[B<-state>]
[B<-CApath directory>]
[B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-issuer_checks>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_return_error>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
[B<-nocert>]
[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+[B<-serverpref>]
[B<-quiet>]
[B<-no_tmp_rsa>]
-[B<-ssl2>]
[B<-ssl3>]
[B<-tls1>]
-[B<-no_ssl2>]
[B<-no_ssl3>]
[B<-no_tls1>]
[B<-no_dhe>]
+[B<-no_ecdhe>]
[B<-bugs>]
[B<-brief>]
[B<-hack>]
[B<-id_prefix arg>]
[B<-rand file(s)>]
[B<-serverinfo file>]
-[B<-auth>]
-[B<-auth_require_reneg>]
[B<-no_resumption_on_reneg>]
+[B<-status>]
+[B<-status_verbose>]
+[B<-status_timeout nsec>]
+[B<-status_url url>]
+[B<-nextprotoneg protocols>]
+
=head1 DESCRIPTION
The B<s_server> command implements a generic SSL/TLS server which listens
if this option is set then no DH parameters will be loaded effectively
disabling the ephemeral DH cipher suites.
+=item B<-no_ecdhe>
+
+if this option is set then no ECDH parameters will be loaded effectively
+disabling the ephemeral ECDH cipher suites.
+
=item B<-no_tmp_rsa>
certain export cipher suites sometimes use a temporary RSA key, this option
disables temporary RSA key generation.
-=item B<-verify depth>, B<-Verify depth>
-
-The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the
-client certificate chain and makes the server request a certificate from
-the client. With the B<-verify> option a certificate is requested but the
-client does not have to send one, with the B<-Verify> option the client
-must supply a certificate or an error occurs.
-
=item B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>
Check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.
is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when
a certificate is requested.
+=item B<-verify depth>, B<-Verify depth>
+
+The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the
+client certificate chain and makes the server request a certificate from
+the client. With the B<-verify> option a certificate is requested but the
+client does not have to send one, with the B<-Verify> option the client
+must supply a certificate or an error occurs.
+
+If the ciphersuite cannot request a client certificate (for example an
+anonymous ciphersuite or PSK) this option has no effect.
+
+=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>,
+B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>, B<-inhibit_map>, B<-issuer_checks>,
+B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>, B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>,
+B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>,
+B<-use_deltas>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+
+Set different peer certificate verification options.
+See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
+=item B<-verify_return_error>
+
+Verification errors normally just print a message but allow the
+connection to continue, for debugging purposes.
+If this option is used, then verification errors close the connection.
+
=item B<-state>
prints out the SSL session states.
given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
1a2b3c4d.
-=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>
+=item B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>
these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
-servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.
+servers and permit them to use SSL v3 or TLS as appropriate.
=item B<-bugs>
the preference order, the order of the server cipherlist irrelevant. See
the B<ciphers> command for more information.
+=item B<-serverpref>
+
+use the server's cipher preferences, rather than the client's preferences.
+
=item B<-tlsextdebug>
print out a hex dump of any TLS extensions received from the server.
an empty TLS ClientHello extension matching the type, the corresponding
ServerHello extension will be returned.
-=item B<-auth>
+=item B<-no_resumption_on_reneg>
-send RFC 5878 client and server authorization extensions in the Client Hello as well as
-supplemental data if the server also sent the authorization extensions in the Server Hello.
+set SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION flag.
-=item B<-auth_require_reneg>
+=item B<-status>
-only send RFC 5878 client and server authorization extensions during renegotiation.
+enables certificate status request support (aka OCSP stapling).
-=item B<-no_resumption_on_reneg>
+=item B<-status_verbose>
+
+enables certificate status request support (aka OCSP stapling) and gives
+a verbose printout of the OCSP response.
+
+=item B<-status_timeout nsec>
+
+sets the timeout for OCSP response to B<nsec> seconds.
+
+=item B<-status_url url>
+
+sets a fallback responder URL to use if no responder URL is present in the
+server certificate. Without this option an error is returned if the server
+certificate does not contain a responder address.
+
+=item B<-nextprotoneg protocols>
-set SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION flag. Required in order to receive supplemental data
-during renegotiation if auth and auth_require_reneg are set.
+enable Next Protocol Negotiation TLS extension and provide a
+comma-separated list of supported protocol names.
+The list should contain most wanted protocols first.
+Protocol names are printable ASCII strings, for example "http/1.1" or
+"spdy/3".
=back