* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
* holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
* (to prevent double locking) */
+/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
int rand_predictable=0;
#endif
-const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
{
- memset(state,0,sizeof(state));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state));
state_num=0;
state_index=0;
- memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
md_count[0]=0;
md_count[1]=0;
entropy=0;
int i,j,k,st_idx;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- MD_CTX m;
+ EVP_MD_CTX m;
int do_not_lock;
/*
*/
/* check if we already have the lock */
- do_not_lock = crypto_lock_rand && (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
st_idx=state_index;
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
j=(num-i);
MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Final(local_md,&m);
+ MD_Final(&m,local_md);
md_c[1]++;
buf=(const char *)buf + j;
st_idx=0;
}
}
- memset((char *)&m,0,sizeof(m));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
* much entropy as fits into md. */
- for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
+ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
{
md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}
static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
- ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, num);
+ ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
+ int num_ceil;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- MD_CTX m;
+ EVP_MD_CTX m;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
}
#endif
+ if (num <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+ /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
*
* For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
*
- * Input into the hash function the top 10 bytes from the
- * local 'md' (which is initialized from the global 'md'
- * before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are
- * to be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the
- * 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this digest output
- * (which is kept in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are
- * returned to the caller and the bottom (up to) 10 bytes are xored
- * into the 'state'.
+ * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+ * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+ * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+ * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+ * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+ * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
+ *
* Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
* caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
if (!initialized)
{
if (do_stir_pool)
{
- /* Our output function chains only half of 'md', so we better
- * make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly distributed'
- * through 'state', our randomness pool. The input function
- * (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
- * suitable for this purpose.
+ /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret,
+ * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets
+ * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool.
+ * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md',
+ * which makes it more suitable for this purpose.
*/
int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
- state_index+=num;
+ state_index+=num_ceil;
if (state_index > state_num)
state_index %= state_num;
- /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % st_num]
+ /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num]
* are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
md_count[0] += 1;
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- locking_thread = 0;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
while (num > 0)
{
+ /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
num-=j;
MD_Init(&m);
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
- MD_Update(&m,&(local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+ MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
#ifndef PURIFY
MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
#endif
- k=(st_idx+j)-st_num;
+ k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
+ MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
- MD_Final(local_md,&m);
+ MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+ MD_Final(&m,local_md);
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
{
state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */
- *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
if (st_idx >= st_num)
st_idx=0;
+ if (i < j)
+ *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
}
}
MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Final(md,&m);
+ MD_Final(&m,md);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- memset(&m,0,sizeof(m));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
return(1);
else
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
int ret;
+ unsigned long err;
ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
if (ret == 0)
{
- long err = ERR_peek_error();
+ err = ERR_peek_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
- (void)ERR_get_error();
+ ERR_clear_error();
}
return (ret);
}
/* check if we already have the lock
* (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
- do_not_lock = crypto_lock_rand && (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
if (!do_not_lock)
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
}
if (!initialized)
{
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- locking_thread = 0;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
}