* Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this tarball for details.
*/
+#include "libbb.h"
#include <syslog.h>
-#include "busybox.h"
-
-static const char * const forbid[] = {
- "ENV",
- "BASH_ENV",
- "HOME",
- "IFS",
- "PATH",
- "SHELL",
- "LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
- "LD_PRELOAD",
- "LD_TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS",
- "LD_BIND_NOW",
- "LD_AOUT_LIBRARY_PATH",
- "LD_AOUT_PRELOAD",
- "LD_NOWARN",
- "LD_KEEPDIR",
- (char *) 0
-};
-
-
-static void catchalarm(int ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED junk)
-{
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-}
+//static void catchalarm(int UNUSED_PARAM junk)
+//{
+// exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+//}
-int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv)
+int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
char *cp;
int timeout = 0;
- char *timeout_arg;
- const char * const *p;
struct passwd *pwd;
- struct spwd *spwd;
+ const char *shell;
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+ /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
+ char buffer[256];
+ struct spwd spw;
+#endif
logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
- openlog(bb_applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
+ openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
- if (getopt32 (argc, argv, "t:", &timeout_arg)) {
- if (safe_strtoi(timeout_arg, &timeout)) {
- timeout = 0;
- }
- }
+ opt_complementary = "t+"; /* -t N */
+ getopt32(argv, "t:", &timeout);
+ argv += optind;
- if (argv[optind]) {
+ if (argv[0]) {
close(0);
close(1);
- dup(xopen(argv[optind], O_RDWR));
+ dup(xopen(argv[0], O_RDWR));
close(2);
dup(0);
}
+ /* Malicious use like "sulogin /dev/sda"? */
if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
}
- /* Clear out anything dangerous from the environment */
- for (p = forbid; *p; p++)
- unsetenv(*p);
+ /* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
+ sanitize_env_if_suid();
- signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);
+// bb_ask() already handles this
+// signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);
- if (!(pwd = getpwuid(0))) {
+ pwd = getpwuid(0);
+ if (!pwd) {
goto auth_error;
}
- if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS) {
- if (!(spwd = getspnam(pwd->pw_name))) {
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
+ {
+ /* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
+ * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
+ struct spwd *result = NULL;
+ int r = getspnam_r(pwd->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result);
+ if (r || !result) {
goto auth_error;
}
- pwd->pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp;
+ pwd->pw_passwd = result->sp_pwdp;
}
+#endif
while (1) {
+ char *encrypted;
+ int r;
+
/* cp points to a static buffer that is zeroed every time */
- cp = bb_askpass(timeout,
+ cp = bb_ask(STDIN_FILENO, timeout,
"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
"(or type Control-D for normal startup):");
bb_info_msg("Normal startup");
return 0;
}
- if (strcmp(pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd), pwd->pw_passwd) == 0) {
+ encrypted = pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd, 1);
+ r = strcmp(encrypted, pwd->pw_passwd);
+ free(encrypted);
+ if (r == 0) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
bb_error_msg("login incorrect");
}
memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+// signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
bb_info_msg("System Maintenance Mode");
- USE_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());
+ IF_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());
- run_shell(pwd->pw_shell, 1, 0, 0);
- /* never returns */
+ shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
+ if (!shell)
+ shell = getenv("sushell");
+ if (!shell) {
+ shell = "/bin/sh";
+ if (pwd->pw_shell[0])
+ shell = pwd->pw_shell;
+ }
+ /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
+ run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL);
-auth_error:
- bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for `root'");
+ auth_error:
+ bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
}