Test: link drbgtest statically against libcrypto

[oweals/openssl.git] / crypto / rand / rand_unix.c

diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index fc2e929c134286259fa01faccb50b50015bef1b6..cb3a6b24ab04c3280f2cd3c9c75eda4c828b0818 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
      * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
      * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
      *
-     *   2 * DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^13
+     *   2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14
      *
      * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
      * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
 
     /*
      * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
-     * ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for
+     * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
      * different process instances.
      */
     data.pid = getpid();