It's not just VMS that needs some symbols to be hacked. Let's

[oweals/openssl.git] / crypto / rsa / rsa_oaep.c

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 44732460b3d7248aa2ecf8da35c56d1ddff159f4..fd0b7f361fbba41e833d4416ecb132811366414c 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@
 
 /* EME_OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
 
+#if !defined(NO_SHA) && !defined(NO_SHA1)
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "sha.h"
-#include "rand.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 
 int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
 
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
        return (0);
        }
     
-    dbmask = Malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
     if (dbmask == NULL)
        {
        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -49,7 +50,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
           emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
     db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
     memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
-    RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+       return (0);
 #ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
     memcpy(seed,
           "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
        seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
 
-    Free(dbmask);
+    OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
     return (1);
     }
 
@@ -74,27 +76,29 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     {
     int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
     unsigned char *maskeddb;
+    int lzero;
     unsigned char *db, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 
-    if (flen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
+    if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
        {
        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
        return (-1);
        }
 
-    dblen = flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-    db = Malloc(dblen);
+    dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
     if (db == NULL)
        {
        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        return (-1);
        }
 
-    maskeddb = from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    lzero = num - flen;
+    maskeddb = from - lzero + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
     
     MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen);
-    for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
-       seed[i] ^= from[i];
+    for (i = lzero; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+       seed[i] ^= from[i - lzero];
   
     MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
     for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
@@ -124,7 +128,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                memcpy(to, db + i, mlen);
            }
        }
-    Free(db);
+    OPENSSL_free(db);
     return (mlen);
     }
 
@@ -156,3 +160,4 @@ int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, unsigned char *seed, long seedlen)
        }
     return (0);
     }
+#endif