*
*/
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP
+
#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
# ifndef NDEBUG
# define NDEBUG
const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, size_t num);
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, size_t num, double add_entropy);
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
-static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
+static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
ssleay_rand_seed,
- ssleay_rand_bytes,
+ ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
ssleay_rand_cleanup,
ssleay_rand_add,
ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
initialized=0;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, size_t num, double add)
+static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
{
- int i,st_idx;
- size_t j,k;
+ int i,j,k,st_idx;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX m;
}
else
MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
-
+
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
+ /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+ purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+ uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's
+ with the caller. Removing that line will make
+ sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
+ other problems such as very insecure keys. */
+
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
MD_Final(&m,local_md);
md_c[1]++;
#endif
}
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, size_t num)
+static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
- int i,st_num,st_idx;
- size_t j,k;
+ int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
int num_ceil;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
#endif
MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-#ifndef PURIFY
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
+
+#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
+ /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
+ * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
+ * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
+ * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
+ * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
+ * security.
+ */
+ MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
#endif
+
k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
if (k > 0)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
return(1);
- else
+ else if (pseudo)
+ return 0;
+ else
{
RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
}
}
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+ {
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
+ }
+
/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
unpredictable */
-static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- int ret;
- unsigned long err;
-
- ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
- if (ret == 0)
- {
- err = ERR_peek_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
- ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- return (ret);
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
}
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)