https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
- Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.1.1c and 1.1.1d [10 Sep 2019]
+
+ *) Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random
+ number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the
+ event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child
+ processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not
+ being used in the default case.
+
+ A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high
+ precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent
+ and child process sharing state is significantly reduced.
+
+ If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using
+ OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all.
+ (CVE-2019-1549)
+ [Matthias St. Pierre]
+
+ *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+ used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+ or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+ `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+ This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+ especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+ By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+ serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+ internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
+ [Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ *) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+ this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+ NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+ does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+ (CVE-2019-1547)
+ [Billy Bob Brumley]
+
+ *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+ An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+ second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+ recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+ encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+ decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+ used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+ As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+ key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+ certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+ The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+ (CVE-2019-1563)
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been
+ improved for older Linux systems. The RAND subsystem will wait for
+ /dev/random to be producing output before seeding from /dev/urandom.
+ The seeded state is stored for future library initialisations using
+ a system global shared memory segment. The shared memory identifier
+ can be configured by defining OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID to
+ the desired value. The default identifier is 114.
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems. Without this
+ fix TLS connections between an EBCDIC system and a non-EBCDIC system that
+ negotiate EMS will fail. Unfortunately this also means that TLS connections
+ between EBCDIC systems with this fix, and EBCDIC systems without this
+ fix will fail if they negotiate EMS.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds
+
+ Mingw isn't a POSIX environment per se, which means that Windows
+ paths should be used for installation.
+ (CVE-2019-1552)
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups.
+ With order 2q subgroups the bit 0 of the private key is not secret
+ but DH_generate_key works around that by clearing bit 0 of the
+ private key for those. This avoids leaking bit 0 of the private key.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools.
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Revert the DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems
+
+ The DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature added a select() call to wait for the
+ /dev/random device to become readable before reading from the
+ /dev/urandom device.
+
+ It turned out that this change had negative side effects on
+ performance which were not acceptable. After some discussion it
+ was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS
+ resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization
+ during early boot time.
+ [Matthias St. Pierre]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019]
+
+ *) Add build tests for C++. These are generated files that only do one
+ thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each. This tests that
+ the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application.
+
+ This test isn't enabled by default. It can be enabled with the option
+ 'enable-buildtest-c++'.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA.
+ [Patrick Steuer]
+
+ *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
+ This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
+ fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
+ generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES,
+ EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust
+ util/fix-doc-nits accordingly.
+ [Paul Yang, Joshua Lock]
+
+ *) Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine()
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme
+ along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging.
+ [Lorinczy Zsigmond]
+
+ *) Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.
+
+ ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input
+ for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value
+ (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length
+ and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12
+ bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16
+ bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any
+ additional leading bytes are ignored.
+
+ It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are
+ unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to
+ serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes
+ the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a
+ change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a
+ new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt
+ messages with a reused nonce.
+
+ Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
+ integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
+ integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
+ affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS,
+ is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
+ applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
+ length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk
+ Greef of Ronomon.
+ (CVE-2019-1543)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Add DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems
+
+ On older Linux systems where the getrandom() system call is not available,
+ OpenSSL normally uses the /dev/urandom device for seeding its CSPRNG.
+ Contrary to getrandom(), the /dev/urandom device will not block during
+ early boot when the kernel CSPRNG has not been seeded yet.
+
+ To mitigate this known weakness, use select() to wait for /dev/random to
+ become readable before reading from /dev/urandom.
+
+ *) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm
+ [Paul Yang]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019]
+
+ *) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through
+ a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD.
+ This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective
+ to affine coordinates.
+ [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ *) Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake
+ message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
+ and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE. Experience has shown that many applications get
+ confused by this and assume that a TLSv1.2 renegotiation has started. This
+ can break KeyUpdate handling. Instead we no longer signal the start and end
+ of a post handshake message exchange (although the messages themselves are
+ still signalled). This could break some applications that were expecting
+ the old signals. However without this KeyUpdate is not usable for many
+ applications.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix a bug in the computation of the endpoint-pair shared secret used
+ by DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions
+ of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. There is a runtime
+ switch SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG (off by default) enabling
+ interoperability with such broken implementations. However, enabling
+ this switch breaks interoperability with correct implementations.
+
+ *) Fix a use after free bug in d2i_X509_PUBKEY when overwriting a
+ re-used X509_PUBKEY object if the second PUBKEY is malformed.
+ [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Remove the 'dist' target and add a tarball building script. The
+ 'dist' target has fallen out of use, and it shouldn't be
+ necessary to configure just to create a source distribution.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018]
+
+ *) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
+
+ The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
+ timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
+ algorithm to recover the private key.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
+ (CVE-2018-0734)
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
+
+ The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
+ timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
+ algorithm to recover the private key.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
+ (CVE-2018-0735)
+ [Paul Dale]
+
+ *) Added EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 and ecdh_KDF_X9_63() as replacements for
+ the EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62 KDF type and ECDH_KDF_X9_62(). The old names
+ are retained for backwards compatibility.
+ [Antoine Salon]
+
+ *) Fixed the issue that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() silently discards random input
+ if its length exceeds 4096 bytes. The limit has been raised to a buffer size
+ of two gigabytes and the error handling improved.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Dr. Falko Strenzke. It has been
+ categorized as a normal bug, not a security issue, because the DRBG reseeds
+ automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness
+ provided by the application.
+
+ Changes between 1.1.0i and 1.1.1 [11 Sep 2018]
+
+ *) Add a new ClientHello callback. Provides a callback interface that gives
+ the application the ability to adjust the nascent SSL object at the
+ earliest stage of ClientHello processing, immediately after extensions have
+ been collected but before they have been processed. In particular, this
+ callback can adjust the supported TLS versions in response to the contents
+ of the ClientHello
+ [Benjamin Kaduk]
+
+ *) Add SM2 base algorithm support.
+ [Jack Lloyd]
*) s390x assembly pack: add (improved) hardware-support for the following
cryptographic primitives: sha3, shake, aes-gcm, aes-ccm, aes-ctr, aes-ofb,
SSL_set_ciphersuites()
[Matt Caswell]
- *) Memory allocation failures consistenly add an error to the error
+ *) Memory allocation failures consistently add an error to the error
stack.
[Rich Salz]
reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not
be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway.
- NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's
+ NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have its
own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not
used by default when no-err is given.
[Richard Levitte]
Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]
*) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of
- memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will
+ memory from its contents. This is done with a counter that will
place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve
two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing
compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can
*) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0
bytes sent in the client random.
[Edward Bishop <ebishop@spyglass.com>]
-
projects / oweals / openssl.git / blobdiff