-/* pcy_tree.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "pcy_int.h"
-/* Initialize policy tree. Return values:
- * 0 Some internal error occured.
- * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
- * 1 Tree initialized OK.
- * 2 Policy tree is empty.
- * 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
- * 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
+/*
+ * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
+ * evaluation.
*/
-static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- unsigned int flags)
- {
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
- X509 *x;
- int ret = 1;
- int i, n;
- int explicit_policy;
- int any_skip;
- int map_skip;
- *ptree = NULL;
- n = sk_X509_num(certs);
-
- /* Disable policy mapping for now... */
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
- explicit_policy = 0;
- else
- explicit_policy = n + 1;
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
- any_skip = 0;
- else
- any_skip = n + 1;
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
- map_skip = 0;
- else
- map_skip = n + 1;
-
- /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
- if (n == 1)
- return 1;
- /* First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the
- * trust anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can
- * calculate explicit_policy value at this point.
- */
- for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
- cache = policy_cache_set(x);
- /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */
- if (cache == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue */
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
- ret = -1;
- /* Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies)
- * and haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
- */
- else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data)
- ret = 2;
- if (explicit_policy > 0)
- {
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- explicit_policy--;
- if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1)
- && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
- explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
- }
- }
-
- if (ret != 1)
- {
- if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy)
- return 6;
- return ret;
- }
-
-
- /* If we get this far initialize the tree */
-
- tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
-
- if (!tree)
- return 0;
-
- tree->flags = 0;
- tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
- tree->nlevel = 0;
- tree->extra_data = NULL;
- tree->auth_policies = NULL;
- tree->user_policies = NULL;
-
- if (!tree)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(tree);
- return 0;
- }
-
- memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
-
- tree->nlevel = n;
-
- level = tree->levels;
-
- /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */
-
- data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
-
- if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))
- goto bad_tree;
-
- for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--)
- {
- level++;
- x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- cache = policy_cache_set(x);
-
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- level->cert = x;
-
- if (!cache->anyPolicy)
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
-
- /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
- if (any_skip == 0)
- {
- /* Any matching allowed if certificate is self
- * issued and not the last in the chain.
- */
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- any_skip--;
- if ((cache->any_skip >= 0)
- && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
- any_skip = cache->any_skip;
- }
-
- if (map_skip == 0)
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
- else
- {
- map_skip--;
- if ((cache->map_skip >= 0)
- && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
- map_skip = cache->map_skip;
- }
-
-
- }
-
- *ptree = tree;
-
- if (explicit_policy)
- return 1;
- else
- return 5;
-
- bad_tree:
-
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-
- return 0;
-
- }
-
-/* This corresponds to RFC3280 XXXX XXXXX:
- * link any data from CertificatePolicies onto matching parent
- * or anyPolicy if no match.
+/*
+ * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
*/
+#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+
+static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
+{
+ if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+ || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK))
+ BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n");
+ else {
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+ BIO_puts(err, " Expected: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
+ oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
+ if (i)
+ BIO_puts(err, ", ");
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(err, "\n");
+ }
+}
+
+static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
+{
+ BIO *err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
+
+ if (err == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (!curr)
+ curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
+ else
+ curr++;
+
+ BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
+ BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
+ for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
+ int i;
+
+ BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n",
+ (long)(plev - tree->levels), plev->flags);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
+
+ X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
+ expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
+ BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
+ }
+ if (plev->anyPolicy)
+ X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
+ }
+ BIO_free(err);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * Return value: <= 0 on error, or positive bit mask:
+ *
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree (including bare TA case)
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT: explicit policy required
+ */
+static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
+ int ret = X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+ int n = sk_X509_num(certs) - 1; /* RFC5280 paths omit the TA */
+ int explicit_policy = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : n+1;
+ int any_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : n+1;
+ int map_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : n+1;
+ int i;
+
+ *ptree = NULL;
+
+ /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
+ if (n == 0)
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
+
+ /*
+ * First setup the policy cache in all n non-TA certificates, this will be
+ * used in X509_verify_cert() which will invoke the verify callback for all
+ * certificates with invalid policy extensions.
+ */
+ for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+
+ /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+
+ /* If cache is NULL, likely ENOMEM: return immediately */
+ if (policy_cache_set(x) == NULL)
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At this point check for invalid policies and required explicit policy.
+ * Note that the explicit_policy counter is a count-down to zero, with the
+ * requirement kicking in if and once it does that. The counter is
+ * decremented for every non-self-issued certificate in the path, but may
+ * be further reduced by policy constraints in a non-leaf certificate.
+ *
+ * The ultimate policy set is the intersection of all the policies along
+ * the path, if we hit a certificate with an empty policy set, and explicit
+ * policy is required we're done.
+ */
+ for (i = n - 1;
+ i >= 0 && (explicit_policy > 0 || (ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) == 0);
+ i--) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);
+
+ /* All the policies are already cached, we can return early */
+ if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID;
+
+ /* Access the cache which we now know exists */
+ cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+
+ if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) && cache->data == NULL)
+ ret = X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
+ if (explicit_policy > 0) {
+ if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ explicit_policy--;
+ if ((cache->explicit_skip >= 0)
+ && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
+ explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (explicit_policy == 0)
+ ret |= X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT;
+ if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) == 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* If we get this far initialize the tree */
+ if ((tree = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree))) == NULL)
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+
+ /*
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
+ *
+ * The top level is implicitly for the trust anchor with valid expected
+ * policies of anyPolicy. (RFC 5280 has the TA at depth 0 and the leaf at
+ * depth n, we have the leaf at depth 0 and the TA at depth n).
+ */
+ if ((tree->levels = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree->levels)*(n+1))) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tree);
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+ }
+ tree->nlevel = n+1;
+ level = tree->levels;
+ if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
+ goto bad_tree;
+ if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
+ policy_data_free(data);
+ goto bad_tree;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In this pass initialize all the tree levels and whether anyPolicy and
+ * policy mapping are inhibited at each level.
+ */
+ for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);
+
+ /* Access the cache which we now know exists */
+ cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+
+ X509_up_ref(x);
+ (++level)->cert = x;
+
+ if (!cache->anyPolicy)
+ level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+
+ /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
+ if (any_skip == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Any matching allowed only if certificate is self issued and not
+ * the last in the chain.
+ */
+ if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
+ level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+ } else {
+ if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ any_skip--;
+ if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
+ any_skip = cache->any_skip;
+ }
+
+ if (map_skip == 0)
+ level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+ else {
+ if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ map_skip--;
+ if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
+ map_skip = cache->map_skip;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *ptree = tree;
+ return ret;
+
+ bad_tree:
+ X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+ int i, matched = 0;
+
+ /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+
+ if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
+ * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
+ *
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
- {
- int i;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *parent;
- last = curr - 1;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++)
- {
- data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
- /* If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
- * CertificatePolicies entry.
- * However such an identical node would be created
- * if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
- * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create
- * link because then it will have the mapping flags
- * right and we can prune it later.
- */
- if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
- && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
- continue;
- /* Look for matching node in parent */
- parent = level_find_node(last, data->valid_policy);
- /* If no match link to anyPolicy */
- if (!parent)
- parent = last->anyPolicy;
- if (parent && !level_add_node(curr, data, parent, NULL))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
-/* This corresponds to RFC3280 XXXX XXXXX:
- * Create new data for any unmatched policies in the parent and link
- * to anyPolicy.
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+
+ /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
+ * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
+ *
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+
+ if (id == NULL)
+ id = node->data->valid_policy;
+ /*
+ * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
+ * node.
+ */
+ if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node))) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+ data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+ data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
+ policy_data_free(data);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+ const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+ || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
+ /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */
+ if (node->nchild)
+ return 1;
+ if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree))
+ return 0;
+ /* Add it */
+ } else {
+ /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
+ if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
+ return 1;
+ /* Locate unmatched nodes */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
+ if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid))
+ continue;
+ if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
*/
-
static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
- {
- int i;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last;
-
- last = curr - 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++)
- {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
-
- /* Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced
- * nodes.
- *
- * Note: need something better for policy mapping
- * because each node may have multiple children
- */
- if (node->nchild)
- continue;
- /* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and
- * id from unmatched node.
- */
- data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy,
- node_critical(node));
-
- if (data == NULL)
- return 0;
- /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
- data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree))
- {
- policy_data_free(data);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
- if (last->anyPolicy)
- {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
- last->anyPolicy, NULL))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
-/* Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
- * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
- * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+
+ if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
+ if (last->anyPolicy &&
+ level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level then
+ * proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever have no
+ * data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
+ *
+ * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of:
+ *
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree
*/
-
static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
- {
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- int i;
- for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, i);
- /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
- if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)
- {
- node->parent->nchild--;
- OPENSSL_free(node);
- (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(curr->nodes, i);
- }
- }
-
- for(;;) {
- --curr;
- for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, i);
- if (node->nchild == 0)
- {
- node->parent->nchild--;
- OPENSSL_free(node);
- (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(curr->nodes, i);
- }
- }
- if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild)
- {
- if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
- curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
- OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
- curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
- }
- if (curr == tree->levels)
- {
- /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
- if (!curr->anyPolicy)
- return 2;
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- }
-
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ int i;
+ nodes = curr->nodes;
+ if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
+ for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+ /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
+ if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
+ node->parent->nchild--;
+ OPENSSL_free(node);
+ (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ --curr;
+ nodes = curr->nodes;
+ for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+ if (node->nchild == 0) {
+ node->parent->nchild--;
+ OPENSSL_free(node);
+ (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
+ }
+ }
+ if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
+ if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
+ curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
+ OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+ curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
+ }
+ if (curr == tree->levels) {
+ /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
+ if (!curr->anyPolicy)
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
- {
- if (!*pnodes)
- {
- *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
- if (!*pnodes)
- return 0;
- }
- else if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1)
- return 1;
-
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
- }
-
-/* Calculate the authority set based on policy tree.
- * The 'pnodes' parameter is used as a store for the set of policy nodes
- * used to calculate the user set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy
- * then pnodes will just point to the authority set. If however the authority
- * set is anyPolicy then the set of valid policies (other than anyPolicy)
- * is store in pnodes. The return value of '2' is used in this case to indicate
- * that pnodes should be freed.
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
+{
+ if (*pnodes == NULL &&
+ (*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1)
+ return 1;
+ return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy) != 0;
+}
+
+#define TREE_CALC_FAILURE 0
+#define TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE 1
+#define TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE 2
+
+/*-
+ * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter is
+ * used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user set.
+ * If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to the
+ * authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set of
+ * valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes.
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ * TREE_CALC_FAILURE on failure,
+ * TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE on success and pnodes need not be freed,
+ * TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE on success and pnodes needs to be freed
*/
-
static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
- {
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
- int i, j;
- curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
-
- /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
- if (curr->anyPolicy)
- {
- if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
- return 0;
- addnodes = pnodes;
- }
- else
- /* Add policies to authority set */
- addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
-
- curr = tree->levels;
- for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++)
- {
- /* If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't
- * appear on lower levels so end search.
- */
- if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy))
- break;
- curr++;
- for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++)
- {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
- if ((node->parent == anyptr)
- && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node))
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (addnodes == pnodes)
- return 2;
-
- *pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
-
- return 1;
- }
-
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
+ int i, j;
+ curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
+
+ /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
+ if (curr->anyPolicy) {
+ if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
+ return TREE_CALC_FAILURE;
+ addnodes = pnodes;
+ } else
+ /* Add policies to authority set */
+ addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
+
+ curr = tree->levels;
+ for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
+ /*
+ * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
+ * levels so end search.
+ */
+ if ((anyptr = curr->anyPolicy) == NULL)
+ break;
+ curr++;
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
+ if ((node->parent == anyptr)
+ && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) {
+ if (addnodes == pnodes) {
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(*pnodes);
+ *pnodes = NULL;
+ }
+ return TREE_CALC_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (addnodes == pnodes)
+ return TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE;
+
+ *pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
+ return TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
- {
- int i;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
-
- X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
-
- /* Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set:
- * this will happen if it is a leaf node.
- */
-
- if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
- return 1;
-
- anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++)
- {
- oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy)
- {
- tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++)
- {
- oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
- node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
- if (!node)
- {
- if (!anyPolicy)
- continue;
- /* Create a new node with policy ID from user set
- * and qualifiers from anyPolicy.
- */
- extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid,
- node_critical(anyPolicy));
- if (!extra)
- return 0;
- extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
- extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
- | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
- tree);
- }
- if (!tree->user_policies)
- {
- tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
- if (!tree->user_policies)
- return 1;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-
- }
-
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
+ * will happen if it is a leaf node.
+ */
+ if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
+ oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
+ tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
+ oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
+ node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
+ if (!node) {
+ if (!anyPolicy)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
+ * from anyPolicy.
+ */
+ extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
+ if (extra == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
+ extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
+ | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
+ node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
+ }
+ if (!tree->user_policies) {
+ tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+ if (!tree->user_policies)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of:
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree
+ * (see tree_prune()).
+ */
static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
- {
- int ret, i;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
-
- for(i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++)
- {
- cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
- return 0;
-
- if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
- && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
- return 0;
- ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
- if (ret != 1)
- return ret;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- }
+{
+ int ret, i;
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+ cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+
+ if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
+ && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+ tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
+#endif
+ ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
+ if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+}
static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
- {
- if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
- OPENSSL_free(node);
- }
-
+{
+ if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
+ OPENSSL_free(node);
+}
void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
- {
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
- int i;
+{
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
+ int i;
- if (!tree)
- return;
+ if (!tree)
+ return;
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
- for(i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++)
- {
- if (curr->cert)
- X509_free(curr->cert);
- if (curr->nodes)
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes,
- policy_node_free);
- if (curr->anyPolicy)
- policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
- }
+ for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+ X509_free(curr->cert);
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
+ policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+ }
- if (tree->extra_data)
- sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data,
- policy_data_free);
+ sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
+ OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
+ OPENSSL_free(tree);
- OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
- OPENSSL_free(tree);
+}
- }
-
-/* Application policy checking function.
+/*-
+ * Application policy checking function.
* Return codes:
- * 0 Internal Error.
- * 1 Successful.
- * -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
- * -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE: Failure to satisfy explicit policy
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID: Inconsistent or invalid extensions
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL: Internal error, most likely malloc
+ * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: Success (null tree if empty or bare TA)
*/
-
int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
- unsigned int flags)
- {
- int ret;
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
- *ptree = NULL;
-
- *pexplicit_policy = 0;
- ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
-
-
- switch (ret)
- {
-
- /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */
- case 2:
- return 1;
-
- /* Some internal error */
- case 0:
- return 0;
-
- /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */
-
- case 6:
- *pexplicit_policy = 1;
- return -2;
-
- /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */
- case 5:
- *pexplicit_policy = 1;
- break;
-
- /* Tree OK: continue */
-
- case 1:
- if (!tree)
- /*
- * tree_init() returns success and a null tree
- * if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
- * I'm not sure that returning success here is
- * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
- * as an internal error which our caller
- * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
- */
- return 1;
- break;
- }
-
- if (!tree) goto error;
- ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto error;
-
- /* Return value 2 means tree empty */
- if (ret == 2)
- {
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
- if (*pexplicit_policy)
- return -2;
- else
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Tree is not empty: continue */
-
- ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
-
- if (!ret)
- goto error;
-
- if (!tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes))
- goto error;
-
- if (ret == 2)
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
-
- if (tree)
- *ptree = tree;
-
- if (*pexplicit_policy)
- {
- nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
- if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
- return -2;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- error:
-
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-
- return 0;
-
- }
-
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int init_ret;
+ int ret;
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
+
+ *ptree = NULL;
+ *pexplicit_policy = 0;
+ init_ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
+
+ if (init_ret <= 0)
+ return init_ret;
+
+ if ((init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) == 0) {
+ if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) {
+ X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *pexplicit_policy = 1;
+ /* Tree empty and requireExplicit True: Error */
+ if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY)
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+ tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
+#endif
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) {
+ X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+ if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT)
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+ }
+
+ /* Tree is not empty: continue */
+ if ((ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes)) == 0 ||
+ !tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes))
+ goto error;
+ if (ret == TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE)
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
+
+ *ptree = tree;
+
+ if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) {
+ nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
+ if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+
+ error:
+ X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+ return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+}