-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* callback functions used by s_client, s_server, and s_time */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include <string.h> /* for memcpy() and strcmp() */
#include "apps.h"
-#undef USE_SOCKETS
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH 16
-int verify_depth = 0;
-int verify_quiet = 0;
-int verify_error = X509_V_OK;
-int verify_return_error = 0;
-unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
-int cookie_initialized = 0;
+VERIFY_CB_ARGS verify_args = { -1, 0, X509_V_OK, 0 };
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+static unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
+static int cookie_initialized = 0;
+#endif
+static BIO *bio_keylog = NULL;
+
+static const char *lookup(int val, const STRINT_PAIR* list, const char* def)
+{
+ for ( ; list->name; ++list)
+ if (list->retval == val)
+ return list->name;
+ return def;
+}
int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
- if (!verify_quiet || !ok) {
+ if (!verify_args.quiet || !ok) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "depth=%d ", depth);
- if (err_cert) {
+ if (err_cert != NULL) {
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err,
X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
- 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ 0, get_nameopt());
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
- } else
+ } else {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "<no cert>\n");
+ }
}
if (!ok) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:num=%d:%s\n", err,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
- if (verify_depth >= depth) {
- if (!verify_return_error)
+ if (verify_args.depth < 0 || verify_args.depth >= depth) {
+ if (!verify_args.return_error)
ok = 1;
- verify_error = X509_V_OK;
+ verify_args.error = err;
} else {
ok = 0;
- verify_error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
+ verify_args.error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
}
}
switch (err) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
BIO_puts(bio_err, "issuer= ");
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert),
- 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ 0, get_nameopt());
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
BIO_printf(bio_err, "notBefore=");
- ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(err_cert));
+ ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notBefore(err_cert));
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
BIO_printf(bio_err, "notAfter=");
- ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(err_cert));
+ ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notAfter(err_cert));
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
break;
case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
- if (!verify_quiet)
+ if (!verify_args.quiet)
policies_print(ctx);
break;
}
- if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2 && !verify_quiet)
+ if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2 && !verify_args.quiet)
policies_print(ctx);
- if (ok && !verify_quiet)
+ if (ok && !verify_args.quiet)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify return:%d\n", ok);
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
}
int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get certificate from '%s'\n",
cert_file);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
if (key_file == NULL)
key_file = cert_file;
BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get private key from '%s'\n",
key_file);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
/*
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"Private key does not match the certificate public key\n");
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
}
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key,
return 1;
}
+static STRINT_PAIR cert_type_list[] = {
+ {"RSA sign", TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN},
+ {"DSA sign", TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN},
+ {"RSA fixed DH", TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH},
+ {"DSS fixed DH", TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH},
+ {"ECDSA sign", TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN},
+ {"RSA fixed ECDH", TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH},
+ {"ECDSA fixed ECDH", TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH},
+ {"GOST01 Sign", TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
static void ssl_print_client_cert_types(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *p;
BIO_puts(bio, "Client Certificate Types: ");
for (i = 0; i < cert_type_num; i++) {
unsigned char cert_type = p[i];
- char *cname;
- switch (cert_type) {
- case TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN:
- cname = "RSA sign";
- break;
+ const char *cname = lookup((int)cert_type, cert_type_list, NULL);
- case TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN:
- cname = "DSA sign";
- break;
+ if (i)
+ BIO_puts(bio, ", ");
+ if (cname != NULL)
+ BIO_puts(bio, cname);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN (%d),", cert_type);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+}
- case TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH:
- cname = "RSA fixed DH";
- break;
+static const char *get_sigtype(int nid)
+{
+ switch (nid) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ return "RSA";
- case TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH:
- cname = "DSS fixed DH";
- break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
+ return "RSA-PSS";
- case TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN:
- cname = "ECDSA sign";
- break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ return "DSA";
- case TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH:
- cname = "RSA fixed ECDH";
- break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ return "ECDSA";
- case TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH:
- cname = "ECDSA fixed ECDH";
- break;
+ case NID_ED25519:
+ return "Ed25519";
- case TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN:
- cname = "GOST94 Sign";
- break;
+ case NID_ED448:
+ return "Ed448";
- case TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN:
- cname = "GOST01 Sign";
- break;
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
+ return "gost2001";
- default:
- cname = NULL;
- }
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
+ return "gost2012_256";
- if (i)
- BIO_puts(bio, ", ");
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
+ return "gost2012_512";
- if (cname)
- BIO_puts(bio, cname);
- else
- BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN (%d),", cert_type);
+ default:
+ return NULL;
}
- BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
}
static int do_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s, int shared)
int i, nsig, client;
client = SSL_is_server(s) ? 0 : 1;
if (shared)
- nsig = SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ nsig = SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
else
nsig = SSL_get_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (nsig == 0)
SSL_get_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL, &rsign, &rhash);
if (i)
BIO_puts(out, ":");
- if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- sstr = "RSA";
- else if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
- sstr = "DSA";
- else if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- sstr = "ECDSA";
+ sstr = get_sigtype(sign_nid);
if (sstr)
- BIO_printf(out, "%s+", sstr);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s", sstr);
else
- BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X+", (int)rsign);
+ BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", (int)rsign);
if (hash_nid != NID_undef)
- BIO_printf(out, "%s", OBJ_nid2sn(hash_nid));
- else
- BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", (int)rhash);
+ BIO_printf(out, "+%s", OBJ_nid2sn(hash_nid));
+ else if (sstr == NULL)
+ BIO_printf(out, "+0x%02X", (int)rhash);
}
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
return 1;
int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s)
{
- int mdnid;
+ int nid;
if (!SSL_is_server(s))
ssl_print_client_cert_types(out, s);
do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 0);
do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 1);
- if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &mdnid))
- BIO_printf(out, "Peer signing digest: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(mdnid));
+ if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid) && nid != NID_undef)
+ BIO_printf(out, "Peer signing digest: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+ if (SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(s, &nid))
+ BIO_printf(out, "Peer signature type: %s\n", get_sigtype(nid));
return 1;
}
}
}
- if (nformats <= 0)
- BIO_puts(out, "NONE");
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
return 1;
}
-int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared)
+int ssl_print_groups(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared)
{
- int i, ncurves, *curves, nid;
- const char *cname;
+ int i, ngroups, *groups, nid;
+ const char *gname;
- ncurves = SSL_get1_curves(s, NULL);
- if (ncurves <= 0)
+ ngroups = SSL_get1_groups(s, NULL);
+ if (ngroups <= 0)
return 1;
- curves = app_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int), "curves to print");
- SSL_get1_curves(s, curves);
+ groups = app_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(int), "groups to print");
+ SSL_get1_groups(s, groups);
- BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curves: ");
- for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
+ BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Groups: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
if (i)
BIO_puts(out, ":");
- nid = curves[i];
+ nid = groups[i];
/* If unrecognised print out hex version */
- if (nid & TLSEXT_nid_unknown)
+ if (nid & TLSEXT_nid_unknown) {
BIO_printf(out, "0x%04X", nid & 0xFFFF);
- else {
+ } else {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Get group name here */
/* Use NIST name for curve if it exists */
- cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
- if (!cname)
- cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname);
+ gname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+ if (gname == NULL)
+ gname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s", gname);
}
}
- if (ncurves == 0)
- BIO_puts(out, "NONE");
- OPENSSL_free(curves);
+ OPENSSL_free(groups);
if (noshared) {
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
return 1;
}
- BIO_puts(out, "\nShared Elliptic curves: ");
- ncurves = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, -1);
- for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
+ BIO_puts(out, "\nShared Elliptic groups: ");
+ ngroups = SSL_get_shared_group(s, -1);
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
if (i)
BIO_puts(out, ":");
- nid = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, i);
- cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
- if (!cname)
- cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname);
+ nid = SSL_get_shared_group(s, i);
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
+ gname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+ if (gname == NULL)
+ gname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s", gname);
}
- if (ncurves == 0)
+ if (ngroups == 0)
BIO_puts(out, "NONE");
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
return 1;
}
#endif
+
int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *key;
- if (!SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, &key))
+
+ if (!SSL_get_peer_tmp_key(s, &key))
return 1;
BIO_puts(out, "Server Temp Key: ");
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) {
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
EC_KEY_free(ec);
cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
- if (!cname)
+ if (cname == NULL)
cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
BIO_printf(out, "ECDH, %s, %d bits\n", cname, EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
}
+ break;
#endif
+ default:
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s, %d bits\n", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_id(key)),
+ EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
}
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 1;
out = (BIO *)BIO_get_callback_arg(bio);
if (out == NULL)
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
BIO_printf(out, "read from %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
- (void *)bio, argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret);
+ (void *)bio, (void *)argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret);
BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret);
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
} else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
BIO_printf(out, "write to %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
- (void *)bio, argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret);
+ (void *)bio, (void *)argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret);
BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret);
}
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
void apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
if (ret == 0)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:failed in %s\n",
str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
- else if (ret < 0) {
+ else if (ret < 0)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:error in %s\n",
str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
- }
}
}
-static const char *ssl_version_str(int version)
-{
- switch (version) {
- case SSL3_VERSION:
- return "SSL 3.0";
- case TLS1_VERSION:
- return "TLS 1.0";
- case TLS1_1_VERSION:
- return "TLS 1.1";
- case TLS1_2_VERSION:
- return "TLS 1.2";
- case DTLS1_VERSION:
- return "DTLS 1.0";
- case DTLS1_BAD_VER:
- return "DTLS 1.0 (bad)";
- default:
- return "???";
- }
-}
+static STRINT_PAIR ssl_versions[] = {
+ {"SSL 3.0", SSL3_VERSION},
+ {"TLS 1.0", TLS1_VERSION},
+ {"TLS 1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION},
+ {"TLS 1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION},
+ {"TLS 1.3", TLS1_3_VERSION},
+ {"DTLS 1.0", DTLS1_VERSION},
+ {"DTLS 1.0 (bad)", DTLS1_BAD_VER},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+static STRINT_PAIR alert_types[] = {
+ {" close_notify", 0},
+ {" end_of_early_data", 1},
+ {" unexpected_message", 10},
+ {" bad_record_mac", 20},
+ {" decryption_failed", 21},
+ {" record_overflow", 22},
+ {" decompression_failure", 30},
+ {" handshake_failure", 40},
+ {" bad_certificate", 42},
+ {" unsupported_certificate", 43},
+ {" certificate_revoked", 44},
+ {" certificate_expired", 45},
+ {" certificate_unknown", 46},
+ {" illegal_parameter", 47},
+ {" unknown_ca", 48},
+ {" access_denied", 49},
+ {" decode_error", 50},
+ {" decrypt_error", 51},
+ {" export_restriction", 60},
+ {" protocol_version", 70},
+ {" insufficient_security", 71},
+ {" internal_error", 80},
+ {" inappropriate_fallback", 86},
+ {" user_canceled", 90},
+ {" no_renegotiation", 100},
+ {" missing_extension", 109},
+ {" unsupported_extension", 110},
+ {" certificate_unobtainable", 111},
+ {" unrecognized_name", 112},
+ {" bad_certificate_status_response", 113},
+ {" bad_certificate_hash_value", 114},
+ {" unknown_psk_identity", 115},
+ {" certificate_required", 116},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+static STRINT_PAIR handshakes[] = {
+ {", HelloRequest", SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST},
+ {", ClientHello", SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO},
+ {", ServerHello", SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO},
+ {", HelloVerifyRequest", DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST},
+ {", NewSessionTicket", SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET},
+ {", EndOfEarlyData", SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA},
+ {", EncryptedExtensions", SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS},
+ {", Certificate", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE},
+ {", ServerKeyExchange", SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE},
+ {", CertificateRequest", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST},
+ {", ServerHelloDone", SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE},
+ {", CertificateVerify", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY},
+ {", ClientKeyExchange", SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE},
+ {", Finished", SSL3_MT_FINISHED},
+ {", CertificateUrl", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_URL},
+ {", CertificateStatus", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS},
+ {", SupplementalData", SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA},
+ {", KeyUpdate", SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ {", NextProto", SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO},
+#endif
+ {", MessageHash", SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH},
+ {NULL}
+};
void msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
{
BIO *bio = arg;
- const char *str_write_p, *str_version, *str_content_type =
- "", *str_details1 = "", *str_details2 = "";
-
- str_write_p = write_p ? ">>>" : "<<<";
-
- str_version = ssl_version_str(version);
+ const char *str_write_p = write_p ? ">>>" : "<<<";
+ const char *str_version = lookup(version, ssl_versions, "???");
+ const char *str_content_type = "", *str_details1 = "", *str_details2 = "";
+ const unsigned char* bp = buf;
if (version == SSL3_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_1_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
+ version == TLS1_3_VERSION ||
version == DTLS1_VERSION || version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
switch (content_type) {
case 20:
- str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec";
+ str_content_type = ", ChangeCipherSpec";
break;
case 21:
- str_content_type = "Alert";
- break;
- case 22:
- str_content_type = "Handshake";
- break;
- }
-
- if (content_type == 21) { /* Alert */
+ str_content_type = ", Alert";
str_details1 = ", ???";
-
if (len == 2) {
- switch (((const unsigned char *)buf)[0]) {
+ switch (bp[0]) {
case 1:
str_details1 = ", warning";
break;
str_details1 = ", fatal";
break;
}
-
- str_details2 = " ???";
- switch (((const unsigned char *)buf)[1]) {
- case 0:
- str_details2 = " close_notify";
- break;
- case 10:
- str_details2 = " unexpected_message";
- break;
- case 20:
- str_details2 = " bad_record_mac";
- break;
- case 21:
- str_details2 = " decryption_failed";
- break;
- case 22:
- str_details2 = " record_overflow";
- break;
- case 30:
- str_details2 = " decompression_failure";
- break;
- case 40:
- str_details2 = " handshake_failure";
- break;
- case 42:
- str_details2 = " bad_certificate";
- break;
- case 43:
- str_details2 = " unsupported_certificate";
- break;
- case 44:
- str_details2 = " certificate_revoked";
- break;
- case 45:
- str_details2 = " certificate_expired";
- break;
- case 46:
- str_details2 = " certificate_unknown";
- break;
- case 47:
- str_details2 = " illegal_parameter";
- break;
- case 48:
- str_details2 = " unknown_ca";
- break;
- case 49:
- str_details2 = " access_denied";
- break;
- case 50:
- str_details2 = " decode_error";
- break;
- case 51:
- str_details2 = " decrypt_error";
- break;
- case 60:
- str_details2 = " export_restriction";
- break;
- case 70:
- str_details2 = " protocol_version";
- break;
- case 71:
- str_details2 = " insufficient_security";
- break;
- case 80:
- str_details2 = " internal_error";
- break;
- case 90:
- str_details2 = " user_canceled";
- break;
- case 100:
- str_details2 = " no_renegotiation";
- break;
- case 110:
- str_details2 = " unsupported_extension";
- break;
- case 111:
- str_details2 = " certificate_unobtainable";
- break;
- case 112:
- str_details2 = " unrecognized_name";
- break;
- case 113:
- str_details2 = " bad_certificate_status_response";
- break;
- case 114:
- str_details2 = " bad_certificate_hash_value";
- break;
- case 115:
- str_details2 = " unknown_psk_identity";
- break;
- }
+ str_details2 = lookup((int)bp[1], alert_types, " ???");
}
- }
-
- if (content_type == 22) { /* Handshake */
+ break;
+ case 22:
+ str_content_type = ", Handshake";
str_details1 = "???";
-
- if (len > 0) {
- switch (((const unsigned char *)buf)[0]) {
- case 0:
- str_details1 = ", HelloRequest";
- break;
- case 1:
- str_details1 = ", ClientHello";
- break;
- case 2:
- str_details1 = ", ServerHello";
- break;
- case 3:
- str_details1 = ", HelloVerifyRequest";
- break;
- case 11:
- str_details1 = ", Certificate";
- break;
- case 12:
- str_details1 = ", ServerKeyExchange";
- break;
- case 13:
- str_details1 = ", CertificateRequest";
- break;
- case 14:
- str_details1 = ", ServerHelloDone";
- break;
- case 15:
- str_details1 = ", CertificateVerify";
- break;
- case 16:
- str_details1 = ", ClientKeyExchange";
- break;
- case 20:
- str_details1 = ", Finished";
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- if (content_type == 24) { /* Heartbeat */
- str_details1 = ", Heartbeat";
-
- if (len > 0) {
- switch (((const unsigned char *)buf)[0]) {
- case 1:
- str_details1 = ", HeartbeatRequest";
- break;
- case 2:
- str_details1 = ", HeartbeatResponse";
- break;
- }
- }
+ if (len > 0)
+ str_details1 = lookup((int)bp[0], handshakes, "???");
+ break;
+ case 23:
+ str_content_type = ", ApplicationData";
+ break;
}
-#endif
}
BIO_printf(bio, "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n", str_write_p, str_version,
(void)BIO_flush(bio);
}
-void tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
- unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg)
-{
- BIO *bio = arg;
- char *extname;
-
- switch (type) {
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name:
- extname = "server name";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length:
- extname = "max fragment length";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url:
- extname = "client certificate URL";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys:
- extname = "trusted CA keys";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac:
- extname = "truncated HMAC";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request:
- extname = "status request";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping:
- extname = "user mapping";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz:
- extname = "client authz";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz:
- extname = "server authz";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type:
- extname = "cert type";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves:
- extname = "elliptic curves";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats:
- extname = "EC point formats";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_srp:
- extname = "SRP";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms:
- extname = "signature algorithms";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp:
- extname = "use SRTP";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat:
- extname = "heartbeat";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket:
- extname = "session ticket";
- break;
-
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate:
- extname = "renegotiation info";
- break;
-
+static STRINT_PAIR tlsext_types[] = {
+ {"server name", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name},
+ {"max fragment length", TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length},
+ {"client certificate URL", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url},
+ {"trusted CA keys", TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys},
+ {"truncated HMAC", TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac},
+ {"status request", TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request},
+ {"user mapping", TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping},
+ {"client authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz},
+ {"server authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz},
+ {"cert type", TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type},
+ {"supported_groups", TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups},
+ {"EC point formats", TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats},
+ {"SRP", TLSEXT_TYPE_srp},
+ {"signature algorithms", TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms},
+ {"use SRTP", TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp},
+ {"session ticket", TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket},
+ {"renegotiation info", TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate},
+ {"signed certificate timestamps", TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp},
+ {"TLS padding", TLSEXT_TYPE_padding},
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg:
- extname = "next protocol";
- break;
+ {"next protocol", TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg},
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac:
- extname = "encrypt-then-mac";
- break;
+ {"encrypt-then-mac", TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac},
#endif
- case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
- extname = "TLS padding";
- break;
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
+ {"application layer protocol negotiation",
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
+ {"extended master secret", TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret},
+#endif
+ {"key share", TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share},
+ {"supported versions", TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions},
+ {"psk", TLSEXT_TYPE_psk},
+ {"psk kex modes", TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes},
+ {"certificate authorities", TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities},
+ {"post handshake auth", TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth},
+ {NULL}
+};
- default:
- extname = "unknown";
- break;
+/* from rfc8446 4.2.3. + gost (https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-smyshlyaev-tls12-gost-suites-04.html) */
+static STRINT_PAIR signature_tls13_scheme_list[] = {
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", 0x0201 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1 */},
+ {"ecdsa_sha1", 0x0203 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1 */},
+/* {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", 0x0301 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224}, not in rfc8446 */
+/* {"ecdsa_sha224", 0x0303 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224} not in rfc8446 */
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", 0x0401 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256 */},
+ {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", 0x0403 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 */},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", 0x0501 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384 */},
+ {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", 0x0503 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 */},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", 0x0601 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512 */},
+ {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", 0x0603 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 */},
+ {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", 0x0804 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 */},
+ {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", 0x0805 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 */},
+ {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", 0x0806 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 */},
+ {"ed25519", 0x0807 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519 */},
+ {"ed448", 0x0808 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448 */},
+ {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", 0x0809 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256 */},
+ {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", 0x080a /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384 */},
+ {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", 0x080b /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512 */},
+ {"gostr34102001", 0xeded /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411 */},
+ {"gostr34102012_256", 0xeeee /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256 */},
+ {"gostr34102012_512", 0xefef /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 */},
+ {NULL}
+};
- }
+/* from rfc5246 7.4.1.4.1. */
+static STRINT_PAIR signature_tls12_alg_list[] = {
+ {"anonymous", TLSEXT_signature_anonymous /* 0 */},
+ {"RSA", TLSEXT_signature_rsa /* 1 */},
+ {"DSA", TLSEXT_signature_dsa /* 2 */},
+ {"ECDSA", TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa /* 3 */},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/* from rfc5246 7.4.1.4.1. */
+static STRINT_PAIR signature_tls12_hash_list[] = {
+ {"none", TLSEXT_hash_none /* 0 */},
+ {"MD5", TLSEXT_hash_md5 /* 1 */},
+ {"SHA1", TLSEXT_hash_sha1 /* 2 */},
+ {"SHA224", TLSEXT_hash_sha224 /* 3 */},
+ {"SHA256", TLSEXT_hash_sha256 /* 4 */},
+ {"SHA384", TLSEXT_hash_sha384 /* 5 */},
+ {"SHA512", TLSEXT_hash_sha512 /* 6 */},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+void tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
+ const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg)
+{
+ BIO *bio = arg;
+ const char *extname = lookup(type, tlsext_types, "unknown");
BIO_printf(bio, "TLS %s extension \"%s\" (id=%d), len=%d\n",
client_server ? "server" : "client", extname, type, len);
- BIO_dump(bio, (char *)data, len);
+ BIO_dump(bio, (const char *)data, len);
(void)BIO_flush(bio);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
int generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned int *cookie_len)
{
- unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int length, resultlength;
- union {
- struct sockaddr sa;
- struct sockaddr_in s4;
-#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
- struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
-#endif
- } peer;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+ size_t length = 0;
+ unsigned short port;
+ BIO_ADDR *lpeer = NULL, *peer = NULL;
/* Initialize a random secret */
if (!cookie_initialized) {
cookie_initialized = 1;
}
- /* Read peer information */
- (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+ lpeer = peer = BIO_ADDR_new();
+ if (peer == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory full\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Read peer information */
+ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), peer);
+ } else {
+ peer = ourpeer;
+ }
/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
- length = 0;
- switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
- length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
- break;
-#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
- case AF_INET6:
- length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
- length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- OPENSSL_assert(0);
- break;
+ if (!BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, NULL, &length)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed getting peer address\n");
+ return 0;
}
+ OPENSSL_assert(length != 0);
+ port = BIO_ADDR_rawport(peer);
+ length += sizeof(port);
buffer = app_malloc(length, "cookie generate buffer");
- switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- memcpy(buffer, &peer.s4.sin_port, sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
- memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
- &peer.s4.sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
- break;
-#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
- case AF_INET6:
- memcpy(buffer, &peer.s6.sin6_port, sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
- memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
- &peer.s6.sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- OPENSSL_assert(0);
- break;
- }
+ memcpy(buffer, &port, sizeof(port));
+ BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, buffer + sizeof(port), NULL);
/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
- buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ buffer, length, cookie, cookie_len);
- memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
- *cookie_len = resultlength;
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ BIO_ADDR_free(lpeer);
return 1;
}
-int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned int cookie_len)
{
- unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int length, resultlength;
- union {
- struct sockaddr sa;
- struct sockaddr_in s4;
-#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
- struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
-#endif
- } peer;
-
- /* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
- if (!cookie_initialized)
- return 0;
-
- /* Read peer information */
- (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
-
- /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
- length = 0;
- switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
- length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
- break;
-#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
- case AF_INET6:
- length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
- length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- OPENSSL_assert(0);
- break;
- }
- buffer = app_malloc(length, "cookie verify buffer");
-
- switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- memcpy(buffer, &peer.s4.sin_port, sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
- memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
- &peer.s4.sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
- break;
-#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
- case AF_INET6:
- memcpy(buffer, &peer.s6.sin6_port, sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
- memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
- &peer.s6.sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- OPENSSL_assert(0);
- break;
- }
-
- /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
- HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
- buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
-
- if (cookie_len == resultlength
+ unsigned char result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int resultlength;
+
+ /* Note: we check cookie_initialized because if it's not,
+ * it cannot be valid */
+ if (cookie_initialized
+ && generate_cookie_callback(ssl, result, &resultlength)
+ && cookie_len == resultlength
&& memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
+int generate_stateless_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ size_t *cookie_len)
+{
+ unsigned int temp;
+ int res = generate_cookie_callback(ssl, cookie, &temp);
+ *cookie_len = temp;
+ return res;
+}
+
+int verify_stateless_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
+ size_t cookie_len)
+{
+ return verify_cookie_callback(ssl, cookie, cookie_len);
+}
+
+#endif
+
/*
* Example of extended certificate handling. Where the standard support of
* one certificate per algorithm is not sufficient an application can decide
struct ssl_excert_st *next, *prev;
};
-struct chain_flags {
- int flag;
- const char *name;
-};
-
-struct chain_flags chain_flags_list[] = {
- {CERT_PKEY_VALID, "Overall Validity"},
- {CERT_PKEY_SIGN, "Sign with EE key"},
- {CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE, "EE signature"},
- {CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE, "CA signature"},
- {CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM, "EE key parameters"},
- {CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM, "CA key parameters"},
- {CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN, "Explicity sign with EE key"},
- {CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME, "Issuer Name"},
- {CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE, "Certificate Type"},
- {0, NULL}
+static STRINT_PAIR chain_flags[] = {
+ {"Overall Validity", CERT_PKEY_VALID},
+ {"Sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_SIGN},
+ {"EE signature", CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE},
+ {"CA signature", CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE},
+ {"EE key parameters", CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM},
+ {"CA key parameters", CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM},
+ {"Explicitly sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN},
+ {"Issuer Name", CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME},
+ {"Certificate Type", CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE},
+ {NULL}
};
static void print_chain_flags(SSL *s, int flags)
{
- struct chain_flags *ctmp = chain_flags_list;
+ STRINT_PAIR *pp;
- while (ctmp->name) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%s: %s\n", ctmp->name,
- flags & ctmp->flag ? "OK" : "NOT OK");
- ctmp++;
- }
+ for (pp = chain_flags; pp->name; ++pp)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%s: %s\n",
+ pp->name,
+ (flags & pp->retval) ? "OK" : "NOT OK");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tSuite B: ");
if (SSL_set_cert_flags(s, 0) & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)
BIO_puts(bio_err, flags & CERT_PKEY_SUITEB ? "OK\n" : "NOT OK\n");
static int retry_cnt;
if (retry_cnt < 5) {
retry_cnt++;
- fprintf(stderr, "Certificate callback retry test: count %d\n",
- retry_cnt);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Certificate callback retry test: count %d\n",
+ retry_cnt);
return -1;
}
#endif
SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
- if (!exc)
+ if (exc == NULL)
return 1;
/*
* Go to end of list and traverse backwards since we prepend newer
* entries this retains the original order.
*/
- while (exc->next)
+ while (exc->next != NULL)
exc = exc->next;
i = 0;
- while (exc) {
+ while (exc != NULL) {
i++;
rv = SSL_check_chain(ssl, exc->cert, exc->key, exc->chain);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Checking cert chain %d:\nSubject: ", i);
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(exc->cert), 0,
- XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ get_nameopt());
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
print_chain_flags(ssl, rv);
if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
if (exc->build_chain) {
if (!SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, 0))
return 0;
- } else if (exc->chain)
+ } else if (exc->chain != NULL) {
SSL_set1_chain(ssl, exc->chain);
+ }
}
exc = exc->prev;
}
{
SSL_EXCERT *exc = app_malloc(sizeof(*exc), "prepend cert");
- exc->certfile = NULL;
- exc->keyfile = NULL;
- exc->chainfile = NULL;
- exc->cert = NULL;
- exc->key = NULL;
- exc->chain = NULL;
- exc->prev = NULL;
- exc->build_chain = 0;
+ memset(exc, 0, sizeof(*exc));
exc->next = *pexc;
*pexc = exc;
{
SSL_EXCERT *curr;
- if (!exc)
+ if (exc == NULL)
return;
while (exc) {
X509_free(exc->cert);
int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
{
SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
- if (!exc)
+ if (exc == NULL)
return 1;
/* If nothing in list, free and set to NULL */
- if (!exc->certfile && !exc->next) {
+ if (exc->certfile == NULL && exc->next == NULL) {
ssl_excert_free(exc);
*pexc = NULL;
return 1;
}
for (; exc; exc = exc->next) {
- if (!exc->certfile) {
+ if (exc->certfile == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing filename\n");
return 0;
}
exc->cert = load_cert(exc->certfile, exc->certform,
- NULL, NULL, "Server Certificate");
- if (!exc->cert)
+ "Server Certificate");
+ if (exc->cert == NULL)
return 0;
- if (exc->keyfile) {
+ if (exc->keyfile != NULL) {
exc->key = load_key(exc->keyfile, exc->keyform,
0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key");
} else {
exc->key = load_key(exc->certfile, exc->certform,
0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key");
}
- if (!exc->key)
+ if (exc->key == NULL)
return 0;
- if (exc->chainfile) {
- exc->chain = load_certs(exc->chainfile, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, NULL, "Server Chain");
- if (!exc->chain)
+ if (exc->chainfile != NULL) {
+ if (!load_certs(exc->chainfile, &exc->chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
+ "Server Chain"))
return 0;
}
}
case OPT_X__LAST:
return 0;
case OPT_X_CERT:
- if (exc->certfile && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) {
+ if (exc->certfile != NULL && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error adding xcert\n", opt_getprog());
goto err;
}
+ *pexc = exc;
exc->certfile = opt_arg();
break;
case OPT_X_KEY:
- if (exc->keyfile) {
+ if (exc->keyfile != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Key already specified\n", opt_getprog());
goto err;
}
exc->keyfile = opt_arg();
break;
case OPT_X_CHAIN:
- if (exc->chainfile) {
+ if (exc->chainfile != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Chain already specified\n",
opt_getprog());
goto err;
static void print_raw_cipherlist(SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *rlist;
- static const unsigned char scsv_id[] = { 0, 0, 0xFF };
+ static const unsigned char scsv_id[] = { 0, 0xFF };
size_t i, rlistlen, num;
if (!SSL_is_server(s))
return;
num = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(num == 2);
rlistlen = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, &rlist);
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Client cipher list: ");
for (i = 0; i < rlistlen; i += num, rlist += num) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, rlist);
if (i)
BIO_puts(bio_err, ":");
- if (c)
+ if (c != NULL) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
- else if (!memcmp(rlist, scsv_id - num + 3, num))
+ } else if (memcmp(rlist, scsv_id, num) == 0) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "SCSV");
- else {
+ } else {
size_t j;
BIO_puts(bio_err, "0x");
for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
}
+/*
+ * Hex encoder for TLSA RRdata, not ':' delimited.
+ */
+static char *hexencode(const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
+ char *out;
+ char *cp;
+ size_t outlen = 2 * len + 1;
+ int ilen = (int) outlen;
+
+ if (outlen < len || ilen < 0 || outlen != (size_t)ilen) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %zu-byte buffer too large to hexencode\n",
+ opt_getprog(), len);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ cp = out = app_malloc(ilen, "TLSA hex data buffer");
+
+ while (len-- > 0) {
+ *cp++ = hex[(*data >> 4) & 0x0f];
+ *cp++ = hex[*data++ & 0x0f];
+ }
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return out;
+}
+
+void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio)
+{
+ int mdpth;
+ EVP_PKEY *mspki;
+ long verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(s);
+
+ if (verify_err == X509_V_OK) {
+ const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(s);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Verification: OK\n");
+ if (peername != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername);
+ } else {
+ const char *reason = X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Verification error: %s\n", reason);
+ }
+
+ if ((mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki)) >= 0) {
+ uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
+ const unsigned char *data = NULL;
+ size_t dlen = 0;
+ char *hexdata;
+
+ mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, &data, &dlen);
+
+ /*
+ * The TLSA data field can be quite long when it is a certificate,
+ * public key or even a SHA2-512 digest. Because the initial octets of
+ * ASN.1 certificates and public keys contain mostly boilerplate OIDs
+ * and lengths, we show the last 12 bytes of the data instead, as these
+ * are more likely to distinguish distinct TLSA records.
+ */
+#define TLSA_TAIL_SIZE 12
+ if (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE)
+ hexdata = hexencode(data + dlen - TLSA_TAIL_SIZE, TLSA_TAIL_SIZE);
+ else
+ hexdata = hexencode(data, dlen);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s%s %s at depth %d\n",
+ usage, selector, mtype,
+ (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) ? "..." : "", hexdata,
+ (mspki != NULL) ? "signed the certificate" :
+ mdpth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate",
+ mdpth);
+ OPENSSL_free(hexdata);
+ }
+}
+
void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
X509 *peer;
- /* const char *pnam = SSL_is_server(s) ? "client" : "server"; */
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Protocol version: %s\n", SSL_get_version(s));
print_raw_cipherlist(s);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Ciphersuite: %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
do_print_sigalgs(bio_err, s, 0);
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
- if (peer) {
+ if (peer != NULL) {
int nid;
+
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Peer certificate: ");
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(peer),
- 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ 0, get_nameopt());
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid))
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
- } else
+ if (SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(s, &nid))
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature type: %s\n", get_sigtype(nid));
+ print_verify_detail(s, bio_err);
+ } else {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "No peer certificate\n");
+ }
X509_free(peer);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ssl_print_point_formats(bio_err, s);
if (SSL_is_server(s))
- ssl_print_curves(bio_err, s, 1);
+ ssl_print_groups(bio_err, s, 1);
else
ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s);
#else
}
int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str,
- SSL_CTX *ctx, int no_ecdhe, int no_jpake)
+ SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(str); i += 2) {
const char *flag = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i);
const char *arg = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i + 1);
- /* If no_ecdhe or named curve already specified don't need a default. */
- if (!no_ecdhe && strcmp(flag, "-named_curve") == 0)
- no_ecdhe = 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- if (!no_jpake && (strcmp(flag, "-cipher") == 0)) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, flag, arg) <= 0) {
- if (arg)
+ if (arg != NULL)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n",
flag, arg);
else
return 0;
}
}
- /*
- * This is a special case to keep existing s_server functionality: if we
- * don't have any curve specified *and* we haven't disabled ECDHE then
- * use P-256.
- */
- if (!no_ecdhe) {
- if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, "-named_curve", "P-256") <= 0) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting EC curve\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- if (!no_jpake) {
- if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, "-cipher", "PSK") <= 0) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting cipher to PSK\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error finishing context\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
{
X509_STORE *vfy = NULL, *ch = NULL;
int rv = 0;
- if (vfyCApath || vfyCAfile) {
+ if (vfyCApath != NULL || vfyCAfile != NULL) {
vfy = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (vfy == NULL)
+ goto err;
if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(vfy, vfyCAfile, vfyCApath))
goto err;
add_crls_store(vfy, crls);
if (crl_download)
store_setup_crl_download(vfy);
}
- if (chCApath || chCAfile) {
+ if (chCApath != NULL || chCAfile != NULL) {
ch = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (ch == NULL)
+ goto err;
if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(ch, chCAfile, chCApath))
goto err;
SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx, ch);
typedef struct {
BIO *out;
int verbose;
- int (*old_cb) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
+ int (*old_cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
void *other, void *ex);
} security_debug_ex;
-static int security_callback_debug(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx,
+static STRINT_PAIR callback_types[] = {
+ {"Supported Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED},
+ {"Shared Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED},
+ {"Check Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ {"Temp DH key bits", SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH},
+#endif
+ {"Supported Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED},
+ {"Shared Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED},
+ {"Check Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK},
+ {"Supported Signature Algorithm", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED},
+ {"Shared Signature Algorithm", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED},
+ {"Check Signature Algorithm", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK},
+ {"Signature Algorithm mask", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK},
+ {"Certificate chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY},
+ {"Certificate chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY},
+ {"Peer Chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_EE_KEY},
+ {"Peer Chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_KEY},
+ {"Certificate chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_CA_MD},
+ {"Peer chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD},
+ {"SSL compression", SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION},
+ {"Session ticket", SSL_SECOP_TICKET},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+static int security_callback_debug(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
int op, int bits, int nid,
void *other, void *ex)
{
security_debug_ex *sdb = ex;
int rv, show_bits = 1, cert_md = 0;
const char *nm;
+ int show_nm;
rv = sdb->old_cb(s, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ex);
if (rv == 1 && sdb->verbose < 2)
return 1;
BIO_puts(sdb->out, "Security callback: ");
+ nm = lookup(op, callback_types, NULL);
+ show_nm = nm != NULL;
switch (op) {
- case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED:
- nm = "Supported Ciphersuite";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED:
- nm = "Shared Ciphersuite";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK:
- nm = "Check Ciphersuite";
- break;
case SSL_SECOP_TICKET:
- BIO_puts(sdb->out, "Session ticket");
- show_bits = 0;
- nm = NULL;
- break;
case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
- BIO_puts(sdb->out, "SSL compression");
show_bits = 0;
- nm = NULL;
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- case SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH:
- nm = "Temp DH key bits";
- break;
-#endif
- case SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED:
- nm = "Supported Curve";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED:
- nm = "Shared Curve";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK:
- nm = "Check Curve";
+ show_nm = 0;
break;
case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
- BIO_printf(sdb->out, "Version=%s", ssl_version_str(nid));
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, "Version=%s", lookup(nid, ssl_versions, "???"));
show_bits = 0;
- nm = NULL;
+ show_nm = 0;
break;
- case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED:
- nm = "Supported Signature Algorithm digest";
+ case SSL_SECOP_CA_MD:
+ case SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD:
+ cert_md = 1;
break;
+ case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED:
case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED:
- nm = "Shared Signature Algorithm digest";
- break;
case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK:
- nm = "Check Signature Algorithm digest";
- break;
case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK:
- nm = "Signature Algorithm mask";
+ show_nm = 0;
break;
- case SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY:
- nm = "Certificate chain EE key";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY:
- nm = "Certificate chain CA key";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_CA_MD:
- cert_md = 1;
- nm = "Certificate chain CA digest";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_PEER_EE_KEY:
- nm = "Peer Chain EE key";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_KEY:
- nm = "Peer Chain CA key";
- break;
- case SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD:
- cert_md = 1;
- nm = "Peer chain CA digest";
- break;
- default:
- nm = NULL;
}
- if (nm)
+ if (show_nm)
BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s=", nm);
switch (op & SSL_SECOP_OTHER_TYPE) {
}
break;
#endif
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_DH:
{
DH *dh = other;
- BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%d", BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%d", DH_bits(dh));
break;
}
+#endif
case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT:
{
if (cert_md) {
int sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(other);
BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(sig_nid));
} else {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(other);
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(other);
const char *algname = "";
EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&algname, EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(pkey));
BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s, bits=%d",
algname, EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
break;
}
{
const unsigned char *salg = other;
const char *sname = NULL;
- switch (salg[1]) {
- case TLSEXT_signature_anonymous:
- sname = "anonymous";
- break;
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- sname = "RSA";
- break;
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
- sname = "DSA";
- break;
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- sname = "ECDSA";
- break;
- }
+ int raw_sig_code = (salg[0] << 8) + salg[1]; /* always big endian (msb, lsb) */
+ /* raw_sig_code: signature_scheme from tls1.3, or signature_and_hash from tls1.2 */
- BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
- if (sname)
- BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", algorithm=%s", sname);
+ if (nm != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s", nm);
else
- BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", algid=%d", salg[1]);
- break;
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, "s_cb.c:security_callback_debug op=0x%x", op);
+
+ sname = lookup(raw_sig_code, signature_tls13_scheme_list, NULL);
+ if (sname != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, " scheme=%s", sname);
+ } else {
+ int alg_code = salg[1];
+ int hash_code = salg[0];
+ const char *alg_str = lookup(alg_code, signature_tls12_alg_list, NULL);
+ const char *hash_str = lookup(hash_code, signature_tls12_hash_list, NULL);
+
+ if (alg_str != NULL && hash_str != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, " digest=%s, algorithm=%s", hash_str, alg_str);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, " scheme=unknown(0x%04x)", raw_sig_code);
+ }
}
}
SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(ctx, security_callback_debug);
SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(ctx, &sdb);
}
+
+static void keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
+{
+ if (bio_keylog == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Keylog callback is invoked without valid file!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * There might be concurrent writers to the keylog file, so we must ensure
+ * that the given line is written at once.
+ */
+ BIO_printf(bio_keylog, "%s\n", line);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_keylog);
+}
+
+int set_keylog_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *keylog_file)
+{
+ /* Close any open files */
+ BIO_free_all(bio_keylog);
+ bio_keylog = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || keylog_file == NULL) {
+ /* Keylogging is disabled, OK. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Append rather than write in order to allow concurrent modification.
+ * Furthermore, this preserves existing keylog files which is useful when
+ * the tool is run multiple times.
+ */
+ bio_keylog = BIO_new_file(keylog_file, "a");
+ if (bio_keylog == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing keylog file %s\n", keylog_file);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Write a header for seekable, empty files (this excludes pipes). */
+ if (BIO_tell(bio_keylog) == 0) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_keylog,
+ "# SSL/TLS secrets log file, generated by OpenSSL\n");
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_keylog);
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ctx, keylog_callback);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void print_ca_names(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
+{
+ const char *cs = SSL_is_server(s) ? "server" : "client";
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(s);
+ int i;
+
+ if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(sk) == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio, "---\nNo %s certificate CA names sent\n", cs);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "---\nAcceptable %s certificate CA names\n",cs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i), 0, get_nameopt());
+ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+ }
+}