hush: add leak detector helper; fix/add tests for it

[oweals/busybox.git] / loginutils / su.c

diff --git a/loginutils/su.c b/loginutils/su.c
index ff6643e60d96bf44765be924e950f61db86e02cd..de8c18d25e40ef1b26247078e9e756c7bed5909f 100644 (file)
--- a/loginutils/su.c
+++ b/loginutils/su.c
@@ -5,86 +5,96 @@
  *  Licensed under the GPL v2 or later, see the file LICENSE in this tarball.
  */
 
-#include "busybox.h"
+#include "libbb.h"
 #include <syslog.h>
 
-int su_main(int argc, char **argv)
+#define SU_OPT_mp (3)
+#define SU_OPT_l (4)
+
+int su_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 {
-       unsigned long flags;
-       char *opt_shell = 0;
-       char *opt_command = 0;
-       char *opt_username = "root";
-       char **opt_args = 0;
+       unsigned flags;
+       char *opt_shell = NULL;
+       char *opt_command = NULL;
+       const char *opt_username = "root";
        struct passwd *pw;
        uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
        const char *tty;
        char *old_user;
 
-       flags = bb_getopt_ulflags(argc, argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
-#define SU_OPT_mp (3)
-#define SU_OPT_l (4)
+       flags = getopt32(argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
+       //argc -= optind;
+       argv += optind;
 
-       if (optind < argc  && argv[optind][0] == '-' && argv[optind][1] == 0) {
+       if (argv[0] && LONE_DASH(argv[0])) {
                flags |= SU_OPT_l;
-               ++optind;
+               argv++;
        }
 
        /* get user if specified */
-       if (optind < argc) opt_username = argv [optind++];
-
-       if (optind < argc) opt_args = argv + optind;
+       if (argv[0]) {
+               opt_username = argv[0];
+               argv++;
+       }
 
-       if (ENABLE_SU_SYSLOG) {
+       if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
                /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to identify
                the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell.
                But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
                in this case resort to getpwuid.  */
                old_user = xstrdup(USE_FEATURE_UTMP(getlogin() ? : ) (pw = getpwuid(cur_uid)) ? pw->pw_name : "");
-               tty = ttyname(2) ? : "none";
-               openlog(bb_applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
+               tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2) ? : "none";
+               openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
        }
 
-       pw = getpwnam(opt_username);
-       if (!pw) bb_error_msg_and_die("Unknown id: %s", opt_username);
+       pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username);
 
        /* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL.  It may be NULL when NEW_USER
           is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), but that doesn't have
           a default shell listed.  */
-       if (!pw->pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell[0]) pw->pw_shell = (char *)DEFAULT_SHELL;
+       if (!pw->pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell[0])
+               pw->pw_shell = (char *)DEFAULT_SHELL;
 
        if ((cur_uid == 0) || correct_password(pw)) {
-               if (ENABLE_SU_SYSLOG)
-                       syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "+ %s %s:%s", tty, old_user, opt_username);
+               if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
+                       syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
+                               '+', tty, old_user, opt_username);
        } else {
-               if (ENABLE_SU_SYSLOG)
-                       syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "- %s %s:%s", tty, old_user, opt_username);
+               if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
+                       syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
+                               '-', tty, old_user, opt_username);
                bb_error_msg_and_die("incorrect password");
        }
 
-       if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_SU_SYSLOG) {
+       if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
                closelog();
                free(old_user);
        }
 
-       if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) opt_shell = getenv("SHELL");
+       if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp))
+               opt_shell = getenv("SHELL");
 
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS
        if (opt_shell && cur_uid && restricted_shell(pw->pw_shell)) {
                /* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
                   probably a uucp account or has restricted access.  Don't
                   compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
                   shell.  */
                bb_error_msg("using restricted shell");
-               opt_shell = 0;
+               opt_shell = NULL;
        }
-
-       if (!opt_shell) opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;
+#endif
+       if (!opt_shell)
+               opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;
 
        change_identity(pw);
+       /* setup_environment params: shell, clear_env, change_env, pw */
        setup_environment(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, !(flags & SU_OPT_mp), pw);
        USE_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(NULL);)
 
        /* Never returns */
-       run_shell(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, opt_command, (const char**)opt_args);
+       run_shell(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, opt_command, (const char**)argv);
 
-       return EXIT_FAILURE;
+       /* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */
 }