*
*/
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
#ifndef RSA_NULL
BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
RSA_eay_init,
RSA_eay_finish,
- 0, /* flags */
+ RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
NULL,
0, /* rsa_sign */
0, /* rsa_verify */
return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
}
-/* Usage example;
- * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
- */
-#define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
- if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
- !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
- CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, \
- (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
- err_instr
-
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
+ {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
+ {
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
{
BN_BLINDING *ret;
int got_write_lock = 0;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
- if ((BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) == CRYPTO_thread_id()) && (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_idptr(ret) == CRYPTO_thread_idptr()))
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
{
/* rsa->blinding is ours! */
return ret;
}
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (local)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ if (unblind == NULL)
+ /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+ * in BN_BLINDING. */
return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
else
{
- int ret;
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- return ret;
- }
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (local)
- return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else
- {
+ /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+ * outside BN_BLINDING. */
int ret;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
return ret;
}
-}
+ }
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+ * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+ * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+ * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+ * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+ * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+ */
+ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+ }
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
+ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
+ {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
}
if (blinding != NULL)
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
+ }
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
BN_init(&local_d);
d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
- d = rsa->d;
+ d= rsa->d;
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
}
if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
+ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
+ {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
}
if (blinding != NULL)
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
+ }
/* do the decrypt */
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
d = rsa->d;
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
p=buf;
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
- break;
+ break;
#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
+ {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+ {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
goto err;
}
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
- BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret);
+ if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
p=buf;
i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
- /* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
- this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
- signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
- small. */
- if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
- goto err;
- }
break;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
- BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1;
- BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1;
+ BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
int ret=0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ {
+ BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+
+ /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
+ */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ BN_init(&local_p);
+ p = &local_p;
+ BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ BN_init(&local_q);
+ q = &local_q;
+ BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ p = rsa->p;
+ q = rsa->q;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
+ {
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compute I mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ c = &local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
- BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ /* compute I mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ c = &local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
- BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ pr1 = &local_r1;
+ BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ pr1 = r1;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
- * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+ * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
- * they ensure p > q [steve]
- */
+ * they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
d = rsa->d;
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
+ {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_INIT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
return(1);
}