* Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this tarball for details.
*/
-#include "busybox.h"
+#include "libbb.h"
#include <utmp.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <selinux/selinux.h> /* for is_selinux_enabled() */
#include <selinux/get_context_list.h> /* for get_default_context() */
#include <selinux/flask.h> /* for security class definitions */
-#include <errno.h>
+#endif
+
+#if ENABLE_PAM
+/* PAM may include <locale.h>. We may need to undefine bbox's stub define: */
+#undef setlocale
+/* For some obscure reason, PAM is not in pam/xxx, but in security/xxx.
+ * Apparently they like to confuse people. */
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#include <security/pam_misc.h>
+static const struct pam_conv conv = {
+ misc_conv,
+ NULL
+};
#endif
enum {
#define write_utent(utptr, username) ((void)0)
#endif /* !ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP */
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_NOLOGIN
static void die_if_nologin_and_non_root(int amroot)
{
FILE *fp;
int c;
- if (access(bb_path_nologin_file, F_OK))
+ if (access("/etc/nologin", F_OK))
return;
- fp = fopen(bb_path_nologin_file, "r");
+ fp = fopen("/etc/nologin", "r");
if (fp) {
while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF)
- putchar((c=='\n') ? '\r' : c);
+ bb_putchar((c=='\n') ? '\r' : c);
fflush(stdout);
fclose(fp);
} else
puts("\r\nSystem closed for routine maintenance\r");
if (!amroot)
exit(1);
- puts("\r\n[Disconnect bypassed -- root login allowed.]\r");
+ puts("\r\n[Disconnect bypassed -- root login allowed]\r");
}
+#else
+static ALWAYS_INLINE void die_if_nologin_and_non_root(int amroot) {}
+#endif
-#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SECURETTY
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SECURETTY && !ENABLE_PAM
static int check_securetty(void)
{
FILE *fp;
int i;
- char buf[BUFSIZ];
+ char buf[256];
- fp = fopen(bb_path_securetty_file, "r");
+ fp = fopen("/etc/securetty", "r");
if (!fp) {
/* A missing securetty file is not an error. */
return 1;
}
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, fp)) {
- for (i = strlen(buf)-1; i>=0; --i) {
+ for (i = strlen(buf)-1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (!isspace(buf[i]))
break;
}
buf[++i] = '\0';
- if ((buf[0]=='\0') || (buf[0]=='#'))
+ if (!buf[0] || (buf[0] == '#'))
continue;
if (strcmp(buf, short_tty) == 0) {
fclose(fp);
return 0;
}
#else
-static inline int check_securetty(void) { return 1; }
+static ALWAYS_INLINE int check_securetty(void) { return 1; }
#endif
static void get_username_or_die(char *buf, int size_buf)
{
int c, cntdown;
+
cntdown = EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT;
-prompt:
- /* skip whitespace */
+ prompt:
print_login_prompt();
+ /* skip whitespace */
do {
c = getchar();
if (c == EOF) exit(1);
static void motd(void)
{
- FILE *fp;
- int c;
+ int fd;
- fp = fopen(bb_path_motd_file, "r");
- if (fp) {
- while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF)
- putchar(c);
- fclose(fp);
+ fd = open(bb_path_motd_file, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ fflush(stdout);
+ bb_copyfd_eof(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ close(fd);
}
}
* We don't want to block here */
ndelay_on(1);
ndelay_on(2);
- bb_info_msg("\r\nLogin timed out after %d seconds\r", TIMEOUT);
+ printf("\r\nLogin timed out after %d seconds\r\n", TIMEOUT);
+ /* unix API is brain damaged regarding O_NONBLOCK,
+ * we should undo it, or else we can affect other processes */
+ ndelay_off(1);
+ ndelay_off(2);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
-int login_main(int argc, char **argv);
+int login_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
int login_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
enum {
LOGIN_OPT_h = (1<<1),
LOGIN_OPT_p = (1<<2),
};
- char fromhost[512];
+ char *fromhost;
char username[USERNAME_SIZE];
const char *tmp;
int amroot;
char full_tty[TTYNAME_SIZE];
USE_SELINUX(security_context_t user_sid = NULL;)
USE_FEATURE_UTMP(struct utmp utent;)
+#if ENABLE_PAM
+ int pamret;
+ pam_handle_t *pamh;
+ const char *pamuser;
+ const char *failed_msg;
+ struct passwd pwdstruct;
+ char pwdbuf[256];
+#endif
short_tty = full_tty;
username[0] = '\0';
signal(SIGALRM, alarm_handler);
alarm(TIMEOUT);
- opt = getopt32(argc, argv, "f:h:p", &opt_user, &opt_host);
+ /* Mandatory paranoia for suid applet:
+ * ensure that fd# 0,1,2 are opened (at least to /dev/null)
+ * and any extra open fd's are closed.
+ * (The name of the function is misleading. Not daemonizing here.) */
+ bb_daemonize_or_rexec(DAEMON_ONLY_SANITIZE | DAEMON_CLOSE_EXTRA_FDS, NULL);
+ /* More of suid paranoia if called by non-root */
+ if (!amroot) {
+ /* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
+ sanitize_env_for_suid();
+ }
+
+ opt = getopt32(argv, "f:h:p", &opt_user, &opt_host);
if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f) {
if (!amroot)
bb_error_msg_and_die("-f is for root only");
USE_FEATURE_UTMP(
safe_strncpy(utent.ut_host, opt_host, sizeof(utent.ut_host));
)
- snprintf(fromhost, sizeof(fromhost)-1, " on '%.100s' from "
- "'%.200s'", short_tty, opt_host);
+ fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s' from '%s'", short_tty, opt_host);
} else
- snprintf(fromhost, sizeof(fromhost)-1, " on '%.100s'", short_tty);
+ fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s'", short_tty);
- bb_setpgrp;
+ /* Was breaking "login <username>" from shell command line: */
+ /*bb_setpgrp();*/
openlog(applet_name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH);
while (1) {
+
+ /* flush away any type-ahead (as getty does) */
+ (void) ioctl(0, TCFLSH, TCIFLUSH);
+
if (!username[0])
get_username_or_die(username, sizeof(username));
+#if ENABLE_PAM
+ pamret = pam_start("login", username, &conv, &pamh);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ failed_msg = "start";
+ goto pam_auth_failed;
+ }
+ /* set TTY (so things like securetty work) */
+ pamret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, short_tty);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ failed_msg = "set_item(TTY)";
+ goto pam_auth_failed;
+ }
+ pamret = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ failed_msg = "authenticate";
+ goto pam_auth_failed;
+ /* TODO: or just "goto auth_failed"
+ * since user seems to enter wrong password
+ * (in this case pamret == 7)
+ */
+ }
+ /* check that the account is healthy */
+ pamret = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ failed_msg = "acct_mgmt";
+ goto pam_auth_failed;
+ }
+ /* read user back */
+ pamuser = NULL;
+ /* gcc: "dereferencing type-punned pointer breaks aliasing rules..."
+ * thus we cast to (void*) */
+ if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void*)&pamuser) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ failed_msg = "get_item(USER)";
+ goto pam_auth_failed;
+ }
+ if (!pamuser || !pamuser[0])
+ goto auth_failed;
+ safe_strncpy(username, pamuser, sizeof(username));
+ /* Don't use "pw = getpwnam(username);",
+ * PAM is said to be capable of destroying static storage
+ * used by getpwnam(). We are using safe(r) function */
+ pw = NULL;
+ getpwnam_r(username, &pwdstruct, pwdbuf, sizeof(pwdbuf), &pw);
+ if (!pw)
+ goto auth_failed;
+ pamret = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ failed_msg = "open_session";
+ goto pam_auth_failed;
+ }
+ pamret = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ failed_msg = "setcred";
+ goto pam_auth_failed;
+ }
+ break; /* success, continue login process */
+
+ pam_auth_failed:
+ bb_error_msg("pam_%s call failed: %s (%d)", failed_msg,
+ pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret);
+ safe_strncpy(username, "UNKNOWN", sizeof(username));
+#else /* not PAM */
pw = getpwnam(username);
if (!pw) {
- safe_strncpy(username, "UNKNOWN", sizeof(username));
- goto auth_failed;
+ strcpy(username, "UNKNOWN");
+ goto fake_it;
}
if (pw->pw_passwd[0] == '!' || pw->pw_passwd[0] == '*')
/* Don't check the password if password entry is empty (!) */
if (!pw->pw_passwd[0])
break;
-
+ fake_it:
/* authorization takes place here */
if (correct_password(pw))
break;
-
-auth_failed:
+#endif /* ENABLE_PAM */
+ auth_failed:
opt &= ~LOGIN_OPT_f;
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
+ /* TODO: doesn't sound like correct English phrase to me */
puts("Login incorrect");
if (++count == 3) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "invalid password for '%s'%s",
write_utent(&utent, username);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
+#if ENABLE_SELINUX
if (is_selinux_enabled()) {
security_context_t old_tty_sid, new_tty_sid;
fchown(0, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
fchmod(0, 0600);
-/* TODO: be nommu-friendly, use spawn? */
- if (ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS) {
- char *script = getenv("LOGIN_PRE_SUID_SCRIPT");
- if (script) {
- char *t_argv[2] = { script, NULL };
- switch (fork()) {
- case -1: break;
- case 0: /* child */
- xchdir("/");
- setenv("LOGIN_TTY", full_tty, 1);
- setenv("LOGIN_USER", pw->pw_name, 1);
- setenv("LOGIN_UID", utoa(pw->pw_uid), 1);
- setenv("LOGIN_GID", utoa(pw->pw_gid), 1);
- setenv("LOGIN_SHELL", pw->pw_shell, 1);
- BB_EXECVP(script, t_argv);
- exit(1);
- default: /* parent */
- wait(NULL);
- }
+ /* We trust environment only if we run by root */
+ if (ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS && amroot) {
+ char *t_argv[2];
+
+ t_argv[0] = getenv("LOGIN_PRE_SUID_SCRIPT");
+ if (t_argv[0]) {
+ t_argv[1] = NULL;
+ xsetenv("LOGIN_TTY", full_tty);
+ xsetenv("LOGIN_USER", pw->pw_name);
+ xsetenv("LOGIN_UID", utoa(pw->pw_uid));
+ xsetenv("LOGIN_GID", utoa(pw->pw_gid));
+ xsetenv("LOGIN_SHELL", pw->pw_shell);
+ xspawn(t_argv); /* NOMMU-friendly */
+ /* All variables are unset by setup_environment */
+ wait(NULL);
}
}
tmp = pw->pw_shell;
if (!tmp || !*tmp)
tmp = DEFAULT_SHELL;
+ /* setup_environment params: shell, loginshell, changeenv, pw */
setup_environment(tmp, 1, !(opt & LOGIN_OPT_p), pw);
+ /* FIXME: login shell = 1 -> 3rd parameter is ignored! */
motd();
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
syslog(LOG_INFO, "root login%s", fromhost);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
+#if ENABLE_SELINUX
/* well, a simple setexeccon() here would do the job as well,
* but let's play the game for now */
set_current_security_context(user_sid);
// setsid();
// /* TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group */
// if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1)) error_msg...
+ // BBox login used to do this (see above):
+ // bb_setpgrp();
+ // If this stuff is really needed, add it and explain why!
/* set signals to defaults */
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
* should it leave SIGINT etc enabled or disabled? */
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
- run_shell(tmp, 1, 0, 0); /* exec the shell finally */
+ /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters */
+ run_shell(tmp, 1, NULL, NULL);
- return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ /* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */
}
projects / oweals / busybox.git / blobdiff