg("server chose cipher %04x\n", cipher);
-
- if (cipher == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) {
- tls->key_size = AES128_KEYSIZE;
- tls->MAC_size = SHA1_OUTSIZE;
- }
- else { /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
- tls->key_size = AES256_KEYSIZE;
- tls->MAC_size = SHA256_OUTSIZE;
+ /* Set up encryption params based on selected cipher */
+#if 0
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+ 0xC0,0x09, // 1 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - ok: wget https://is.gd/
+ 0xC0,0x0A, // 2 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - ok: wget https://is.gd/
+ 0xC0,0x13, // 3 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
+ 0xC0,0x14, // 4 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (might fail with older openssl)
+ // 0xC0,0x18, // TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ // 0xC0,0x19, // TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+#endif
+ 0xC0,0x23, // 5 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - ok: wget https://is.gd/
+ // 0xC0,0x24, // TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 - can't do SHA384 yet
+ 0xC0,0x27, // 6 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
+ // 0xC0,0x28, // TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 - can't do SHA384 yet
+ 0xC0,0x2B, // 7 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ok: wget https://is.gd/
+ // 0xC0,0x2C, // TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - wget https://is.gd/: "TLS error from peer (alert code 20): bad MAC"
+//TODO: GCM_SHA384 ciphers can be supported, only need sha384-based PRF?
+ 0xC0,0x2F, // 8 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ // 0xC0,0x30, // TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - openssl s_server ... -cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384: "decryption failed or bad record mac"
+ //possibly these too:
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+ // 0xC0,0x35, // TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ // 0xC0,0x36, // TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+#endif
+ // 0xC0,0x37, // TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ // 0xC0,0x38, // TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 - can't do SHA384 yet
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1
+ 0x00,0x2F, // 9 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES128-SHA
+ 0x00,0x35, //10 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES256-SHA
+#endif
+ 0x00,0x3C, //11 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES128-SHA256
+ 0x00,0x3D, //12 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES256-SHA256
+ 0x00,0x9C, //13 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ok: openssl s_server ... -cipher AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ // 0x00,0x9D, // TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - openssl s_server ... -cipher AES256-GCM-SHA384: "decryption failed or bad record mac"
+#if ALLOW_RSA_NULL_SHA256
+ 0x00,0x3B, // TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+#endif
+#endif
+ cipherid1 = cipherid[1];
+ tls->cipher_id = 0x100 * cipherid[0] + cipherid1;
+ tls->key_size = AES256_KEYSIZE;
+ tls->MAC_size = SHA256_OUTSIZE;
+ /*tls->IV_size = 0; - already is */
+ if (cipherid[0] == 0xC0) {
+ /* All C0xx are ECDHE */
+ tls->flags |= NEED_EC_KEY;
+ if (cipherid1 & 1) {
+ /* Odd numbered C0xx use AES128 (even ones use AES256) */
+ tls->key_size = AES128_KEYSIZE;
+ }
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1 && cipherid1 <= 0x19) {
+ tls->MAC_size = SHA1_OUTSIZE;
+ } else
+ if (cipherid1 >= 0x2B && cipherid1 <= 0x30) {
+ /* C02B,2C,2F,30 are AES-GCM */
+ tls->flags |= ENCRYPTION_AESGCM;
+ tls->MAC_size = 0;
+ tls->IV_size = 4;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* All 00xx are RSA */
+ if ((ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1 && cipherid1 == 0x2F)
+ || cipherid1 == 0x3C
+ || cipherid1 == 0x9C
+ ) {
+ tls->key_size = AES128_KEYSIZE;
+ }
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_TLS_SHA1 && cipherid1 <= 0x35) {
+ tls->MAC_size = SHA1_OUTSIZE;
+ } else
+ if (cipherid1 == 0x9C /*|| cipherid1 == 0x9D*/) {
+ /* 009C,9D are AES-GCM */
+ tls->flags |= ENCRYPTION_AESGCM;
+ tls->MAC_size = 0;
+ tls->IV_size = 4;
+ }
}
+ dbg("server chose cipher %04x\n", tls->cipher_id);
+ dbg("key_size:%u MAC_size:%u IV_size:%u\n", tls->key_size, tls->MAC_size, tls->IV_size);
+
/* Handshake hash eventually destined to FINISHED record
* is sha256 regardless of cipher
* (at least for all ciphers defined by RFC5246).
* It's not sha1 for AES_128_CBC_SHA - only MAC is sha1, not this hash.
*/
+/* HANDSHAKE HASH:
sha256_begin(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx);
hash_handshake(tls, ">> client hello hash:%s",
tls->hsd->saved_client_hello, tls->hsd->saved_client_hello_size
hash_handshake(tls, "<< server hello hash:%s",
tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN, len
);
+ */
}
static void get_server_cert(tls_state_t *tls)
find_key_in_der_cert(tls, certbuf + 10, len);
}
+/* On input, len is known to be >= 4.
+ * The record is known to be SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE.
+ */
+static void process_server_key(tls_state_t *tls, int len)
+{
+ struct record_hdr *xhdr;
+ uint8_t *keybuf;
+ int len1;
+ uint32_t t32;
+
+ xhdr = (void*)tls->inbuf;
+ keybuf = (void*)(xhdr + 1);
+//seen from is.gd: it selects curve_x25519:
+// 0c 00006e //SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, len
+// 03 //curve_type: named curve
+// 001d //curve_x25519
+//server-chosen EC point, and then signed_params
+// (RFC 8422: "A hash of the params, with the signature
+// appropriate to that hash applied. The private key corresponding
+// to the certified public key in the server's Certificate message is
+// used for signing.")
+//follow. Format unclear/guessed:
+// 20 //eccPubKeyLen
+// 25511923d73b70dd2f60e66ba2f3fda31a9c25170963c7a3a972e481dbb2835d //eccPubKey (32bytes)
+// 0203 //hashSigAlg: 2:SHA1 (4:SHA256 5:SHA384 6:SHA512), 3:ECDSA (1:RSA)
+// 0046 //len (16bit)
+// 30 44 //SEQ, len
+// 02 20 //INTEGER, len
+// 2e18e7c2a9badd0a70cd3059a6ab114539b9f5163568911147386cd77ed7c412 //32bytes
+//this item ^^^^^ is sometimes 33 bytes (with all container sizes also +1)
+// 02 20 //INTEGER, len
+// 64523d6216cb94c43c9b20e377d8c52c55be6703fd6730a155930c705eaf3af6 //32bytes
+//same about this item ^^^^^
+
+//seen from ftp.openbsd.org
+//(which only accepts ECDHE-RSA-AESnnn-GCM-SHAnnn and ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphers):
+// 0c 000228 //SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, len
+// 03 //curve_type: named curve
+// 001d //curve_x25519
+// 20 //eccPubKeyLen
+// eef7a15c43b71a4c7eaa48a39369399cc4332e569ec90a83274cc92596705c1a //eccPubKey
+// 0401 //hashSigAlg: 4:SHA256, 1:RSA
+// 0200 //len
+// //0x200 bytes follow
+
+ /* Get and verify length */
+ len1 = get24be(keybuf + 1);
+ if (len1 > len - 4) tls_error_die(tls);
+ len = len1;
+ if (len < (1+2+1+32)) tls_error_die(tls);
+ keybuf += 4;
+
+ /* So far we only support curve_x25519 */
+ move_from_unaligned32(t32, keybuf);
+ if (t32 != htonl(0x03001d20))
+ bb_simple_error_msg_and_die("elliptic curve is not x25519");
+
+ memcpy(tls->hsd->ecc_pub_key32, keybuf + 4, 32);
+ tls->flags |= GOT_EC_KEY;
+ dbg("got eccPubKey\n");
+}
+
static void send_empty_client_cert(tls_state_t *tls)
{
struct client_empty_cert {
};
struct client_empty_cert *record;
- record = tls_get_outbuf(tls, sizeof(*record));
-//FIXME: can just memcpy a ready-made one.
- fill_handshake_record_hdr(record, HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE, sizeof(*record));
- record->cert_chain_len24_hi = 0;
- record->cert_chain_len24_mid = 0;
- record->cert_chain_len24_lo = 0;
+ record = tls_get_zeroed_outbuf(tls, sizeof(*record));
+ //fill_handshake_record_hdr(record, HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE, sizeof(*record));
+ //record->cert_chain_len24_hi = 0;
+ //record->cert_chain_len24_mid = 0;
+ //record->cert_chain_len24_lo = 0;
+ // same as above:
+ record->type = HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE;
+ record->len24_lo = 3;
dbg(">> CERTIFICATE\n");
xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls, sizeof(*record));
struct client_key_exchange {
uint8_t type;
uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo;
- /* keylen16 exists for RSA (in TLS, not in SSL), but not for some other key types */
- uint8_t keylen16_hi, keylen16_lo;
- uint8_t key[4 * 1024]; // size??
+ uint8_t key[2 + 4 * 1024]; // size??
};
//FIXME: better size estimate
- struct client_key_exchange *record = tls_get_outbuf(tls, sizeof(*record));
+ struct client_key_exchange *record = tls_get_zeroed_outbuf(tls, sizeof(*record));
uint8_t rsa_premaster[RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE];
+ uint8_t x25519_premaster[CURVE25519_KEYSIZE];
+ uint8_t *premaster;
+ int premaster_size;
int len;
- tls_get_random(rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster));
- if (TLS_DEBUG_FIXED_SECRETS)
- memset(rsa_premaster, 0x44, sizeof(rsa_premaster));
- // RFC 5246
- // "Note: The version number in the PreMasterSecret is the version
- // offered by the client in the ClientHello.client_version, not the
- // version negotiated for the connection."
- rsa_premaster[0] = TLS_MAJ;
- rsa_premaster[1] = TLS_MIN;
- dump_hex("premaster:%s\n", rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster));
- len = psRsaEncryptPub(/*pool:*/ NULL,
- /* psRsaKey_t* */ &tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key,
- rsa_premaster, /*inlen:*/ sizeof(rsa_premaster),
- record->key, sizeof(record->key),
- data_param_ignored
- );
- record->keylen16_hi = len >> 8;
- record->keylen16_lo = len & 0xff;
- len += 2;
+ if (!(tls->flags & NEED_EC_KEY)) {
+ /* RSA */
+ if (!(tls->flags & GOT_CERT_RSA_KEY_ALG))
+ bb_simple_error_msg("server cert is not RSA");
+
+ tls_get_random(rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster));
+ if (TLS_DEBUG_FIXED_SECRETS)
+ memset(rsa_premaster, 0x44, sizeof(rsa_premaster));
+ // RFC 5246
+ // "Note: The version number in the PreMasterSecret is the version
+ // offered by the client in the ClientHello.client_version, not the
+ // version negotiated for the connection."
+ rsa_premaster[0] = TLS_MAJ;
+ rsa_premaster[1] = TLS_MIN;
+ dump_hex("premaster:%s\n", rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster));
+ len = psRsaEncryptPub(/*pool:*/ NULL,
+ /* psRsaKey_t* */ &tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key,
+ rsa_premaster, /*inlen:*/ sizeof(rsa_premaster),
+ record->key + 2, sizeof(record->key) - 2,
+ data_param_ignored
+ );
+ /* keylen16 exists for RSA (in TLS, not in SSL), but not for some other key types */
+ record->key[0] = len >> 8;
+ record->key[1] = len & 0xff;
+ len += 2;
+ premaster = rsa_premaster;
+ premaster_size = sizeof(rsa_premaster);
+ } else {
+ /* ECDHE */
+ static const uint8_t basepoint9[CURVE25519_KEYSIZE] = {9};
+ uint8_t privkey[CURVE25519_KEYSIZE]; //[32]
+
+ if (!(tls->flags & GOT_EC_KEY))
+ bb_simple_error_msg("server did not provide EC key");
+
+ /* Generate random private key, see RFC 7748 */
+ tls_get_random(privkey, sizeof(privkey));
+ privkey[0] &= 0xf8;
+ privkey[CURVE25519_KEYSIZE-1] = ((privkey[CURVE25519_KEYSIZE-1] & 0x7f) | 0x40);
+
+ /* Compute public key */
+ curve25519(record->key + 1, privkey, basepoint9);
+
+ /* Compute premaster using peer's public key */
+ dbg("computing x25519_premaster\n");
+ curve25519(x25519_premaster, privkey, tls->hsd->ecc_pub_key32);
+
+ len = CURVE25519_KEYSIZE;
+ record->key[0] = len;
+ len++;
+ premaster = x25519_premaster;
+ premaster_size = sizeof(x25519_premaster);
+ }
+
record->type = HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
- record->len24_hi = 0;
+ /* record->len24_hi = 0; - already is */
record->len24_mid = len >> 8;
record->len24_lo = len & 0xff;
len += 4;
// of the premaster secret will vary depending on key exchange method.
prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/
tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret),
- rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster),
+ premaster, premaster_size,
"master secret",
tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32, sizeof(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32)
);
memcpy(&tmp64[32], &tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32[0] , 32);
prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/
- tls->client_write_MAC_key, 2 * (tls->MAC_size + tls->key_size),
+ tls->client_write_MAC_key, 2 * (tls->MAC_size + tls->key_size + tls->IV_size),
// also fills:
// server_write_MAC_key[]
// client_write_key[]
// server_write_key[]
+ // client_write_IV[]
+ // server_write_IV[]
tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret),
"key expansion",
tmp64, 64
);
tls->client_write_key = tls->client_write_MAC_key + (2 * tls->MAC_size);
tls->server_write_key = tls->client_write_key + tls->key_size;
+ tls->client_write_IV = tls->server_write_key + tls->key_size;
+ tls->server_write_IV = tls->client_write_IV + tls->IV_size;
dump_hex("client_write_MAC_key:%s\n",
tls->client_write_MAC_key, tls->MAC_size
);
dump_hex("client_write_key:%s\n",
tls->client_write_key, tls->key_size
);
+ dump_hex("client_write_IV:%s\n",
+ tls->client_write_IV, tls->IV_size
+ );
+
+ aes_setkey(&tls->aes_decrypt, tls->server_write_key, tls->key_size);
+ aes_setkey(&tls->aes_encrypt, tls->client_write_key, tls->key_size);
+ {
+ uint8_t iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ memset(iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ aes_encrypt_one_block(&tls->aes_encrypt, iv, tls->H);
+ }
}
}
-static const uint8_t rec_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC[] = {
+static const uint8_t rec_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC[] ALIGN1 = {
RECORD_TYPE_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, TLS_MAJ, TLS_MIN, 00, 01,
01
};
fill_handshake_record_hdr(record, HANDSHAKE_FINISHED, sizeof(*record));
- len = get_handshake_hash(tls, handshake_hash);
+ len = sha_end(&tls->hsd->handshake_hash_ctx, handshake_hash);
+
prf_hmac_sha256(/*tls,*/
record->prf_result, sizeof(record->prf_result),
tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret),
//SvKey len=455^
// with TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: 461 bytes:
// 0c 00|01|c9 03|00|17|41|04|cd|9b|b4|29|1f|f6|b0|c2|84|82|7f|29|6a|47|4e|ec|87|0b|c1|9c|69|e1|f8|c6|d0|53|e9|27|90|a5|c8|02|15|75...
+ //
+ // RFC 8422 5.4. Server Key Exchange
+ // This message is sent when using the ECDHE_ECDSA, ECDHE_RSA, and
+ // ECDH_anon key exchange algorithms.
+ // This message is used to convey the server's ephemeral ECDH public key
+ // (and the corresponding elliptic curve domain parameters) to the
+ // client.
dbg("<< SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE len:%u\n", len);
-//probably need to save it
+ dump_raw_in("<< %s\n", tls->inbuf, RECHDR_LEN + len);
+ if (tls->flags & NEED_EC_KEY)
+ process_server_key(tls, len);
+
+ // read next handshake block
len = tls_xread_handshake_block(tls, 4);
}
send_change_cipher_spec(tls);
/* from now on we should send encrypted */
/* tls->write_seq64_be = 0; - already is */
- tls->encrypt_on_write = 1;
+ tls->flags |= ENCRYPT_ON_WRITE;
send_client_finished(tls);
if (len != 1 || memcmp(tls->inbuf, rec_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 6) != 0)
bad_record_die(tls, "switch to encrypted traffic", len);
dbg("<< CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC\n");
- if (CIPHER_ID1 == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+
+ if (ALLOW_RSA_NULL_SHA256
&& tls->cipher_id == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
) {
tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = tls->MAC_size;
- } else {
- unsigned mac_blocks = (unsigned)(tls->MAC_size + AES_BLOCKSIZE-1) / AES_BLOCKSIZE;
+ } else
+ if (!(tls->flags & ENCRYPTION_AESGCM)) {
+ unsigned mac_blocks = (unsigned)(TLS_MAC_SIZE(tls) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1) / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
/* all incoming packets now should be encrypted and have
* at least IV + (MAC padded to blocksize):
*/
- tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = AES_BLOCKSIZE + (mac_blocks * AES_BLOCKSIZE);
- dbg("min_encrypted_len_on_read: %u", tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read);
+ tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = AES_BLOCK_SIZE + (mac_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = 8 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
+ dbg("min_encrypted_len_on_read: %u\n", tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read);
/* Get (encrypted) FINISHED from the server */
len = tls_xread_record(tls, "'server finished'");
/* application data can be sent/received */
/* free handshake data */
+ psRsaKey_clear(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key);
// if (PARANOIA)
// memset(tls->hsd, 0, tls->hsd->hsd_size);
free(tls->hsd);
// To run a test server using openssl:
// openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:$((4096/4*3)) -keyout key.pem -out server.pem -nodes -days 99999 -subj '/CN=localhost'
-// openssl s_server -key key.pem -cert server.pem -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1
+// openssl s_server -key key.pem -cert server.pem -debug -tls1_2
//
// Unencryped SHA256 example:
// openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:$((4096/4*3)) -keyout key.pem -out server.pem -nodes -days 99999 -subj '/CN=localhost'
-// openssl s_server -key key.pem -cert server.pem -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher NULL
-// openssl s_client -connect 127.0.0.1:4433 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher NULL-SHA256
+// openssl s_server -key key.pem -cert server.pem -debug -tls1_2 -cipher NULL
+// openssl s_client -connect 127.0.0.1:4433 -debug -tls1_2 -cipher NULL-SHA256
void FAST_FUNC tls_run_copy_loop(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned flags)
{
int nread;
if (safe_poll(pfds, 2, -1) < 0)
- bb_perror_msg_and_die("poll");
+ bb_simple_perror_msg_and_die("poll");
if (pfds[0].revents) {
void *buf;
projects / oweals / busybox.git / blobdiff