* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+
-#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
#ifndef RSA_NULL
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
+ RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont,
+ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
RSA_eay_init,
RSA_eay_finish,
- 0,
+ RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
NULL,
+ 0, /* rsa_sign */
+ 0, /* rsa_verify */
+ NULL /* rsa_keygen */
};
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- const RSA_METHOD *meth;
- BIGNUM f,ret;
+ BIGNUM *f,*ret;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
-#ifndef NO_SHA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
break;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
- goto err;
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
}
- if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
to[k]=0;
r=num;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_BLINDING *ret;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ }
+
+ ret = rsa->blinding;
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
+ {
+ /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
+
+ *local = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
+
+ /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
+ * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
+ * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
+ * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
+ */
+ *local = 0;
+
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ if (!got_write_lock)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ }
+ ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ if (unblind == NULL)
+ /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+ * in BN_BLINDING. */
+ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
+ else
+ {
+ /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+ * outside BN_BLINDING. */
+ int ret;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+ * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+ * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+ * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+ * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+ * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+ */
+ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+ }
+
+/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- const RSA_METHOD *meth;
- BIGNUM f,ret;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
+ break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
+ {
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- { if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
+ }
else
{
- if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ local_d = d = BN_new();
+ if(!d)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ d= rsa->d;
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ {
+ if(local_d) BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ {
+ if(local_d) BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if(local_d) BN_free(local_d);
}
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
+ {
+ BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
+ if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
+ res = f;
+ else
+ res = ret;
+ }
+ else
+ res = ret;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ j=BN_num_bytes(res);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
to[k]=0;
r=num;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- const RSA_METHOD *meth;
- BIGNUM f,ret;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
+ {
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
/* do the decrypt */
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- { if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
+ }
else
{
- if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ local_d = d = BN_new();
+ if(!d)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ {
+ if(local_d) BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ {
+ if(local_d) BN_free(local_d);
goto err;
+ }
+ if(local_d) BN_free(local_d);
}
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
p=buf;
- j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+ j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
break;
-#ifndef NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
- break;
+ break;
#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
+/* signature verification */
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- const RSA_METHOD *meth;
- BIGNUM f,ret;
+ BIGNUM *f,*ret;
int i,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (buf == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
goto err;
}
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
- goto err;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
}
- if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12))
+ if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
+
p=buf;
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
break;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
+ break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
break;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- const RSA_METHOD *meth;
- BIGNUM r1,m1;
+ BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
+ BIGNUM *local_dmp1, *local_dmq1, *local_c, *local_r1;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
int ret=0;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_init(&m1);
- BN_init(&r1);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
- {
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+ local_dmp1 = BN_new();
+ local_dmq1 = BN_new();
+ local_c = BN_new();
+ local_r1 = BN_new();
+ if(!local_dmp1 || !local_dmq1 || !local_c || !local_r1)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ {
+ BIGNUM *local_p = NULL, *local_q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+
+ /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
+ */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ local_p = p = BN_new();
+ if(!p) goto err;
+ BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ local_q = q = BN_new();
+ if(!q)
+ {
+ BN_free(local_p);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p,
- ctx))
- goto err;
+ p = rsa->p;
+ q = rsa->q;
}
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q,
- ctx))
- goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx) || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
+ {
+ if(local_p) BN_free(local_p);
+ if(local_q) BN_free(local_q);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
+ if(local_p) BN_free(local_p);
+ if(local_q) BN_free(local_q);
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compute I mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ c = local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
}
- if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+ /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ dmq1 = local_dmq1;
+ BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+ /* compute I mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ c = local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ dmp1 = local_dmp1;
+ BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
- if (r0->neg)
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ pr1 = local_r1;
+ BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ pr1 = r1;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
- * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+ * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
- * they ensure p > q [steve]
- */
- if (r0->neg)
+ * they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+ * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+ * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+ * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
+ if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
+ {
+ /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+ * mod_exp and return that instead. */
+
+ BIGNUM *local_d = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ local_d = d = BN_new();
+ if(!d) goto err;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ d = rsa->d;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ {
+ if(local_d) BN_free(local_d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if(local_d) BN_free(local_d);
+ }
+ }
ret=1;
err:
- BN_clear_free(&m1);
- BN_clear_free(&r1);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if(local_dmp1) BN_free(local_dmp1);
+ if(local_dmq1) BN_free(local_dmq1);
+ if(local_c) BN_free(local_c);
+ if(local_r1) BN_free(local_r1);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return(ret);
}