EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
- ret=strlen(f);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,ret);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
+ goto err;
OPENSSL_free(f);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
- (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL);
+ if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+ (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
+ goto err;
ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
)&0xffffffffL;
+ err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+ {
+ return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+ }
+#endif
+
X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
{
return(a->cert_info->issuer);
return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+ {
+ return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
+ }
+#endif
+
X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
{
return(a->cert_info->subject);
return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+ {
+ return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
+ }
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
* this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
#endif
-/* Case insensitive string comparision */
-static int nocase_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (a->length != b->length)
- return (a->length - b->length);
-
- for (i=0; i<a->length; i++)
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
{
- int ca, cb;
-
- ca = tolower(a->data[i]);
- cb = tolower(b->data[i]);
-
- if (ca != cb)
- return(ca-cb);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Case insensitive string comparision with space normalization
- * Space normalization - ignore leading, trailing spaces,
- * multiple spaces between characters are replaced by single space
- */
-static int nocase_spacenorm_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
-{
- unsigned char *pa = NULL, *pb = NULL;
- int la, lb;
-
- la = a->length;
- lb = b->length;
- pa = a->data;
- pb = b->data;
+ int ret;
- /* skip leading spaces */
- while (la > 0 && isspace(*pa))
- {
- la--;
- pa++;
- }
- while (lb > 0 && isspace(*pb))
- {
- lb--;
- pb++;
- }
+ /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
- /* skip trailing spaces */
- while (la > 0 && isspace(pa[la-1]))
- la--;
- while (lb > 0 && isspace(pb[lb-1]))
- lb--;
+ if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
+ {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
- /* compare strings with space normalization */
- while (la > 0 && lb > 0)
- {
- int ca, cb;
+ if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
+ {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
- /* compare character */
- ca = tolower(*pa);
- cb = tolower(*pb);
- if (ca != cb)
- return (ca - cb);
+ ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
- pa++; pb++;
- la--; lb--;
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
- if (la <= 0 || lb <= 0)
- break;
+ return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
- /* is white space next character ? */
- if (isspace(*pa) && isspace(*pb))
- {
- /* skip remaining white spaces */
- while (la > 0 && isspace(*pa))
- {
- la--;
- pa++;
- }
- while (lb > 0 && isspace(*pb))
- {
- lb--;
- pb++;
- }
- }
}
- if (la > 0 || lb > 0)
- return la - lb;
- return 0;
-}
-
-int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
{
- int i,j;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *na,*nb;
-
- if (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)
- != sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(b->entries))
- return sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)
- -sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(b->entries);
- for (i=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)-1; i>=0; i--)
- {
- na=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries,i);
- nb=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(b->entries,i);
- j=na->value->type-nb->value->type;
- if (j) return(j);
- if (na->value->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
- j=nocase_spacenorm_cmp(na->value, nb->value);
- else if (na->value->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING
- && OBJ_obj2nid(na->object) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress)
- j=nocase_cmp(na->value, nb->value);
- else
- {
- j=na->value->length-nb->value->length;
- if (j) return(j);
- j=memcmp(na->value->data,nb->value->data,
- na->value->length);
- }
- if (j) return(j);
- j=na->set-nb->set;
- if (j) return(j);
- }
+ unsigned long ret=0;
+ unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- /* We will check the object types after checking the values
- * since the values will more often be different than the object
- * types. */
- for (i=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)-1; i>=0; i--)
- {
- na=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries,i);
- nb=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(b->entries,i);
- j=OBJ_cmp(na->object,nb->object);
- if (j) return(j);
- }
- return(0);
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
+ if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+ NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
+ ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
+ )&0xffffffffL;
+ return(ret);
}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
/* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
* this is reasonably efficient. */
-unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
{
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned long ret=0;
unsigned char md[16];
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
- EVP_Digest(x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length, md, NULL, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+ && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
+ ret=(((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
+ ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
+ )&0xffffffffL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
- ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
- )&0xffffffffL;
return(ret);
}
#endif
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
{
- EVP_PKEY *xk=NULL;
- int ok=0;
+ EVP_PKEY *xk;
+ int ret;
xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
- switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k))
+
+ if (xk)
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
+ else
+ ret = -2;
+
+ switch (ret)
{
case 1:
- ok=1;
break;
case 0:
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
break;
case -2:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (k->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- break;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (k->type == EVP_PKEY_DH)
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ }
+ if (xk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and
+ * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is
+ * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification
+ * flags.
+ */
+
+static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
+ int curve_nid;
+ if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
+ if (!grp)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+ /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
+ if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */
+ {
+ /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with
+ * curve.
+ */
+ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
+ *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+ }
+ else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */
+ {
+ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ }
+ else
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ }
+
+int X509_check_suiteb_chain(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ int rv, i, sign_nid;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned long tflags;
+ if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ tflags = flags;
+ /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+ i = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ i = 0;
+
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
+ {
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+ /* Correct error depth */
+ i = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ /* Check EE key only */
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ /* Correct error depth */
+ i = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+ {
+ sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
{
- /* No idea */
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY);
- break;
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+ goto end;
}
-#endif
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ goto end;
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
- return(ok);
+ /* Final check: root CA signature */
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
+ end:
+ if (pk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
+ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+ || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
+ i--;
+ /* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing
+ * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
+ */
+ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
+ if (perror_depth)
+ *perror_depth = i;
+ }
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+int X509_check_suiteb_crl(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ int sign_nid;
+ if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
}
+