/* ocsp_vfy.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <string.h>
-static X509 *ocsp_find_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags);
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret);
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
/* Verify a basic response message */
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
int i, ret = 0;
- signer = ocsp_find_signer(bs, certs, st, flags);
- if (!signer)
+ ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
+ if (!ret)
{
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
goto end;
}
- if(!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
+ if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+ flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
{
EVP_PKEY *skey;
skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
- ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- if(ret <= 0)
+ if (skey)
+ {
+ ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+ }
+ if(!skey || ret <= 0)
{
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
}
- if(!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
{
+ int init_res;
if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
+ init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
else
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
+ init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
+ if(!init_res)
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
goto end;
}
/* At this point we have a valid certificate chain
- * need to verify it against the OCSP criteria.
+ * need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria.
*/
-#if 0
- if(ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags))
- {
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
+ ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);
+
+ /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
+ if (ret != 0) goto end;
/* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and
* check for explicit trust
}
ret = 1;
}
-
+
end:
if(chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
- return 1;
+ return ret;
}
-static X509 *ocsp_find_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
{
X509 *signer;
OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId;
if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)))
- return signer;
+ {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 2;
+ }
if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
(signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid)))
- return signer;
+ {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 1;
+ }
/* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
- return NULL;
+ *psigner = NULL;
+ return 0;
}
{
int i;
unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *key;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
X509 *x;
/* Easy if lookup by name */
- if(id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
+ if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
/* Lookup by key hash */
/* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
- if(id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL;
+ if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL;
keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
/* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
- for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- key = x->cert_info->key->public_key;
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx,EVP_sha1());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,key->data, key->length);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,tmphash,NULL);
+ X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
if(!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
return x;
}
}
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
+ X509 *signer, *sca;
+ OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
+ int i;
+ sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
+ i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
+
+ /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
+ if (i <= 0) return i;
+
+ signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+ /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1)
+ {
+ sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
+ i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
+ if (i < 0) return i;
+ if (i)
+ {
+ /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
+ if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags)) return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
+ return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
+ }
+
+
+/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same
+ * algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer.
+ * If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
+ {
+ OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
+ int i, idcount;
+
+ idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
+ if (idcount <= 0)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
+
+ *ret = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++)
+ {
+ tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+ /* Check to see if IDs match */
+ if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid))
+ {
+ /* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */
+ if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm,
+ cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))
+ return 2;
+ /* Else mismatch */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
+ *ret = cid;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
+ {
+ /* If only one ID to match then do it */
+ if(cid)
+ {
+ const EVP_MD *dgst;
+ X509_NAME *iname;
+ int mdlen;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)))
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+ if (mdlen < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
+ (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
+ return 0;
+ iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
+ if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
+ return -1;
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
+ return 0;
+ X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* We have to match the whole lot */
+ int i, ret;
+ OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++)
+ {
+ tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+ ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
+ if (ret <= 0) return ret;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
+ {
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) &&
+ (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
+ return 1;
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP
+ * response verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it
+ * against a given trust value.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ X509 *signer;
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+ int ret;
+ X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+ if (!req->optionalSignature)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName;
+ if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ nm = gen->d.directoryName;
+ ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+ flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *skey;
+ skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
+ ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+ if(ret <= 0)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
+ {
+ int init_res;
+ if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
+ init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL);
+ else
+ init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
+ req->optionalSignature->certs);
+ if(!init_res)
+ {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ {
+ ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ X509 *signer;
+ if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN))
+ {
+ signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
+ if (signer)
+ {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
+ if (signer)
+ {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 2;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }