Remove unnecessary trailing whitespace

[oweals/openssl.git] / crypto / srp / srp_vfy.c

diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 1bf2f267ed3fd402f12548851f9ddd1418b77a24..f9988abd2d7bf850b8d681ff03800c4c94cc80b7 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -69,8 +69,10 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
      *  4 bytes unencoded = 6 bytes encoded
      *  etc
      */
-    if (padsize == 3)
-        return -1;
+    if (padsize == 3) {
+        outl = -1;
+        goto err;
+    }
 
     /* Valid padsize values are now 0, 1 or 2 */
 
@@ -80,12 +82,12 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
     /* Add any encoded padding that is required */
     if (padsize != 0
             && EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl, pad, padsize) < 0) {
-        EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
-        return -1;
+        outl = -1;
+        goto err;
     }
     if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl2, (const unsigned char *)src, size) < 0) {
-        EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
-        return -1;
+        outl = -1;
+        goto err;
     }
     outl += outl2;
     EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, a + outl, &outl2);
@@ -93,8 +95,11 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
 
     /* Strip off the leading padding */
     if (padsize != 0) {
-        if ((int)padsize >= outl)
-            return -1;
+        if ((int)padsize >= outl) {
+            outl = -1;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
         /*
          * If we added 1 byte of padding prior to encoding then we have 2 bytes
          * of "real" data which gets spread across 4 encoded bytes like this:
@@ -112,6 +117,7 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
         outl -= padsize;
     }
 
+ err:
     EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
 
     return outl;
@@ -181,9 +187,9 @@ void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
 static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void)
 {
     SRP_user_pwd *ret;
-    
+
     if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
-        /* SRPerr(SRP_F_SRP_USER_PWD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */
+        /* SRPerr(SRP_F_SRP_USER_PWD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ /*ckerr_ignore*/
         return NULL;
     }
     ret->N = NULL;
@@ -592,10 +598,14 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
         if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0)
             goto err;
         N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+        if (N_bn_alloc == NULL)
+            goto err;
         N_bn = N_bn_alloc;
         if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0)
             goto err;
         g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+        if (g_bn_alloc == NULL)
+            goto err;
         g_bn = g_bn_alloc;
         defgNid = "*";
     } else {
@@ -617,15 +627,19 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
             goto err;
         s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
     }
+    if (s == NULL)
+        goto err;
 
     if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn))
         goto err;
 
-    BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
+    if (BN_bn2bin(v, tmp) < 0)
+        goto err;
     vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
     if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
         goto err;
-    t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
+    if (!t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v)))
+        goto err;
 
     if (*salt == NULL) {
         char *tmp_salt;
@@ -633,7 +647,10 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
         if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
             goto err;
         }
-        t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+        if (!t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN)) {
+            OPENSSL_free(tmp_salt);
+            goto err;
+        }
         *salt = tmp_salt;
     }
 
@@ -680,11 +697,15 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
             goto err;
 
         salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+        if (salttmp == NULL)
+            goto err;
     } else {
         salttmp = *salt;
     }
 
     x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
+    if (x == NULL)
+        goto err;
 
     *verifier = BN_new();
     if (*verifier == NULL)