remove now-unneeded memset
[oweals/busybox.git] / loginutils / sulogin.c
index 763a9913a95b67178877fe9b51d0e4d55faa81fb..6e3d3b0190922c08ca11c6a366f450246a540e7b 100644 (file)
 /* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
 /*
+ * Mini sulogin implementation for busybox
+ *
  * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this tarball for details.
  */
 
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
+#include "libbb.h"
 #include <syslog.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <utmp.h>
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include "busybox.h"
-
-
-#define SULOGIN_PROMPT "\nGive root password for system maintenance\n" \
-       "(or type Control-D for normal startup):"
-
-static const char * const forbid[] = {
-       "ENV",
-       "BASH_ENV",
-       "HOME",
-       "IFS",
-       "PATH",
-       "SHELL",
-       "LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
-       "LD_PRELOAD",
-       "LD_TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS",
-       "LD_BIND_NOW",
-       "LD_AOUT_LIBRARY_PATH",
-       "LD_AOUT_PRELOAD",
-       "LD_NOWARN",
-       "LD_KEEPDIR",
-       (char *) 0
-};
-
-
-
-static void catchalarm(int ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED junk)
-{
-       exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-}
 
+//static void catchalarm(int UNUSED_PARAM junk)
+//{
+//     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+//}
 
-int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv)
+
+int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 {
        char *cp;
-       char *device = NULL;
-       const char *name = "root";
        int timeout = 0;
-
-#define pass bb_common_bufsiz1
-
-       struct passwd pwent;
        struct passwd *pwd;
-       const char * const *p;
+       const char *shell;
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
-       struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
+       /* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
+       char buffer[256];
+       struct spwd spw;
 #endif
 
-       openlog("sulogin", LOG_PID | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH);
        logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
-       if (argc > 1) {
-               if (strncmp(argv[1], "-t", 2) == 0) {
-                       if (argv[1][2] == '\0') { /* -t NN */
-                               if (argc > 2) {
-                                       timeout = atoi(argv[2]);
-                                       if (argc > 3) {
-                                               device = argv[3];
-                                       }
-                               }
-                       } else { /* -tNNN */
-                               timeout = atoi(&argv[1][2]);
-                               if (argc > 2) {
-                                       device = argv[2];
-                               }
-                       }
-               } else {
-                       device = argv[1];
-               }
-               if (device) {
-                       close(0);
-                       close(1);
-                       close(2);
-                       if (open(device, O_RDWR) == 0) {
-                               dup(0);
-                               dup(0);
-                       } else {
-                               /* Well, it will go only to syslog :) */
-                               bb_perror_msg_and_die("Cannot open %s", device);
-                       }
-               }
+       openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
+
+       opt_complementary = "t+"; /* -t N */
+       getopt32(argv, "t:", &timeout);
+       argv += optind;
+
+       if (argv[0]) {
+               close(0);
+               close(1);
+               dup(xopen(argv[0], O_RDWR));
+               close(2);
+               dup(0);
        }
+
+       /* Malicious use like "sulogin /dev/sda"? */
        if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
-               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-       }
-       if (access(bb_path_passwd_file, 0) == -1) {
-               bb_error_msg_and_die("No password file");
+               logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
+               bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
        }
 
-       /* Clear out anything dangerous from the environment */
-       for (p = forbid; *p; p++)
-               unsetenv(*p);
+       /* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
+       sanitize_env_if_suid();
 
-       signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);
-       if (!(pwd = getpwnam(name))) {
-               bb_error_msg_and_die("No password entry for `root'");
+       pwd = getpwuid(0);
+       if (!pwd) {
+               goto auth_error;
        }
-       pwent = *pwd;
+
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
-       spwd = NULL;
-       if (pwd && ((strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0)
-                               || (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "*") == 0))) {
-               endspent();
-               spwd = getspnam(name);
-               if (spwd) {
-                       pwent.pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp;
+       {
+               /* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
+                * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
+               struct spwd *result = NULL;
+               int r = getspnam_r(pwd->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result);
+               if (r || !result) {
+                       goto auth_error;
                }
+               pwd->pw_passwd = result->sp_pwdp;
        }
 #endif
+
        while (1) {
-               cp = bb_askpass(timeout, SULOGIN_PROMPT);
+               char *encrypted;
+               int r;
+
+               /* cp points to a static buffer that is zeroed every time */
+               cp = bb_ask(STDIN_FILENO, timeout,
+                               "Give root password for system maintenance\n"
+                               "(or type Control-D for normal startup):");
+
                if (!cp || !*cp) {
-                       puts("\n"); /* Why only on error path? */
-                       fflush(stdout);
-                       /* Why only to syslog? */
-                       syslog(LOG_INFO, "Normal startup");
-                       exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
-               } else {
-                       safe_strncpy(pass, cp, sizeof(pass));
-                       memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
+                       bb_info_msg("Normal startup");
+                       return 0;
                }
-               if (strcmp(pw_encrypt(pass, pwent.pw_passwd), pwent.pw_passwd) == 0) {
+               encrypted = pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd, 1);
+               r = strcmp(encrypted, pwd->pw_passwd);
+               free(encrypted);
+               if (r == 0) {
                        break;
                }
                bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
-               bb_error_msg("Incorrect root password");
+               bb_error_msg("login incorrect");
        }
-       memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
-       signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
-       bb_info_msg("Entering System Maintenance Mode");
+       memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
+//     signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
 
-#if ENABLE_SELINUX
-       renew_current_security_context();
-#endif
+       bb_info_msg("System Maintenance Mode");
 
-       run_shell(pwent.pw_shell, 1, 0, 0);
+       IF_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());
+
+       shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
+       if (!shell)
+               shell = getenv("sushell");
+       if (!shell) {
+               shell = "/bin/sh";
+               if (pwd->pw_shell[0])
+                       shell = pwd->pw_shell;
+       }
+       /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
+       run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL);
 
-       return 0;
+ auth_error:
+       bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
 }